Taverns and Drinking in Early America, by Sharon V. Salinger –

A Review, by Matthew Lipscomb

            Taverns and Drinking in Early America, by Sharon V. Salinger, serves to, ironically, uncork the bottle on the history of alcohol from an arguably interesting standpoint. The issue of alcohol, as it relates to culture, history, and social impact, has been a frequent and growing topic for historians. Perhaps brought on by the immanent, cultural documentarian Ken Burns and his award winning series Prohibition – there is now a growing body of work that respectively cuts at the issues from various different angles.  For Example, The search for God and Guinness, by Stephen Mansfield explains and defends the folksy axiom that “Guinness is not just good for you  -it’s good for the world.” In doing so – it argues that the Guinness brand helped combat drunkenness by providing a less intoxicating choice and also created a benchmark standard for a corporate culture of both corporate integrity and excellence towards it’s employees – essentially contextualizing and then subsequently applying the recent increase in the ambient cultural interest in alcohol history and the public awareness of a growing sense of corporate malfeasance as being the new normative standard for many modern companies.  Salinger, likewise, chooses a certain vector by which to advance a contribution – choosing to historically extrapolate the relationships and influences of tavern culture in respect to both travelers and their drinking and lodging accommodations. Salinger seeks to explore these roles from sociological and cultural standpoints while exploring the culture of inn-staying travelers and drinking in the larger culture, as it related to the taverns that accompanied these inns (5). She historically charts the origins, changes, and the historical and cultural transformations taking place through which the culture was both changed and sustained.

            Salinger’s first chapter explores the origins of American Tavern Drinking Culture, the laws regulating it (22), the roles of women (23) and its relationships with various trades, such a mariners (39). An important topic that is also covered is the legislations related to and the devastating impact of alcohol upon the American Indian tribes (27). Salinger also sees the origins of tavern culture through various sectarian traditions (Puritan, for example) and those secular as well. Salinger also covers the tradition of credit, as it relates to the budding economic hegemony of the colonies and tavern culture (42).

            Salinger’s second chapter explores the organized culture that evolved within port-situated taverns: the fabric of local community that essentially evolved – secondary to their generally intentioned purpose, which was for travelers (58). Salinger shows how other cultural edifices, such as how gaming (gambling), eventually also evolved (58) and how Taverns also become known for fraternities/clubs that came to often be organized within them (76). Salinger’s third chapter covers the subsequent attempts at combating consequential drunkenness from non-sectarian (136) and sectarian (102) legislative provinces and the consequences of their sometimes-differing presuppositional ideological dispositions/predilections in terms of tolerance and/or their desire to prevent it. In her fourth chapter, Salinger reviews the topic of legal prosecution, again, from nonsectarian (123) and then sectarian (136) ideological biases from different legal provinces & states. Chapter six expands her analysis of the legal questions as they relate to licensing where she examines the associated procedures as they related to community density and revenue (153), the qualifications that were established for accepting or denying licenses (159), how the issues affected women contextually, and what she titles as the questions of the “vagaries and Inconsistencies” that plagued any attempted legislative efforts in terms of the comprehensiveness of their application, integrity in quality, and fairness in their overall affect. She examines these problems from a ‘law-creation’ standpoint and then from that of a ‘law-effect’ one (173). Chapter six examines the subsequent question of were there too many taverns and the associated demographics and laws related to their oversight and regulatory planning, initially in port cities (184) and then later in outlying towns and rural areas (199).

            In Chapter seven, Salinger covers the issues of the proverbial ‘tavern degenerate’ – and the legislations and cultural dynamics associated with those who abused alcohol on a relatively consistent basis (211). Of interest, is Salinger’s relating of the American custom of travelers often sleeping in the same bed with likewise-traveling strangers (215) and the discomfort and aggravation that this caused foreign travelers who were always completely taken back by the practice (212). Salinger further explores both the social interaction dynamics and the questions related to the propagation of ‘gendered spaces’ (220). Salinger makes an effort to explore how gender, class, and wealth differences combined with different attitudes present in such individuals, pervasive as thy were across such social and cultural strata, as they related to the abuse or ‘presuppositionally proper means’ of enjoying alcohol. She traces the rapid and evolving differences (226) that transpire initially in situ, in various different contexts – such as port taverns – and then, later, other outliers; such as rural contexts and the like.

            One potential weakness in Salinger’s Taverns and Drinking is that it falls under the same rubric of ‘General History’ – which to many people is simply indelibly boring. A contrast to this, for example, is the before mentioned book by Mansfield, The Search for God and Guinness – which, essentially, revolves around the presumption that there is a built-in demographic of ardent Guinness lovers who simply love all things Guinness and, therefore, a history of the beer brand and its relation to pretty much anything immediately becomes a topic of intense fascination to a huge number of people. Salinger’s book, on the other hand, appeals to a smaller, much less pedestrian and much more academic crowd – and this is genuinely unfortunate.  It seems that Salinger may be trying to put too much in for too many people. Feminist and gender studies are very popular – perhaps she could have made this the central theme – as it is inserted in almost every context that she explores, or even (for the beneficence of Postcolonial scholarship), she could have focused on the impact and history of Alcohol and the American Indian. That said, however – Taverns and Drinking stands on its own as a definitive and valuable contribution to that which it simply presents itself as – and is definitely enjoyable for those who have the eyes and ears to see and hear the value that it brings to the table.

Tragedy and Triumph, Empire and Nativity – Exploring the Life of Native American Convert Samson Occom through the Dialectical Historiography Method: Analyzing the Conflicts of the Central but Apposing Metanarratives of His Life.

Submitted by Matthew Lipscomb

Religion in the Age of Wesley, Whitefield, and Edwards,

Spring 2012, REL/HIST 4999,

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Dr. Jonathan M. Yeager, 4/18/2012

Introduction: Subject, Method, and Goal

            The little round box had languished in obscurity for decades, covered both in dust and intricately carved adornments, its origin and purpose unknown to the curators of the Peabody Essex Museum in Salem, Massachusetts.  It was not until emissaries of the Mohegan Nation came to visit one day in 1995 that it was recognized as something of profound importance. The visitors sent a picture of it to an aged, tribal medicine woman in their nation, Gladys Tantaquidgeon, and it was only then – through her deep knowledge of the tribe and its troubled, convoluted past – that its secrets were finally unlocked. Tantaquidgeon recognized that a story was being told in the designs that had been inlaid upon the bark by long-dead Native American craftsmen. It was a history of the Mohegan tribe, as told through the manner of the ancients and sent as a gift by a certain, venerated individual, to his sister, Lucy Occom Tantaquidgeon.  That man was one Samson Occom: a pivotal individual in an immensely conflicted and wrenchingly turbulent time for both the Mohegan tribe and the entirety of the colonial world. Occom lived in a time of extreme opposites that in turn defined, shaped, and controlled his world. This essay will attempt to explore these opposites without disregarding their extremes, through a dialectical[1] approach. The attempt will be made to make use of what is essentially a relatively old historical method. It will be applied to an equally old historical individual, to unlock and interpret a true relevance and meaning for his time. It is through the juxtaposition of these conflicts that the dialectical method will be shown as the best way to understand the profound importance of Occom and the critical roles he played in the respective theaters of colonial religion, culture, and politics.

An Introductory Note on Method: Understanding Dialectical Historiography

            The dialectical method used here comes from the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770 – 1831). For Hegel, the crucial aspects of life revolved around events or concepts that were in opposition to one another: those things that we could observe (phenomenal)[2] vs. those things that were potentially beyond our senses (noumenon),[3] and the interplay between what could seem sensible on one hand vs. that which may or may not be able to be understood on its own. For Hegel, the interplay of these formed a new process or a new creative space[4] for understanding what he then termed the ‘dialectic.’ Hegel believed dialectic served as a tool for intuition into the intellectual content of an idea as well as a ways and means of authentic and meaningful cognitive reflection into the larger essence of both the structured meaning (philosophy) and an approachable rhetorical assimilation (definition) of not just the respective, conflicting ideas/situations, but the larger context within which they were mutually and sometimes irrevocably conjoined.[5] Hegel believed that by employing this process of contrasting extremes, a more authentic and meaningful penetration into the essence or nature of the potential understandability of the reality of the situation or the individual could be grasped; much more so then that which was attainable through traditional or conventional ways of doing philosophy. In the following sections an exploration will be attempted across five different contexts of the respective conflicts that Occom found in his historical situation. If this method is successful, then we will see both Occom and each of his situations in profoundly different but much more powerful and insightful ways.

            It should be noted that applying the dialectical method to historical interpretation (dialectical historiography) is only one method among many. Other methods that are often used include Early Colonialist (Pre-modern),[6] Marxist,[7] Postcolonialist,[8] and even Postmodern[9] historiographies. Examples in currently available historical research related to Occom (which have also been employed here) include Dana D. Nelson’s essay ‘ “(I Speak Like A Fool But I Am Constrained)” Samson Occom’s Short Narrative of the Racial Self,’ in Helen Jaskowski’s Early Native American Writing – New Critical Essays, where she employs a Postcolonialist historiographical method to explore the power differential between individuals situated within the Empire and those who are potentially subjugated by it (in respective colonies) by the expansion of and effects of colonization.  A second example is Margaret Connell Szasz, in her introduction to W. DeLoss Love’s 1899 book on Occom entitled Samson Occom and the Christian Indians of New England. Szasz points out the essentially “pre-modern” view that served as Love’s way of understanding early Colonial History. Love would have been influenced by the notion of “manifest destiny” – or that it was essentially a divine right and worthy goal to colonize the world by through the expansion of ‘empire’, which in turn could possibly (as it often did) oppress differing cultures and impress their own values and other social and economic apparatuses upon them, usually to the colonized individual’s detriment. Throughout her introduction, Szasz praises Love’s work but then also points out what she views as its terrible flaws.

Dialectic One: Native vs. Puritan Religion, Occom’s Conversion to the Puritan Religion

             One very important conflict in Occom’s early life was between the religion of his Indian ancestors and that of the Puritan colonialists which he converted to.  Occom made clear that he considered his native religion to be a “heathen” religion.[10] Occom began his childhood immersed in both his native religious culture and his native language. He understood very little English, and neither did most of his fellow Indians that he knew as a child.[11] Occom recounted both the low level of agricultural and organizational sophistication of his native culture as well as how he was first exposed to the Christian faith.[12] Occom’s interest in the Christian religion was initially kindled by an awareness that there was something tremendous going on, amongst the Colonists and their religious meetings. A tangible excitement had infected everyone who heard about it.[13]

            In addition to this excitement, there was a second factor that figured into the conflict between Native and Colonial religious traditions: the natives’ belief that the power of their own shamans had been significantly weakened in its struggle against the religion of the Colonists. One seemed to be stronger than the other. In 1650, a well-known shaman converted when his guardian spirit, which was that of a snake, was unable to injure the first convert in Martha’s Vineyard named Hiacoomes.[14] Occom very much believed in the power and efficacy of this own native religion, even as he had taken note of its perceived lack of power against that of the Puritan colonists.  In 1761, he lived among the Montauk and served as a schoolteacher there. In describing the Montauk shamans, he writes:

As for the Powaws, they say they get their art from…the devil,. But then partly by dreams or night visions, and partly by the devil’s immediate appareance to them by various shapes; sometimes in the shape of one creature, sometimes in another, sometimes by taking a voice…  And I don’t see for my part, why it is not as true, as the English or other nations’s witchcraft, but is a great mystery of darkness. [15]

            Occom’s transition from the Indian to Puritan religion was marked by an intense six months of having a personal feeling of experiencing great darkness and deep, intense struggle within his heart.[16] His conversion marked a change not just in his spiritual condition but also his understanding for a need to gain an education – specifically, how to speak the English language.

After I was awakened and converted…I began to Learn the English Letters; got me a Primer, and used to go to my English Neighbors Frequently for Assistance in Reading…[17]

            On December 6, 1743, Occom traveled to Lebanon Crank, Connecticut, to the home of Eleazar Wheelock with the goal of preparing for college. Occom spent four years with Wheelock, who proved to be a very important figure throughout Occom’s life. Occom continued to dive deeper into studies of his adopted religion, leaving Wheelock after four years to study under Benjamin Pomeroy in Hebron, Connecticut. Under Pomeroy’s tutelage, Occom moved farther past the relative simplicity of his native religion and into much greater sophistication. Setting the ambitious goal of attending Yale, he studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.[18]  The first of two significant frustrations to his religious advancement plagued him in 1749, as he was unable to continue his studies due to debilitating eyestrain: his own health did not allow him to proceed.[19] Occom also encountered a second considerable frustration that would plague his ability to see things through to the completion he hoped for in his heart: racism. Years later, in a letter from 1768, he bemoans his bishops reluctance to support his missions work, and he tells his superiors:

It seems to that they are very indifferent whether the poor Indians go to Heaven or to Hell. I can’t help my thoughts; and I am apt to think they don’t want the Indians to go to Heaven with them.[20]

            For Occom, the embrace and growth in of his adopted religion brought him many opportunities. But it is was also a harbinger of further complexities and even more oppositions that would eventually darken and deeply challenge him in future years.

Dialectic Two: The Politics of Empire – Religious vs. Political ambitions the Mohegan-mason land and Brotherton Lands ordeals

            In addition to religious conflict, Occom lived in a time of tremendous political controversy. Occom’s tribe – the Mohegans – was an offshoot of the Uncas tribe.[21] Long before Occom was born, the Mohegans had been involved in political conflicts, which served to create their identity as a people. In the early years of colonization, the Mohegans had become friends with the United Puritan Colonies and helped fight against the Narragansett in King Phillips war and then later in the American Revolution.[22]

            The source of the controversy began when the tribal founder, Uncas, deeded all Mohegan lands to his patron John Mason. It was generally understood by the tribe that Uncas did this as a preemptive measure so that he could help assure political stability insofar as the land would then be in a trust. Connecticut eventually stated they in fact owned it all, and that they were the final arbiters of the land’s use and its general leasing policy. In 1671, Mason created a large tract known as the Sequestered Lands. The descendants of Mason and many fellow Mohegans sought royal control rather than colonial, and the Connecticut assembly wound up supporting the generational control by sachems. But this eventually split the Mohegans. By 1740 most of the tribe of 400 had converted to Christianity and owned 5,000 acres. However, due to the number of white settlers who had moved into areas and then fenced them off, they were unable to practice their traditional hunter-gatherer means of economic and culinary self-sustenance.[23] Amid this ongoing, inter-generational controversy, Occom became an advocate for those who apposed the traditional, linage-mediated leadership of the sachems because he knew that ultimately it meant that the state of Connecticut was in control and not the tribe.  Occom became so involved in the controversy that he was eventually accused of heresy because of it in 1765.  Occom apologized for his political activities and was later acquitted.[24]

            But these huge conflicting oppositions left huge marks upon Occom. To preserve what he could of his native lands in the face of continued conflict with advancing settlement of native lands, Occom synthesized new strategies and new ways of dealing with continuing conflicts, in what could be argued to be a true Dialectic. Occom’s “synthesis” was to place greater emphasis on education in terms of knowledge and pacifism in terms of war and political allegiances.  

The grand controversy which has subsisted between the colony of Connecticut and the Mohegan Indians above seventy years, is finally decided in favor of the colony. I am afraid the poor Indians will never stand a good chance with the English in their land controversies; because they are very poor, they have no money, Money is almighty now-a-days; and the Indians have no learning, no wit, no cunning: the English have all.[25]

            When the Revolutionary War began, Occom seemed to draw upon his experience in the conflicts of politics throughout his lifetime in that he enjoined his fellow Indian brethren to declare neutrality, arguing that the right decision was “not to meddle with the Family Contentions of the English but will be at peace and quietness, Peace never does any hurt, Peace is from the God of Peace and Love…Jesus Christ is the Prince of Peace.”[26]

 Dialectic Three: The Dynamics of Personal Identity in Occom as Native vs. Intellectual.

            Samuel Occom could change his religious faith, his clothes, his occupation, his deportment and even his language, but he could not change the fact that he was a Native American. Because of who he was, he was often asked to visit different places, such as London in December of 1765. He was there for two and a half years, working with Nathaniel Whitaker. The trip had been organized by the Rev. Eleazar Wheelock with the express purported goal of raising money for his project of Moore’s Indian Charity School.[27]

            Occom’s experience in London highlighted the two separate identities that he held existentially in tension.  His appearance as a theological sophisticate, who had learned to speak English well and had studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew,[28] spurred an ordination offer by the Episcopalians who were moved and impressed by his impassioned sermons.[29] He preached between 200 to 300 exhorations[30] and collected seven thousand pounds in newly raised funds for what he thought would be the Indian school.[31]

            But for all his rhetorical skills and education, he was still simply a savage in the eyes of many others. He generated a great stir insofar as he was openly lampooned, not just on the street corners, but in the London Theaters, where normally one would assume the highest acolytes of advanced society would have rather spoken their graces.  But Occom heard only ridicule and derisions from their stages.  In a 1771 letter to Wheelock,[32] Occom described himself as being “gazing stocke, yea even a Laughing Stocke.”

            Occom’s reaction, however, is dialectical. He retreated into neither extreme, but instead formulated a new space to inhabit existentially.  He did not stubbornly defend his intellectual vigor (he refused the offer of the Episcopalians) nor did he simply resign himself to be a fool. His movement/synthesis is that he resigns himself to be a fool for Christ, perhaps knowing that a Godly-oriented intellect is sure to be foolish in the eyes of any fellow man.

If I was no fully Persuaded and Asure’d that this work was of god, and I had had an undoubted Call of god to Come over into this Country, I wou’d not have come over, like a fool as I did, without any Countenance from our Board, but I am Will Still to be a fool for Christ Sake – this Eleviats my Heart amidst all my Burdens, and Balances all my Sorrows at Times, or enables me to bear my Trials, that I am in the way of my Duty, and the Lord use me in any Shape to promote his kingdom in the World[33]

            In Dana D. Nelson’s essay on Occom, she suggests that in Occom’s words “…and the Lord use me in any Shape to promote his kingdom in the World,” provides a window into the pain induced by the aforementioned intellectual vs. native dialectic-conflict/synthesis.  It is understood that Occom came back from the trip a very different man.[34] The force of these two natures and his process of dealing with them had begun to have an effect on a second set of contradictions in his life and experience.

Dialectic Four: The Dynamics of Personal Identity in Occom as Native vs. Colonist, His Eventual Break with Wheelock

            Although Occom had worked with Wheelock for 28 years – since his early days in Wheelock’s home as a young student – his return from London marked a change in their relationship.[35]  Wheelock argued that the seminary would be better built in New Hampshire,[36] much to Occom’s dismay. Occom saw the fruits of his labor evaporate before his eyes.

            In Nelson’s essay, she argues for a Postcolonialist, Historiographical method as being the most proper to understand Occom, arguing that both his behavior within the colonial empire during his early years, and his break with Wheelock in his later years, represent an acknowledgement of his own oppression by the ‘colonial empire dynamic,’ which “creates a game he can’t win.”[37]

            What follows, however, is arguably another ‘synthesis,’ in that Occom neither embraces the assumed structures of colonial life for Indians (which would be represented by a continued subservience to Wheelock) and neither does he reject its Christian message. He again charts another course – even in the greatest of difficulty – in the face of imperialism and racism.  In his Narrative Occom tells a parable after questioning why other missionaries were paid 12 times more per year.

I can’t think of any thing, but this as a Poor Indian Boy Said, Who was Bound out to an English Family, and he used to Drive Plow for a young man, and he whipt and Beat him almost every Day, and the young man found fault with him and Complained of him to his master and the poor Boy was Called to answer for himself before his master, and he was asked, what it was he did, and that he was So Complained of and beat almost every Day. He Said, he did not know, but he Supposed it was because he could not drive any better; but says he, I Drive as well as I know how; and at other Times he Beats me, because he is of a mind to beat me: but says he believes he Beats me for most of the time “because I am an Indian.[38]

            Nelson argues that Occom sees himself “as that beaten Indian boy, carrying out his mission of Christianizing and civilizing for the benefit of the colony as well, he says, ‘as I know how.’ “ This, again, is Occom finding a new place to exist, sandwiched between two imposing realities: the grace that he finds in the Christian faith and the harshness of colonial imperialism and its correlating, intrinsic racism. Occom moves on, continuing to minister to his people, but outside of the structures, wishes, and imperatives of the organization (the colonial religious structure) and the personality (Wheelock) that gave birth to him.

Now you See what difference they made between me and other missionaries; they gave me 180 Pounds for 12 years Service, which they gave for one years Services in another Mission, —In my Service (I speak like a fool, but I am Constrained) I was my own Interpreter. I was both a School master and a Minister to the Indians, yea I was their Ear, Eye & Hand, as Well as Mouth, I leave it with the World, as wicked as it is, to Judge, whether I ought not to have had half as much… [39]

            Eventually, Wheelocks’ terrible treatment of Occom would become legendary and Occom would move his tribe into what he hoped would eventually be the safety of Oneida, N.Y.,[40] essentially leaving behind all of his former, white, evangelical support.[41]

Dialectic Five: The struggle with cultural idioms & artifacts both native and foreign, Occom’s struggle with alcohol and racism.

            Some of the strongest oppositional forces that Occom struggled to mitigate were related to the respective cultures that he found himself within. He was a child of Indian culture, yet he was also an adopted son of the Puritans.  Although Occom could find or resolve for himself an otherwise transcendent or multifaceted relation to both of the cultures that eventually defined him, it was not always easy for those around him to understand this “place” that he had arrived for himself in an existential or otherwise personal way. He was often subjected to inordinately repetitious explanations of Indian cultural life by both the curious but genuinely benign, and also by the malignant, condescendingly reactionary, racist individuals he often encountered.[42] There was never an end of potential things to talk about for both the inquisitive and the hateful that he encountered, as even the naming of newborn children was different between the cultures.[43] Occom no doubt welcomed and enjoyed the intellectually engaged individuals who were fascinated by what was otherwise an authentically cultural, dialectical space that he had painstakingly and creatively synthesized to inhabit for himself. For others, however, there was no allowable place for such “existential innovation;” his existence was a harsh deviation from inalterable presuppositions. He was simply intolerable in his very existence as an Indian convert. In a letter to Eleazar Wheelock dated March 17, 1769, Occom wrote “…sometimes – them pretended Christians are seven times worse then the Savage Indians…”[44]

            Indeed, Wheelock seemed to fall suspect to this line of thinking, when instead he spent the money that had been raised for purposes of missions to the Indians on the founding of Dartmouth College. Wheelock argued that Indian education has become an altogether useless endeavor, citing Occom’s own occasional drunkenness.[45] Alcohol had indeed become a very common stumbling block for ministers who were not immune to the dangers of alcohol addiction and abuse. Another Indian convert who became a Baptist minister, Samuel Ashbow (1718-95) established a reputation as being an advocate for temperance – but he also himself went through periods where he struggled with alcohol.[46] In a sermon entitled “Wo Unto Him That Givest His Neighbour Drink,” Occom writes:

This is the Miserable Situation if mankind, he is now prone to all manner of Sin, – alas, Where is man and What is man? The most Nobel Creature is become the most Ignoble Creature, from being almost an Angel, is become a Divil, – and amoungst the various committed, Drunkenness is one of the Worst, yet it is growing amongst all all Nations. – – –[47]

            Occom never denied this struggle that was taking place within him, regarding ‘white man’s drink’. In a letter dated January 4, 1769 Occom writes to the Connecticut Board of Correspondents of the Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge (SPCK) and said:

As I Stand in Connection to you, So I find it my Duty to make my Faults know to you.  – I have been shamefully over taken With Strong Drink, by Which I have greatly Wounded the Cause of God, and Blemished the Pure Religion of Jesus Christ, and blackened my own Character, and brought a reproach on the ministry…[48]

            In March of that same year, Occom writes Wheelock to says

I don’t remember that I have been overtaken with strong drink this winter, but many White people make no bones of it to call me a drunkard, and I expect it, as I have many enemies round about here, yea they call me a lyar and rogue and what not, and they curse & damn me to the lowest Hell. [49]

            Occom was acquitted essentially because he had openly confessed to his struggle,[50] but then again in 1770 Wheelock received more letters that Occom was again struggling with alcohol[51] in a “public and aggravated manner.”[52] Two of Occom’s friends – John Thornton, Esq. and David McClure – responded to his defense. Thornton wrote to Wheelock “Pray my dear Sir, use him tenderly, for I am much mistaken if his heart is not right with God.” McClure echoes Thornton in telling Wheelock, “The crimes of intemperance…with which he has been charged are very much extenuated by the temptations that he was under.” Wheelock’s faith in him was broken – and he considered Occom to be a lost cause, as he has already lost a number of his other boy schoolmasters to alcoholism. [53]

            After his break with Wheelock following the London trip, he engaged himself to work with other Native American leaders in New England to migrate many of the Christian Indians to live among the Oneidas in New York. Occom did this with the express purpose of shielding them from outside influence and non-Indian leadership,[54] which despite their many blessings on his own life, he had come to see as also a great burden and disappointment.

Conclusions – Interpreting the Contours of Occom’s life through a Dialectical Light

            Just like Occom’s box, much of history and its meaning can become buried, out of sight and out of mind for forthcoming generations of historians. The hustle and bustle of the now settles like dust, obscuring our connections with our pasts, and in turn, subsequently, our own selves. We may look at them, but because we don’t care to look differently their secrets remain obscured and unknown. The character and story of Samson Occom remains a subject that bears the worth of our renewed consideration and attention and just like the carvings on his box which told a story in their own, ancient, traditional method we can gain an understanding of his history by dialectically tracing the contours of the opposing conflicts of his own life carved upon him by the difficulties and conflicts he endured. His life then becomes a box of carvings that can themselves be read dialectically and with a new and before unseen light. Far from being insignificant, the story of his life bears a torchlight that can be carried into the dark, troubling questions of his time. And like his carvings without the generationally imparted interpretive skills of a tribal elder – without dialectic – they cannot be understood. They cannot speak. Being both an Indian and a Christian convert, he authentically straddled between two worlds, and through a Dialectical Historiography, his torch is significantly brighter and more informative than many other characters who did not face such monumental, cultural, existential, and religious impositions, subsequent choices and/or syntheses. In tracing these conflicts dialectically, we can appropriate a much deeper understanding for ourselves all of the issues and challenges of that time; much more than we could, otherwise, with other historical methods or arguably even other historical individuals.

            In a world that continued to seemingly shrink, both economically and culturally, Occom strove to preserve his native identities while still pushing forward with his own. He struggled to be both multicultural and yet to still embrace and celebrate his own culture. In many ways he succeeded. In a few ways – he failed. Occom’s life shows that even in the midst of tremendous oppositional choices and realties, it was and still is possible to boldly move forward through tragedy to find triumph and pain to find success. This is the greatest value that Occom can bring us: any hope that we may try to find for the present is always also critically rooted in the past. If we forsake an understanding of the struggles and contentions, resolutions and syntheses, personal identities and national agendas of the past, we may in fact forsake not just a deeper knowledge of the contradicted past, but also a profound knowledge of our own conflicted future.

Bibliography

Britannica, Encylopedia. “Merriam Webster Online Dictionary.” Phenomenal – Definition from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 2012 йил 12-April. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phenomenal.

—. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. 2012 йил 12-April. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noumenon.

Cambridge Studies in American Literature and Culture. Early Native American Writing – New Critical Essays. Edited by Helen Jaskowski. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

DeForrest, John William. History of the Indians of Connecticut From the Earliest Known Period to 1850. Connecticut Historical Society. New Haven, CT: Nabu Public Domain Reprints, 1851.

Frederick Copleston, S. J. A History of Philosophy. Vol. Third. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1985.

Graff, Barzun. The Modern Researcher. Vol. Fourth. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985.

Kidd, Thomas S. The Great Awakening – The Root of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial American. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

Love, W. Deloss. Samson Occom and the Christian Indians of New England. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

Oxford University Press. The Collected Writings of Samson Occom, Mohegan – Leadership and Literature in Eighteenth-Century Native America. Edited by Joanna Brooks. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Poster, Mark. Cultural History + Postmodernity – Disciplinary Readings and Challenges. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Simmons, William S. Spirits of New England Tribes – Indian History and Folklore, 1620-1984. London: University Press of New England, 1986.

University of Oklahoma Press. American Indian Nonfiction. Edited by Bernd C. Peter. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007.

Matthew Lipscomb

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

REL 4999, Religion in the time of Edwards, Wesley and Whitfield

London Yale University Press.  615 pp.  $25.00 (paper), ISBN 0-300-09693-3.

         Jonathan Edwards – A Life, by George M. Marsden, represents one of the best examinations of Jonathan Edwards amid an ever-growing body of Edwardsian scholarship. In it, Marsden explores the life and times of one of Evangelicalisms foremost fathers though the lenses of his historical background, his personality, his writings, and the many and multifaceted individuals and events that shaped and guided him. Through Marsden’s exploration of the life of Jonathan Edwards – we can see more clearly the reasons that Edwards holds his fatherly focus from within multiple echelons of Evangelical history: he is a father to those who studiously examine theology, to those who wrestle with their faith, to those who embrace science as an important and equal aspect when properly understood, and more so importantly – all those who love to expound secondly on the justice and truth of God, but primarily – and, for them, more importantly – the sweet grace of God.

         It must be conceded, however, that any book can be found wanting in some inventive-to-the-reader regard. No book can cover everything in such comprehensive detail whereas to be sufficient for everyone, everywhere, and concerning everything. But Marsden comes as close to a gold standard as can be considered possible. Marsden allows a detailed – yet approachable writing style that benefits both the seminary student and the blue-collar deacon. When Marsden describes why Edwards might have had “too dim a view on human nature” by telling us that there were various horrific murders by the hands of his own relatives – and that his grandmother was “an incorrigible profligate” (22) – we can almost see Marsden winking at us through the pages; too respectful to use the word ‘slut’ – too honest to leave it out.  Though Marsden may use eloquent language to innocuously avoid the rhetorical banality of the more crass & common descriptor for Edward’s grandmother – Marsden keeps his language otherwise remarkably accessible and open.

         This avoidance of seminarian jargon is especially helpful when covering the topics of how and why Calvinists believe that God’s grace cannot be controlled (28), the sovereignty of God in Edward’s theology (11), his polemics against Arminianism (87-88), Edward’s belief in how and why the Universe actually exists (77), Edwards thoughts on then-modern social conundrums – such as Slavery (255) and the American Indians (174-175, 390), and many others.

         A second strength in Marsden’s book is the varieties of lenses through which Marsden provides us images of Edwards. Marsden does in fact us a historical accounting of Edwards – as would be normally expected of any biographer. However, Marsden shows his true biographical mastery in further existentially refracting Edwards through the prisms of both his philosophy and his love of science. We are entreated to not just a theologian, philosopher, and scientist – but also a true revolutionary. When Marsden describes how Edwards understands the idea of Intertrinitarian (488) and Redemptive Love (4, 192-194) the nature of the Universe (74) and how he believed it to have been literally created for the communication of divine love to mankind (77), we see a picture of a man who can hardly be described succinctly as a fire & brimstone preacher – but, more so, an outspoken and tireless advocate and apostle of God’s Love.

         Marsden shows us a theologian who has both Love and the idea of the Sovereignty of God at the forefront of his mind (11), a scientist who studies Newton & (72) and a philosopher who has both wrestled with Liebniz (72) and the age-old question of the role of language (221). Through Marsden we see a man who is as apt to contemplate both how light works (75) and how the world works in cosmic terms (88) as much as he is driven to contemplate the deep mysteries of God.

         But are there ‘mysteries’ about Edwards that Marsden could have attempted an exploration of?  Much greater understanding has been reached in regards to certain types of Autism – such as Asperger’s Syndrome. Many historical characters, such as Albert Einstein and Thomas Edison have been psychologically recontextualized, in light of different assumptions of personality and behavioral norms. Most historians agree that both Einstein and Edison were very likely ‘Aspies’ – as the Asperger’s community often refers to its members as in terms of being. Marsden’s assertions that Edwards seemingly possessed ‘no middle gears’ (39) and that he set virtually impossible standards for himself (34) would seem as classic tell-tale signs of Aspergian behavior; a tendency to hyper-focus and not adequately manage a proper level of attention across one’s responsibilities – those both great and those small – as well as a life built around logic and idealism vs. emotion. Perhaps Edwards’ fixation on the emotion and love of God echoed out of his own struggle to properly understand and appropriate his own (Aspies tend to understand and feel love from a logical progression & appropriated nature vs. an ecstatic and/or emotional loci). A Detailed analysis, from the perspective of an authoritative biographical master such as Marsden, would have arguably been a significant contribution to Edwardsian scholarship.

         But a masterpiece is defined by it’s own summation – not the list of things that could have been, or should have been – by the ever-changing standards of other scholars and laypersons.  Within Marsden’s book we can find more then enough to chew on about Edward’s life then we can likely expend within our own lifetime. And it is in the benefit of such digestion – that Marsden’s mastery makes it own case. Edward’s does not just belong to his own time – he belongs to ours as well – and of those future generations to come, who will struggle, fight and overcome frustrations, fears, and challenges – just as Edward’s did in his own age. 

Lantern Carriers of Different Lights:

The Evangelical Response to the New Atheists.

In his work The Gay Science[1], Nietzsche writes of a mad atheist who enters into a village of fellow atheists who are all clueless as to the full ramification of their belief. Surely there is, in our own present time, no short supply of lantern-carrying atheists who are dead-set upon their own quests to “illuminate” those of us from the presupposed ‘bondages’ of religion. Often referred to as “The New Atheists,” they practice a form of Materialist Atheism in that they vehemently deny any potential metaphysical or non-rational ontology. There is, in their view, nothing beyond the potential of science or reason that one is either able, or should even attempt to grasp.  It is the goal of this paper to try to ‘find a lantern,’ with the intended purpose of shedding some light into this conflict. We will examine three works by different advocates for each respective side. For the side of Materialist Atheism: God is not Great – How Religion Poisons Everything by Christopher Hitchens, The End of Faith – Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason by Sam Harris, and The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins. While there has been a general response across the entire theologial/ideologial continuum, this project will focus on the response of the Evangelical segment. Reponses examined will include: Atheism Remix by R. Albert Mohler Jr, The Twilight of Atheism – The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World by Alister McGrath, and The End of Reason – A Response to the New Atheists by Ravi Zacharias.

Materialist Atheist Selection #1: Christoper Hitchens’s God is Not Great, How Religion Poisons Everything

The first book that we will consider is a popular work by the author Christopher Hitchens. Hitchens has a well-deserved reputation as a hard-biting polemicist and his style is definitely not hidden in his book. In the introduction, entitled Putting It Mildly, Hitchens makes clear that he is not doing this because of some kind of grave injustice perpetrated upon him: “I am inflicting all this upon you because I am not one of those whose chance at wholesome belief was destroyed by child abuse or brutish indoctrination.”[2] Hitchens goes on to elaborate on what he proposes to be his “four irreducible objections to religious faith.” That it 1) wholly represents the origins of man and the cosmos,” and that 2) “because of this error it manages to combine the maximum of servility with the maximum of solipsism,” 3) “that it is both the result and the cause of dangerous sexual repression,” and 4) “that it is ultimately grounded on wish-thinking.” Hitchens then describes what might be considered a functionally nihilist ideological ontology, by making a self-referential description of the thought he espouses and that of others, or so he says, who like him trumpet that: “Our belief is not a belief. Our principles are not a faith. We do not rely on science and reason, because these are necessary rather then sufficient factors, but we distrust anything that contradicts science or outrages reason.”[3] He goes on to indirectly make the Anti-Foundationalist/Marxist/Critical Theory assertion of language: that language essentially “goes all the way down”[4] – in that he asserts that they (i.e., Materialist Atheists[5]) believe that “(s)erious ethical dilemmas are better handled by Shakespeare and Tolstoy and Schiller and Dostoyevsky and George Elliot then in the mystical morality tales of the holy books. Literature, not scripture, sustains the mind and – since there is no other metaphor – also the soul.”[6] Hitchens adds that he believes the beauty of their belief is that they are open and have disagreements between themselves. “We may differ on many things, but what we respect is free inquiry, open-mindedness, and the pursuit of ideas for their own sake. We do not hold to our convictions dogmatically…” In a characteristically derogatory tone, he adds that “There is no need for us to gather every day, or every seven days, or on any high and auspicious day, to proclaim our rectitude or to grovel and wallow in our unworthiness.”[7] Hitchens seemingly never misses a beat when it comes to an opportunity to make a snide or haughty remark. He does, however, perhaps begrudgingly refer to as “great” past Christian painters, composers and thinkers such as “Augustine, Aquinas, Maimonides, and Newman,” but appends his comments with

These mighty scholars may have written many evil and foolish things, and been laughably ignorant of the germ theory of disease or the place of the globe in the solar system, let alone the universe, and this is the plain reason why there are no more of them today, and why there will be no more of them tomorrow. Religion spoke it’s last intelligible or noble or inspiring words a long time ago: either that or it mutated into an admirable or nebulous humanism…[8]

He goes on to assert the traditional Feuerbachian interpretation[9] of religion: that it essentially is a reflection of man’s own idealism[10] and that science is much more interesting then any theology or biblical history.[11] He concludes with gratuitous apologies for both Marx[12] and Freud,[13] and that religion is to be enjoyed[14] but only from a historical context, echoing Daniel Dennett’s commentary of seeing religion as only having value from a histori-cultural context.[15]

Later chapters include lurid titles such as Religion Kills, in which he proposes to outline the various atrocities (both past and ongoing) that are uniquely particular to religious matters such as the Serbian Conflict, The Crusades, Baghdad, Bethlehem, and the catholic/protestant conflicts in Belfast, Ireland. He goes on to talk about dietary laws, in A Short Digression on the Pig; or, Why Heaven Hates Ham. Hitchens attempts to expand the discussion from the culinary to the issue of health in chapter 4, A Note on Health, to Which Religion Can Be Hazardous, in which he proposes that religion is largely to blame for the continued spread of AIDS, pestilence and the continued practice of distinctly unhygienic religious rituals.[16] Hitchens, in chapter 5 entitled The Metaphysical Claims of Religion, argues that because religion comes from the past, it represents an uneducated view of reality – a past that essentially represents ‘the bawling and fearful infancy of our species…” and therefore, is “a babyish attempt to meet our inescapable demand for knowledge (as well as comfort, reassurance and other infantile needs).” Hitchens also explores the Evolution vs. Intelligent Design debate in Chapter 5, citing what he claims to be obviously flawed or ridiculous and/or inefficient aspect of our physical state.[17] He then makes his case for atrocities both in the Old[18] and the New Testaments,[19]as well as for the nature and origin of the Koran.[20] In The Tawdriness of the Miraculous, he cites various situations where things that were proposed to be supernatural, but were in fact perfectly normal. He cites examples employed in the process of making Mother Teresa a Saint,[21] the “notorious” annual liquefaction of the blood of San Gennaro in Naples, [22] as well as how other religions have used various effects of nature to ‘over-reach’ them as being spiritual or metaphysical in origin.[23] He argues that the beginnings of religion are almost always corrupt,[24] and that religion, contrary to conventional wisdom, supposedly never makes people behave any better.[25] Nor does he find any value in Eastern Religion, as a suitable alternative,[26] and that because of such alleged precepts, which include:

• “Presenting a false picture of the world to the innocent and the credulous
• The doctrine of blood sacrifice
• The doctrine of atonement
• The doctrine of eternal reward and/or punishment
• The imposition of impossible tasks and rules.”

Hitchens argues that because of these “religion is not just amoral, but positively immoral.[27] He further argues that raising your child to be religious can certifiably be considered “child abuse”[28] and argues that a secularist ideal is always better then a religious one.[29] He counter-argues against many of the common counter-assertions given against it.[30] Hitchens concludes his book by arguing that what is needed is a “New Enlightenment” to essentially wash away the ‘damaging and deprecating vestiges’ of religion from the greater society of Man.[31]

Materialist Atheist Selection #2: Sam Harris’ The End of Faith – Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason

Sam Harris continues in the same style of Hitchens – in that he has no room for any allowance of “faith”  – or even the presumed reality of a metaphysical reality behind it. He opens his book with a chapter entitled Reason in Exile in which he argues that the essence of faith is the antithesis of reason.[32] Harris then argues that it is only “because the church has been politically hobbled in the West” that we have the ability to approximate reason in our day-to-day lives.[33] He argues that it is only through the gross and profound ignoring of the implications of the precepts of their own faith that modern people of faith are even able to live in the modern world,[34] and that idea of being fully reasonable, yet dedicated-to-one’s faith is a completely mythological state.[35] He cites numerous individuals who have openly declared to war between faith and reason to be officially over. [36]

In his chapter entitled The Nature of Belief, Hitchens has no use at all for the term “faith” which – for him – is “a belief in, and life orientation toward, certain historical and metaphysical presuppositions.”[37] Hitchens briefly engages Tillich, but describes him as being “parish of one” for trying to “cast away ‘idolatrous faith,’” arguing instead that the larger portion of Christianity embraces something much more crass and essentially non-philosophic in nature. For everybody else,

“The truth is that religious faith is simply unjustified belief in matters of ultimate concern – specifically in propositions that promise some mechanism by which human life can be spared the ravages of time and death.” [38]

In a chapter entitled In the Shadow of God, Hitchens goes to great lengths to explore the historical underbelly of the church, with references to the crusades, torture, inquisitions, and anti-Semitism; which he luridly describes as “integral to church doctrine as the flying buttress is to a Gothic cathedral, and this terrible truth has been published in Jewish blood since the first centuries of the common era.”[39] After thoroughly excoriating the historical role of the Christian church, he moves on to Muslims in a chapter entitled The Problem with Islam, which he describes as being “a fringe without a center.”

Harris then argues for a “science of good and evil.’ He says that the fact that “different times and cultures disagree about ethical questions should not trouble us,”[40] and that “if there are right and wrong answers to ethical questions, these answers will best be sought in the living present.”[41] He argues that

 “There will probably come a time when we achieve a detailed understanding of human happiness, and of ethical judgments themselves, at the level of the brain. A scientific understanding of the link between intentions, human relationships, and states of happiness would have much to say to about the nature of good and evil and about the proper response to the moral transgressions of others.[42]

Harris concludes his book with what seems to be an apologetic for the practice of mediation[43] and an extended quote which he “selected at random from a shelf of Buddhist Literature,” which he invites the reader to try to “find anything even remotely like this in the Bible or the Koran.”[44] In a section titled Afterword, he address the issue that this and other similar statements mark End of Faith as “not a truly atheistic book,” but rather a “stalking horse for Buddhism, New-Age mysticism, or some other form or irrationality.” Hichens defends his argument for the use of mediation by saying that it is not on par with an assumed sense of spirituality, but rather “requires that a person pay extraordinarily close to his moment-by-moment experience of the world.”[45]

Materialist Atheist Selection #3: Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion

Dawkins continues much in the same vein as Hitchens and Harris.  In a chapter entitled A Deeply Religious Non-Believer, he describes his position.

Human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain. An atheist in this sense of philosophical naturalist is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles – except in the sense of natural phenomena that we don’t yet understand.[46]

As a closing thought for the first chapter he states:

It is in the light of the unparalleled presumption of respect for religion that I make my own disclaimer for this book. I shall not go out of my way to offend, but nor shall I don kid gloves to handle religion any more gently then I would handle anything else.

It may be ironic to some, but in the very first paragraph of the next chapter, The God Hypothesis, he writes:

The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character of all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty, ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully. Those of us schooled from infancy in his ways can become desensitized to their horror.[47]

It does not take an overactive imagination to hear the responsive voice of any given reader, being seemingly reciprocally induced to chide the author with the trite & sarcastic, but commonly overheard hyperbolic phrase: “Please tell me Mr. Dawkins, how do you really feel about this?”

Dawkins then defines “The God Hypothesis,” which he seeks to argue against, as a belief that “there exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed us and created the universe and everything in it.”[48] Dawkins describes his opposing view: that “any creative intelligence, of sufficient complexity to design anything, comes into existence only as the end product of an extended process of evolution.”[49]

Dawkins goes on to attempt to prove the validity of the one assertion over the other, exploring the issues of secularism and faith/religion as they related to the Founding Fathers of the United States[50] as well as a study financed by the Templeton Foundation that purported to show the ineffectiveness of prayer in medical treatments.[51]

Dawkins then moves on to a chapter entitled Arguments For God’s Existence, in which he reviews many of the classic “proofs” for the existence of God. These are Thomas Aquinas’ five ‘proofs;’ The Unmoved Mover, The Uncaused Cause, The Cosmological Argument, The Argument from Degree, and The Teleological Argument, or Argument from Design.[52] He then discusses various other a priori/ontological arguments, and then ‘arguments from beauty,’ personal experience, and scripture. In the latter he explores a litany of supposed hard-to-deny inconsistencies within the Bible, citing various scholarly skeptics such as Bart Erhlman, Robin Layne Fox, and Jacques Berlinebalau. [53] He then cites and responds to “Pascal’s Wager,” as well as “Bayesian Arguments,” as they were cited from Stephen Unwin’s popular book The Probability of God.[54] He then offers an entire chapter of arguments against the probability of God existing in a chapter entitled Why There Almost Certainly Is No God. Dawkins treats his readers with subsequent chapters on The Roots of Religion,[55] and The Roots of Morality: Why Are We Good?[56]  Dawkins then goes on a lengthy “analysis” of the “quality” of the Old & New Testaments describing them as;

“Not systematically evil but just plain weird, as you would expect of a chaotically cobbled-together anthology of disjointed and ‘improved’ by hundreds of anonymous authors and copyists, unknown to us  and mostly unknown to each other, spanning nine centuries.”[57]

Dawkins follows this up on the next chapter, What’s Wrong With Religion? Why Be So Hostile?  with his exact assessment:

As a scientist, I am hostile to fundamentalist religion because it actively debauches the scientific enterprise. It teaches us not to change our minds, and to not want to know exciting things that are available to be known. It subverts science and saps that intellect.[58]

Dawkins concludes his book with a chapter that purports to illustrate the deleterious effects that religion has upon children, echoing both Harris’ and Hitchen’s likewise assertions that it is moreso often a form of child abuse in Childhood, Abuse and the Escape from Religion, and ends with a discussion, A Much Needed Gap, where he argues that religion need not take any special place either emotionally, existentially, or educationally; that there is no excusable place for it – whatsoever.[59]

Evangelical Response Selection #1: Ravi Zacharias’ The End of Reason, A Response to the New Atheists.

Ravi Zacharias is himself a former atheist[60] and is now considered to be a genuinely “insightful and accomplished philosopher.”[61] Zacharias, whose audio programs Let My People Think[62] and Just Thinking[63] have established him as a serious scholar with wide readership and influence. In the initial part of the book – which consists only of forward, prologue, essay, and then notes – he describes himself as having been a former atheist growing up in India, born into a family of the highest caste of Hinduism.[64] He describes how Nietzsche himself wrote of the “universal madness” that would “break out when the truth of what mankind had done in killing God dawned on us.”[65] Zacharias talks about the madness that enveloped Nietzsche toward the end of his life, and how Zacharias, as did several of his friends did successfully, eventually tried to take his own life.[66]

Zacharias begins his rebuttal by talking about ‘origins’ – and cites “the odds of random life” occurring, citing Donald Page of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Science – that they have proposed that the calculated odds of “our universe randomly taking a form suitable for life as one out of 10,000,000,000¹²⁴ – a number that exceeds all imagination.”[67] Zacharias offers more statistics against the improbability of spontaneous non-metaphysically guided evolution (or the otherwise creation of life as being possible) and then moves on to what he describes as the lack of answers, subsequent existential alienation, despair and emptiness that materialistic evolution induces. He cites Voltaire, Sartre, and Nietzsche for their “honest and consistent” views in this regard – then discusses the life of Michel Foucault – and how he chose to instead embrace the lunacy of LSD and a personal motto of “it is forbidden to forbid.” He describes how this led Foucault into deep into sadomasochistic practices and eventually an untimely death from AIDS.[68] From here, Zacharias moves on to the issue of morality – and he engages Sam Harris, in Harris’ argument that Foucault was not the direct result of atheism,[69] arguing that

For Harris to deny that Foucault is a product of atheist thinking would mean that he would have to reconsider is appraisal of all forms of Christian expression with the same judgment. Harris just happens to borrow from a worldview better then his own, while castigating it at the same time. [70]

He then goes on to explore if reason alone can be a source of moral judgments, which he argues that it cannot, saying,

Christianity teaches that every single life has ultimate value. In secularism, while there is no ultimate value to life, the atheist subjectively selects particular values to applaud. This game is played every day by the relativist camp, while it refused to allow the other side the benefit of playing by the same rules. [71]

             Some of the strongest words of rebuke that Zacharias employs are directed towards Harris’ descriptions of Muslim and Christian communities, while displaying 

“Rather amazing prejudice” in ignoring “the tinderbox of angst among these youth in France. Shame on him for his callous statements and pathetic misrepresentations he employs in his hostility to a people and their beliefs!” [72]

Zacharias goes on to chide Harris for his references to Buddhism – observing that in Buddhism there is no “self,” and that all of the ‘passion’ that Harris argues with would in fact be seen as intrinsically sinful.[73] Zacharias concludes with an argument that

Europe is demonstrating that it’s secular world-view – one that Harris applauds – cannot stand against the onslaught of Islam and is already in demise. In the end, America’s choice will be between Islam and Jesus Christ. History will prove before long the truth of this contention. [74]

Evangelical Response Selection #2: R. Albert Mohler Jr.’s  Athiesm Remix, A Christian Confronts the New Atheists.

Mohler’s book is the shortest of all those reviewed here, clocking in at only 108 pages. Mohler divides his book into four sections: The Endgame of Secularism, The Assault on Theism, The Defense of Theism, and The Future of Christianity. His book is based on the W.H. Griffith Thomas Lectures, which he delivered in 2008 at the Dallas Theological Seminary.[75]

Mohler traces the rise of theology, starting with Nietzsche,[76]  “what historians now call the ‘Victorian Loss of Faith,’”[77] the Russian Revolution,[78] and what Max Weber described as the “disenchantment” with the enchanted world.[79] He references the work of Charles Taylor and his work A Secular Age, in which he traces the phases of secularism – which begin in being able to believe, to being able to not believe, and then unable to believe; that those who initially provided freedom – take it away by describing people who do believe in God as “dangerous people who do dangerous things.”[80] In the second chapter, Mohler gives short biographies of Richard Dawkins,[81] Daniel Dennet,[82] Sam Harris,[83] and Christopher Hitchens.[84] He defines eight distinct issues that all the “four horseman”[85] hold in common: an “unprecedented boldness,”[86] a “clear and specific rejection of the Christian God of the Bible,”[87] an explicit rejection of Jesus Christ,[88] that the arguments that they provide are grounded in scientific argument, [89] that it refuses to tolerate even moderate or liberal forms of belief,[90] that it attacks toleration of faith by others,[91] that they question the rights of parent to provide religious instruction; often equating it to “child abuse,”[92] and that “religion itself must be eliminated in order to preserve human freedom.”[93]

In his third chapter, Mohler reiterates that need for a cogent, intellectual response from Evangelicals to their challengers.[94] He refers to McGrath’s book, The Twilight of Atheism,[95] which actually preceded Dawkins’ book, but remains an “instructive analysis of atheism as a worldview in the West.”[96] Mohler points out that even though it seems to be “an example of very poor timing,”[97] it still serves as a very good response to what it foresaw as coming[98] because of its macro-view and accurate analysis of the situation. A second individual that Mohler references is the widely influential theologian and philosopher Alvin Plantinga, who serves as John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.[99] He points out that the crux of Plantinga’s argument against Dawkins is that his work is almost “so philosophically vacuous as to be unworthy of serious consideration.”[100]  Mohler quotes Plantinga in regards to Dawkins, as saying

Why, you might even say that some of his forays into philosophy are at best sophomoric, but that would be unfair to sophomores; the fact is (grade inflation aside) many of his arguments would receive a failing grade in a sophomore philosophy class. [101]

Mohler concludes his book with the acknowledgement that a continued engagement is necessary. He cites a number of responses that are taking place, in addition to the default evangelical response, such as the feminist theologian Tina Beattie, who is professor of theology at Roehampton University in London. Mohler points out that she sees the New Atheism as a “primarily British and American phenomenon.”[102] She refers to the debates as being “testosterone-charged,”[103] and argues that a feminist theological interpretation has an opportunity to move the conversation forward by “reversing” the patriarchal structure of the classical Christian tradition to one that will dethrone authorities such as the Bible in terms of theological method.  Mohler also discusses the response of John F. Haught, senior fellow in science and religion at the Woodstock Theological Center at Georgetown University, who complains that the entire affair is, “in the end, theologically uninteresting.”[104] Haught, who is a liberal, sees the entire conversation as existing between Atheists and Conservative Christians.[105] Both Haught and Beatie are “appalled by the identification of Christian theology with biblical literalism,” and Haught shares Plantinga’s assertion that the New Atheists “lack a first-year student’s knowledge of philosophy and theology.”[106]

Evangelical Response Selection #3: Alister McGrath’s The Twilight of Atheism, The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern Word.

McGrath’s book – of the three evangelical responses detailed here – is the longest and most scholarly. It is also different from the two books by Mohler and Zacharias in that it is not a direct response – but rather an indirect response to them in that it addresses them from a “macro” viewpoint, rather then a point-by-point basis. As Mohler points out, it actually predates the works by Harris, Dawkins, and Hitchens. McGrath takes a ‘bird’s eye’ view and examines the entire atheistic movement historically and then traces both its preliminary successes – and what he diagnoses as its ultimate present and forthcoming failure. Rather then attacking their arguments piecemeal, he explores the entire school of thought as well the origins of their ideology.

McGrath begins by exploring the roots of classical Greek atheism and follows the various itinerations of the expression through various historical timeframes. He explores its context within the French Revolution,[107] and then explores its “intellectual foundations” in Feuerbach,[108] Marx,[109] and Freud.[110] McGrath then explores what he refers to as “the failure of the religious imagination” though the works of Shelly,[111] Eliot,[112] and Swinburn. [113] McGrath then explores atheism’s philosophic roots and its attendant “Death of God” notion in the characters of Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, and Camus.

McGrath follows this with a discussion regarding the resurgence of religion in a chapter entitled The Unexpected Resurgence of Religion.[114] Like Zacharias, McGrath began his own intellectual journey as an atheist, having read and been influenced by A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and Bertrand Russell’s Why I Am Not A Christian. McGrath goes on to say that the principle cause of his atheism was that he had become a Marxist, and that he felt that it “held the key to the future.”[115] McGrath talks about the explosion of Pentecostalism, especially in Latin America, where Marxism is in full retreat before its expansion. In one of McGrath’s few pointed assertions he makes note that where “in some deplorable cases, Marxism made use of firing squads and force in securing its power base, Pentecostalism seems to put its trust in the power of God to change people’s lives.”[116] In what, for some, might be an interesting turn-around, McGrath argues that it is Protestantism’s “lack of imagination”[117] that even made atheism “an attractive alternative,” further citing that it was the freedom intrinsic to Christianity, that even allowed ‘a move away from the sacred’ to take place.[118] McGrath then explores the issues of Modernity,[119] Postmodernity,[120] and the “Embarrassing Intolerance of Atheism.”[121] In a chapter entitled The Atheists Revolt, McGrath tells the story of Madalyn Murray O’Hair and her eventual murder.[122] In his concluding chapter End of Empire, McGrath cites various arguments for Atheism’s continual receding appeal from society. He argues that atheism has changed its roles, and that rather then being a ‘liberator’ it has become an oppressor, that it has offered no suitable and reliable alternative the community that naturally springs from aggregates of people sharing their faith together both individually and corporately, and that, in general, it has offered no long-term vision that can equal in its existential effect that which the faith (Christian or otherwise) offers. 

Concluding Observations

One interesting note that can be made about all the books reviewed, is that those which take a side of Materialist Atheism are rather lengthy, whereas those of the evangelical response (with the exception of McGrath’s book) are decidedly concise. A second observation that can be made is that the average tone between them is markedly different as well. The defender of Materialist Atheism/New Atheism are all very patronizing and condescending, especially Hitchen’s book – which, as was pointed out before – never seems to miss a chance to make a pretentious and ostentatious remark about anybody ‘on the other side,’ even as Dawkins, for example, states that he does not do so any more then he need, though he clearly does anyway. The writers on the evangelical side all practice a very warm and engaging style – one that once one has spent time reading “the opposition” becomes actually quite refreshing.

All three Evangelical responses anchor their faith in Christ and the scriptures as a matter of faith. In each case, their opposition seems to allude to alternate foundations beside “reason.” Harris offers a retreat into the field of neuroscience as suitable a futuristic, eventual source for ethical guidance,[123] Hitchens offers “literature” in a potentially Marxist/Critical Theory alternative to any presupposed scriptural foundation, and Dawkins finds adequate foundation for everything exclusively in science.

McGrath’s argument that the so-called ‘liberator’ is now an actually an oppressor appears to ring true throughout all three books reviewed. But it can be argued that the Christian’s side is potentially more inclusionary because of its acceptance of the ‘Ottoian other’[124] – whereas the other side adamantly accepts only what it understands and sees as a suitable foundation, which is generally understood as being science. But as Michael Polanyi argues in his book Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, the history of science is full of “anomalies,” which – when eventually understood – radically impacted previously dismissed or ignored understandings.[125] Science is itself an ever-changing set of assumptions – and to build assumptions upon assumptions is potentially a dangerous endeavor ontologically.   In each case, all of the defendants of atheism found no suitable role for faith or religion, outside of a limited historical value – instead, they all revert back to science and reason as preferred foundations, with others foundations (as previously noted) being indirectly asserted.  Hitchens does not discount the ‘historical poetry’ of religion – as he describes the possibility he might ironically potentially be found sitting “quietly in the back of some old Celtic or Saxon church,” referencing Philip Larkin’s poem “Church-going.”[126] Religion can only be enjoyed tangentially – but not directly, as it no longer has any direct use or need for implementation. For Hitchens it is all relegated to gazing, as it were, at stain glass windows. There is no other purpose in it. All three authors appeal to reason and the accessibility of science as the only suitable foundation of an understanding of the world. Hitchen’s accusations of solipsism may contain a degree of irony – because, generally speaking – all three responses argue for a spiritual reality beyond the innate capacities of the mind. If science can be seen as an extension of the senses, then it is the New Atheists who would seem to be more prone to actually flirt with Solipsism. In terms of an arguable continuum, Materialist Atheism would positionally be closer to an exclusively cognitive-only understanding of the world, albeit one whereby science functions as an extended cognitive/neurological ‘sense capability.’ The accusations of ‘wish-thinking’ cognitions vs. a grounding in reason/rationality (and as a logical extension, science), also would seem to be infirm, as there is a distinct difference between faith and fantasy. For to believe in something that cannot be proven, is different then adhering to a purposefully and randomly created construct. The difference in this can be seen in the ancient Greeks and the ways that they viewed their Gods, as merely metanarrationally-cultural content carriers – vs. actual revered and existent deities.[127]

In regards to the interplay between faith and belief, Hitchens makes four references[128] to the early church father, Tertullian, who is credited with the motto Credibile est, quia ineptum est, (“I believe it because it is absurd,”)[129] though none of the Evangelical responses base their defenses upon such a notion. Although Mohler offers a criticism of Tillich  (stating that it was in part his liberal theology that potentially provided a substrate for the thinking of materialist atheism’s attempted resurgence[130]) McGrath’s, Zacharias’, and his own defenses mirror Tillich’s own stated distaste for the irrational.[131] In Mohler’s critique of John F. Haught, who (as noted before) sees himself as a third party observing ‘all the fuss’ between the atheist’s posture and conservative Evangelical Christians – Mohler points out Haught’s embrace of Evolution as a de facto ontological reality to be believed and embraced, which he is apposed to. Mohler’s conservative side shows as he relegates members of this camp to the ‘liberal’ side of things – and contributes their positions as the partial cause of the ongoing situation. But another theologian and scientist from a generation past, who helped legitimize the belief of an ongoing evolution as part of God’s spiritual plan, himself highlighted the responsibility that such an evolution would in fact bring – echoing Zacharias’ own struggle with an atheism-induced suicide attempt. In How I Believe, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin warns us,

Consider all around you the increasing number of those who are privately bored to tears and those who commit suicide in order to escape from life…The time is close at hand when mankind will see that, precisely in virtue of its position in a cosmic evolution which it has become capable of discovering and criticizing, it now stands biologically between the alternatives of suicide and worship.[132]

In closing, one figure that does stand out in the intersection of faith and science is Richard Feynman – who was himself an avowed atheist.[133] Feynman is widely regarded as an intellectual of immense proportions, and his biography by James Gleich was appropriately titled Genius. Dawkins registers his respect for Feyman,[134] but Feynman registers a very different view of Faith, one standing in marked contrast with those who have followed him.  They call for the complete dismissal of faith and religion from all ongoing aspects of life and culture. In contrast, Feynman establishes and defends faith as a crucial part of the very fabric and success of Western civilization. In his last essay entitled The Relation of Science and Religion, in his book The Pleasure of Finding Things Out, Feynman asserts,

Western civilization, it seems to me, stands by two great heritages. One is the scientific spirit of adventure – the adventure into the unknown” and that “the other great heritage is Christian ethics – the basis of action on love, the brotherhood of all men, the value of the individual – the humility of the spirit. [135]

Feyman further argues that “These two heritages are logically, thoroughly consistent,” and then he concludes with a question – that in light of all the harsh criticisms of the New Atheists and their ‘responders’ – remains very poignant and integral to the discussion still today.

So far, have we not drawn strength and comfort to maintain the one or the other of these consistent heritages in a way which attacks the value of the other? Is this unavoidable? How can we draw inspiration to support these two pillars of Western civilization so that they may stand together in full vigor, mutually unafraid? Is this not the central problem of our time?

I put it up to the panel for discussion.[136]

And so the conversation – goes on.

Bibliography

Chardin, Pierre Teilhard de. How I Believe. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008.

Dennett, Daniel C. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Dumas, Andre. Dietrich Bonhoeffer – Theologian of Reality. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971.

Feynman, Richard P. The Pleasure of Finding Things Out. Campbridge: Perseus Publishing, 2000.

—. What Do You Care What Other People Think? New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.

Gleick, James. Genius – The Life and Science of Richard Feynman. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992.

Gleijzer, Richard R. and Michael Bernard-Donals. Rhetoric in an Antifoundational World – Language, Culture, and Pedagogy. London: Yale University Press, 1998.

Harris, Sam. The End of Faith – Religion, Terror, and Future of Reason. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010.

Hitchens, Christopher. God is not Great – How Religion Poisons Everything. New York: Twelve, 2009.

Jr., R. Albert Mohler. Atheism Remix – A Christian Confronts the New Atheists. Wheaton: Crossway, 2008.

McGrath, Alister. The Twilight of Atheism – The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World. New York: Galilee Doubleday, 2006.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Good Reads. 16 4 2010. Good Reads. 16 4 2010 <http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/94578.The_Gay_Science_with_a_Prelude_in_Rhymes_and_an_Appendix_of_Songs >.

Pals, Daniel L. Eight Theories of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Polanyi, Michael. Personal Knowledge – Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. 3 vols.

Zacharias, Ravi. Let My People Think, Ravi Zacharias, Archives, Christian Radio Ministry Broadcast. 16 4 2010. Ravi Zacharias. 16 4 2010 <http://www.oneplace.com/Ministries/Let_My_People_Think/archives.asp&gt;.

—. Ravi Zacharias International Ministries :: Just Thinking Radio Program. 17 4 2010. Ravi Zacharias. 17 4 2010 <http://www.rzim.org/resources/listen/justthinking.aspx >.

—. The End of Reason – A Response to the New Atheists. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008.

The ‘Doctor of Grace’ was ‘an Apostle of the Apophatic:’ Exploring Augustine’s Hamartiology and His Concept of Grace and Free Will Within It, With Concluding Reference to Tulips & Daisies.

Augustine’s Central Philosophy and What It Informed: Grace, and His Theology of A Free Will 

My whole hope is in thy exceeding great mercy and that alone. Give what thou commandest and command what thou wilt. Thou commandest continence from us, and when I knew, as it is said, that no one could be continent unless God gave it to him, even this was a point of wisdom to know whose gift it was. For by continence we are bound up and brought back together in the One, whereas before we were scattered abroad among the many. For he loves thee too little who loves along with thee anything else that he does not love for thy sake, O Love, who dost burn forever and art never quenched. O Love, O my God, enkindle me! Thou commandest continence; give what thou commandest, and command what thou wilt. (Augustine Confessions CHAPTER XXIX, 40)

Brevity, generally speaking, potentially precludes a capacity for detail and thoroughness. But it is this present writer’s calculated risk: to affirm that Augustine’s understanding of granted Free Will cannot be partially understood apart from his apprehension of God’s granted Grace. And, therefore, I have hopefully properly judged it as necessarily attendant, and in it’s inclusion, in the pursuant discussion, even at the risk of it being extended in scope, complexity, and length, done an allowable thing. I trust it is both potential and forgivable to will this.

Augustine can also be seen as allowing and affirming many things, including Free Will,  but if a central theme to his thought could be posited, it could arguably be an assertion of the inherency of an understanding within the Christian experience of the necessity of a full and complete understanding of God’s Grace. Augustine can be said to embody a theology which might be considered a philosophy of Grace, in that his theology and his subsequent process of theological formulation are inescapably connected back to his understanding of it. F.F. Bruce in The Spreading Flame points out that the Pauline doctrine of Grace can be seen as being referenced theologically, in the progressive history of the church at a variety of points – such as The Epistle to Diognetus and in the works of Tertullian – “but not until Augustine do we find an adequate and sympathetic comprehension of what it really is[1]” In examining Augustine and his philosophy of a Free Will, we therefore must also understand that certain element and apprehension of Grace that he felt both he and all believers functioned under; for the essence of it served not just as his frame of reference, but also to frame and hang, as it were, his thoughts on the subject upon Philosophy’s own wall of thought.

Augustine’s youthful years are self-described as vain, and erotically motivated; full of selfish self-deceit. In the opening pages of his Confessions, under a chapter titled Wrestling with Puberty, Augustine writes

I was unable to distinguish pure affection from unholy desire. Both boiled in confusion within me, dragging my unstable youth down over the cliffs of impure desires and plunging me into a gulf of indecency. (Confessions, Book II, Chapter II, 41)

His conversion, subsequent baptism into the church, and his evolving, changing theological embodiment in terms of how he saw himself in terms of his own unworthiness of his own salvation, are indelibly marked and informed by it. In a consideration of his understanding of Grace; we see the unmistakable outlines of an understanding of what C.S. Lewis, in writing to Sheldon Vanauken[2]; regarding the death of his wife, Davy, once termed “A Severe Mercy.” He clearly understood the depths of the profoundness of his lost state and brokenness, both in the past and even in his ongoing struggles in the present[3]. This gave a certain gravity to his hamartiology;[4] or his understanding of the nature and extent of his sin, theologically. Augustine constantly and tirelessly affirms that his Salvation and anything attendant to it theologically are inextricably tied to a thoroughgoing understanding of a profound understanding of Grace.[5] Nothing, not our Free Will, not our Salvation, nor any hope is possible without it.[6]

Augustine’s Paradox Explicated:

The Necessity for a Free Will Orthodoxy 

In reading Augustine; On Free Choice of the Will, Book Three, we hear clearly hear the words of the theologian explaining his position with his fellow interlocutor, Evodius. Augustine and Evodius together explore the idea of Free Will and not just what it means to have it – but the necessary understanding that it does in fact exist.

Augustine, speaking to Evodius, writes,

 …we agreed that nothing can make the mind a slave to inordinate desire except its own will. For the will cannot be forced into such iniquity by anything superior or equal to it, since that would be unjust; or anything inferior to it, since that is impossible (On Free Choice of the Will, Book Three, Pg 71,72).

Augustine further writes that he believes that the “movement” that takes place “by which the will turns from enjoying the Creator to enjoying his creatures belongs to the will itself.” It is very possible that the enjoyment of “creatures,” rather then the creator, may well be a reference to Augustine’s own struggles with lust. His earlier struggles serve to undergird and illuminate the sincerity and the depth of his own theological expressions. Augustine is not the detached schoolmaster; he shows himself to be one who has struggled with the things of which he speaks.

It is not unlikely that Augustine would have unkind words to speak to those who have traveled down paths he would most certainly have disapproved of. In On Free Choice of the Will, he and Evodius make mention of a stone that falls because of the natural action of gravity and that it is not possible that one might sin by the same inherent act as a stone would in turn fall, under the influence of gravity, without any choice in the endeavor. In speaking of such speculation – he calls such ideas insane, and those who would believe such nonsense, dumber then the rock of which they reference[7].

In addition to using words like insane and the aspersion of ‘being dumber then a rock’ – Augustine further gives the harsh indictment that people who actually think this way should be “banished from the human race.[8]”

Augustine then goes on in his discussion with Evodius to make further remarks in regards to those who think that we must sin expressly because of God’s foreknowledge of our infractions, noting that some people think in such terms because “they are more eager to excuse then to confess their sins.[9]”  He cautions against those who engage in an oppositionally-related fallacy of disbelieving divine judgments, thinking that “fortune will defend them from those who accuse them,” relying rather on sense of chance and/or fate in terms of their fortune. Augustine, likewise, condemns this also as being “full of the most foolish and insane error.[10]”

In various parts of The City of God; Augustine also clearly reaffirms previous contentions, outlined in his earlier interlocutor-style presentations, but this time directly. In speaking of God – he says

He assigned free choice to the intellectual nature in such a way that, if it willed, it might abandon God – it’s own happiness, to be sure – with uninterrupted misery being the result. He knew beforehand that certain angels would abandon such a great good through pride – a pride by which they would will to be able to attain a happy life on their own. Nevertheless, he did not take away this power of free choice from them, but judged it to be better and more efficacious to bring good out of evil then to allow evils to exist. (Augustine, The City of God, Book XXII, from Augustine Political Writings, Pg. 185)

Centuries later, Augustine’s thoughts are reflected in the thoughts of the Christian mystic A.W. Tozer, as he posits his own solution to the Calvinist/Arminian debate, in The Knowledge of the Holy, where he states that a God less sovereign could never allow Free Will in his creatures. The reality of Free Will affirms God’s sovereignty and is not an offense to it.  [11]

Some Calvinian apologists have speculated that Augustine’s “will” is not textually equateable to volitional capabilities[12] – at least as they are understood within the Western epistemological mindset. But Augustine’s own words in The City of God show these to be ultimately fallacious endeavors.

Even if the order of all causes is certain to God, it does not follow that nothing depends on the free choice of our own wills. Our wills are themselves included in that order of causes which is known with certainty by and which is contained in his foreknowledge, for human wills are the causes of human actions.

From all this we conclude that the only efficient causes of all things which occur are voluntary causes; that is, they are causes which come from nature which is the spirit of life.

Just as he is the creator of all natures, so is he the giver of all powers, but not of all wills.

Therefore, whatever power they have, they possess with the utmost certainty, and what they are about it do, they are surely about to do, for he whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it and would in fact do it.

(Selections from Augustine, The City of God, Book V, Chapter 9, Augustine Political Writings, Pgs. 38,39 – Italics mine)

 A Divergent Inheritance:

The Tulip[13] & The Daisy[14] 

The divergent schools of Soteriological Determinism that followed Augustine and his contentions with Pelagius,[15] and then Calvin vs. Arminius, seemingly represent two different views of Grace, Free Will, and Soteriological Determinism. Each makes some degree of an affirmation of connectedness back to Augustine, both in their respective affirmations of both God’s Grace and his imparted Free will, or, as in the case of Calvinism – the lack thereof[16].

In today’s ongoing theological conversation, any reference to Augustine has scant reference to his thoughts on Free Will. The bulk of what is found regarding him in present-day conversations, articles  is provided only as support to Modern Evangelicalisms continued embracement of Calvinistic Predestinationism, carried on under the banner of Reformed Theology. You have to dig into Augustine and read for yourself what is, to some peoples eyes, a glaring contradiction. Augustine believed in both Predestination and Free Will; regardless of how you logically/Kataphatically seek to express those concepts under the banners of Calvinism and it’s Tulip – or -Arminianism and it’s Daisy. There is no doubt in this present writer’s mind, that many life-long, dyed-in-the-wool Calvinists would be utterly speechless to hear Augustine argue with them across the ages, against their own ideas of a forced-by-Foreknowledge lack of any Free Will.

But in light of the continued conversation of what is commonly referred to as “Postmodernity[17]” in theological circles, more and more influential thinkers are reexamining the Apophatic vs. Kataphatic spheres[18], especially as they relate to Calvinism and Augustine’s assertions of the free choice of the will.

 Proposed: An Apostle of The Apophatic;

Augustine’s Solution in His Seeming

Embracement of Contradictions 

Though Augustine is strongly viewed by modern Calvinists as their veritable ‘patron saint,’ there is potentially an argument to be made, that within the theology of Augustine, that even in his early work – a clear apophatism is present, and that it continues to develop and assert itself – in that Augustine represents a clear deferment to the apophaticism of Arminianism[19] in regards to the nature and interplay of the Will of God vs. The Will of Man. Augustine does not anguish on what he can positively say vs. what he can’t – but, as can be argued was in the epistimological spirit of his own age, he easily accepts that which he cannot.

As Augustine matured as a person, he also matured as a theologian; this rejection of ‘certifiable knowledge’ is born out when in his Confessions, written in what might be considered a middle period of his theological development; he writes that he is already seemingly tiring of the answers that Philosophy and Reason have to offer[20]; and in one particular section, uses language almost akin to the modern joke of the question of “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” – in referencing one of the questions he had asked in his days as a Manichean – does God have fingernails?[21]

Calvin takes Augustine’s teachings on Predestination and furthers a Kataphatic approach vs. Augustine’s seeming apophatic one; he wants to say something – and that something takes on a Determinist mindset. Augustine makes clear in On Free Choice of the Will, as referenced prior, that foreknowledge does not force the occurrence of something; either in the heart and mind of God or man, when in his discussion with Evodius he clearly speaks of those who “might object that God himself will act out of necessity rather then by His own will in everything that he is going to do.[22]” Augustine understands our natural adamancy to enforce logical knowables (as he was no doubt acquainted with the scripture verses that proclaim the limits of human Reason[23]) and in such, can be argued to represent the essence of the Mythological/Classicist; in as much as the questions of Modernism relate back to in it’s oppositionally-related natural proclivity towards assertions of the Kataphatic, theological “positives;” or things you can say vs. those you can’t about God and the things of the Divine – which, can be argued, began actually potentially their assent through the Greek philosophical tradition.[24]

If we can argue that Calvin was a Modernist in his own Kataphatic Determinist evaluations of the will of God and that of Man and their logical interplay, then for all their claim to him (Calvin: “Augustine is ours”) in regards to Augustine – he is most certainly completely not. As Augustin, like Boethius, knew that foreknowledge did not necessarily force occurrence, as if such were true: that God’s knowledge of what we would choose, forced us to do it – then God’s own knowledge of his own choices would likewise invalidate His own sovereignty over his own choices. Augustine may or may not have realized that it was not wise to pick and choose which apophatic “mystery” you want to accept: you cannot say that God’s own self-knowledge cannot limit his own self – but it can yours; as in such a task you’re just performing epistemological back flips with God’s ontology, and then your own – leaving God’s transcendence as your ‘end all/be all’ for the equation. Can a God be beyond himself? When Evodius in On Free Choice of The Will references the conflict of God somehow being bound by a foreknowledge of His own future decisions, he tries to isolate the concept as ‘what happens in creation and not what happens within Himself[25]”

 An apophatic theologian, such as Augustine, would assert that it is not just unsafe to stake out such claims, but completely impossible: and that rather then continue potentially, if not inherently, in further vain ascensions toward what we want to say, we should rather celebrate both what we de facto know and that which we have voluntarily, contra the cataphatic, surrendered as unknowable. The apophaticism of Augustine was not unique or obtuse; but rather a natural, logical expression of the Epistemological development of his philosophical epoch. It can effectively be argued, that they were simply questions that he did not bother to ask; their presences/absences were seemingly a natural given. Not everything necessarily needed to make sense, and what we might see – perhaps through Modernist, Scientific and arguably rational-centric eyes – might be absurd. And Augustine might well have thought that fact to be not just good, but celebrateable.

As a theological consensus began to assert itself against the abuses of Pelagius, and the subsequent reactionary rise of the assertions of Calvinism in a response, these questions of Apaphatic vs. Kataphatic theology were seemingly increasingly ignored. Whereas Augustine and Boethius gladly ceded the apaphatic affirmation of the mystery of foreknowledge and it’s relation to Predestination, Luther and then Calvin refused to accept what could be argued was the wisdom in Augustine’s natural apophatism.

Both Pelagius and Luther/Calvin arguably represent cataphatic treatments of a necessarily apophatic dimension of God and his relation to us. 

For all their claim to him, the Kataphatism of Calvinism must cede to the Apophatisim of Augustine, as least as he writes of his beliefs in regards to the will in On Free Choice of the Will. If such is true, then the Arminian claims to a potential for Free Will to coexist within Foreknowledge and what is often termed Unconditional Election is not a heresy, as Calvinists are so often quick to assert, but it is a steadfast truth – if not in a triumphant, conjoined mystery.  Augustine concludes his thoughts in On Free Choice of the Will, with a sincerely Kataphatic statement in relation to the paradox of a God potentially bound by His own foreknowledge, “and just as you remember some things that you have done but did not do everything that you remember, God foreknows everything that he causes but does not cause everything that he foreknows.”

A full analysis of the principles of the Tulip and then those of the Daisy, are truly beyond the scope of this already potentially over-extended essay; for which I must beg forgiveness. To explore them would necessitate a further treatment that would no doubt encompass the length of this introspection multiple times.  The conflicts and the realities of what the Christian scripture appears to say in places, and then in others – truly cannot be resolved, at least within our own mortal understandings.  But, as Augustine seeks to explore and affirm; we can understand certain truths, if we accept the larger mysteries and embrace God on His terms, in His Grace, and ultimately  – at His Word, and not our own.

Conclusions; a Garden still yielding fruit 

In his book, The Decent of the Dove, Charles Williams writes that Christianity has neither completely embraced nor escaped “…the phrases of Augustine. But without Augustine it might have ceased to be Christendom.” Indeed, the history of Christianity is both filled and fraught with many colorful characters; the vibrancy and color of its canvas painted both brightly and darkly, with both their successes and their respective failures; each adding or detracting, perhaps depending upon the perspective one might take of them, to the whole of what is known as Christianity. This much can be asserted regarding Augustine, that were he to have merely trumpeted the idea of a Free Will outside of the added gravitas of his own grappling with Grace, and not demonstrated the pronounced and continued inclusion of a serious and well-articulated hamartiology, his thoughts on all he affirmed, struggled with and articulated with passion, as he did in On Free Choice of the Will and his other proceeding works, would no doubt potentially have lost a degree of resonance that they have had throughout the proceeding generations of theologians, ministers, and laypersons who have come along and picked up his ‘phrases;’ exploring, mediating on them, and making them essential components of their own belief and faith.

In his continued professions of not just the actuality, but the criticality of the necessity of Free Will; asserted in On The Free Will, ascended to in Confessions, and affirmed at his height as a theologian in The City of God – Augustine may, in the eyes of some, represent the natural result of internal theological inconsistencies, and in those of others, perhaps the embodiment of ‘an apostle of the apophatic’ – for his capability to harmonize apparently differential theological concepts; and in the act, accepting the mysteries therein and thereof as both natural and celebrateable – either way. Because either way he is still one of the truly great ‘doctors’ of the faith, quite literally: as Augustine, in Catholic theology; because of his emphasis on Grace, is actually referred to as “The Doctor of Grace[26].”

This much is sure: Augustine has been and will likely remain a continued caretaker of the Theological Garden of Christianity. His writings continue to influence the very soil of it’s thought and the ‘flowers’ that grow within it. As theology and thought continue to both remain steadfast and yet grow in the legacy of both the past and the exciting engagements of the future – his shadow will remain for all those who study the past in an attempt to potentially understand the future; and his contributions in regards to bringing the Divine down into a context for what he had hoped for, for his own generation, which has been handed down to others proceeding far, far past his own years; ones which will continue to be both a fascinating and a fertile ground for ideas, both old and new.

 References/Bibliography 

Williams, Charles. The Decent of the Dove.
Vancouver, BC: Regent College Publishing, 2001.

Dr. Tom Gill. Saint Augustine: Confessions. Trans. Dr. Tom Gill
Gainesville, FL: Bridge Logos, 2003.

Bruce, F.F. The Spreading Flame.
Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1954.

Vanauken, Sheldon. A Severe Mercy.
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998.

McTavish, T. J. A Theological Miscellany
Nashville, TN: W Publishing Group, 2005.

Williams, Thomas. Augustine: On Free Choice of the Will. Trans. Thomas Williams.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub Co Inc, 1993.

Kelly, J.N.D. Early Christian Doctrines
San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1978.

Tkacz, Michael W. Augustine, Political Writings: The City of God. Trans. Michael W. Tkacz
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub Co Inc, 1994.

Tozer, A. W. The Knowledge of the Holy
New York, NY: HarperSanFranciso, 1978.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Grudem, Wayne. Bible Doctrine. ed. Jeff Purswell
Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999.

“Doctors of the Church.” NewAdvent.org 29 Nov. 2007. The Catholic Encyclopedia. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05075a.htm&gt;.

‘Truth to the Power, But They Still Don’t Believe,’ Dialectic Past, Present & Future: Exploring the Greek Philosophic Foundations of the Past, It’s Origin, meaning for Today, and Possibly Even the Future; with Concluding Reference to Rodney Hunter & Postmodernism

Y ‘Those Who Seek a Sign’ vs. ‘Those who seek Wisdom:’

Mythological & Oral Traditions Of Rhetoric as Foundations for the Emergence of Dialectic Z

Most Christians who study their bibles or attend Sunday school with any regularity will have sooner or later read and studied through the 1^st chapter of the book of 1^st Corinthians. Tucked down, about a third of the way through, lies a singular verse – which very often is overlooked; considering the soteriological focus of the chapter – which almost, on it’s face, seems an incongruent distraction.

For Jews request a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom;

Most who read it, will never give it much thought; but it is the contention of this writer; as will hopefully be born out in the proceeding discussion – that a solid argument can be made that within this small, seemingly out of place verse – we find a hint of what could potentially be considered to be a number of the stones of the very foundations of Western Civilization. Though it can be argued that it is perhaps also a reductionist statement to make such an assertion, the contention can and herein will be made that prior to the inception and subsequent maturation of Greek culture and thought, mythological underpinnings served as the overriding metanarrative[1] of the bulk of all human history and it’s attendant thought. It was in the gradual unfurling of the Greek tapestry of ever-evolving thinkers that individuals began to challenge the longstanding mythologically-inclined epistemological frameworks that served them and that through which man and society both understood the world and themselves. While other cultures and traditions continued to embrace a teleological process based on story, or myth – the movement from existential experience, based upon mythological foundations – to cogently expressed frameworks by which to understand both logic, the surrounding world, and the respective dynamics of each, slowly and inevitably began their progressions. In the proceeding pages we will examine the nature of the definition of the term Dialectic, as well as it’s origins, it’s subsequent evolving meanings in comparison with those in it’s past, the present, as well as a speculated potential future; using individuals from the Greek traditions and their contributions to the founding and subsequent progression of the meaning of the word – both then, and now, and in the encroaching, potential future. The present writer will attempt to show that a true understanding of the word must incorporate a sense of changeability in terms of definition; albeit under the continued affluence of those responsible for it foundations and inception, in terms of it’s past and now it’s present use – as well as it’s future form; all of which cannot escape the touch of those who made the move beyond Sign to Wisdom and Story/Myth to Reason.

ST

Y  Myth as an Initial Foundation – The Need for Culture, Self-History, and an Inherent Identity/Understanding of each Z

In his book, The Power of Myth, Joseph Campbell along with Bill Moyers, explore the need that man has for a deeper meaning beyond what he can readily see. They make note that at one time Greek, Latin and Biblical literature were epistemological staples in the education process. They mourn the fact that this is largely untrue in our modern age[2]. In his book The Everlasting Man – G.K Chesterton provides an apologetic for Christianity in that he frames the entirety of History through the process and idea of the Christian concept of Redemption. A central thesis to this argument is the understanding that for much of human history, Religion, Culture and the Beliefs that defined both these things and Society were largely both accepted and understood as patently mythological in their essence. They are accepted as fact – but they are not questioned regardless of their apparent absurdity in this or that regard. The myth or the story was more important then the embraced or rejected authenticity thereof. What was of importance was the ethos and the spirit behind the ideas espoused, whether they be for the purposes of explaining how the world came to be, or how it was societally governed. One might argue that the mythology that drove the world was much like the modern tradition of Santa Clause or the Tooth Fairy. With punctual regularity, the time honored traditions of each were perpetually embodied and modeled to each successive generation by the prior; though the pervasively scientific worldview of the Modern adult would vehemently deny any practical capability for an inherent actuality, even as the premodern man – absent of Science, did likewise – but through what what might have been or seemed to him the societally accepted ‘Common Sense.’ It was celebrated and believed – but no body really defends it as actuality. Just as most adults today would be deeply offended if you told a small child there was no Santa Clause; they know there is not, but it is perfectly natural to believe it, teach it, and celebrate it. In these ways – these icons (Old Saint Nick & The Tooth Fairy) are modern representatives of the mythological narratives replete throughout Antiquity.

It is simply false to say that the other sages and heroes had claimed to be that mysterious master and maker, of whom the world had dreamed and disputed. Not one of them had ever claimed to be anything of the sort. Not one of their sects or schools had ever claimed that they had claimed to be anything of the sort. The most that any religious prophet had said was that he was the true servant of such a being. The most that any visionary had ever said was that men might catch glimpses of the glory of that spiritual being; or much more often of lesser spiritual beings. The most that any primitive myth had ever suggested was that the creator was present at creation. But that the creator was present at scenes a little subsequent to the supper-parties of Horace, and talked with tax-collectors and government officials in the detailed daily life of the Roman Empire, and that this fact continued to be firmly asserted by the whole of that great civilization for more than a thousand years–that is something utterly unlike anything else in nature. (G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man)

Operating under such constraints of ‘Believed Disbelief’ the epistemological framework of the given societies were openly and unapologetically accepted as potentially illusory and infirm – but the history and provability was – contra Modernity’s inherent ‘must prove it’ tendency – simply not the issue; the experience of the belief was the foundation of societies understanding of itself: the very essence of the Mythological. A civilization might worship a sun God – and accept it’s reality for what it appeared to be on it’s face; evolving complex rituals and beliefs in the practice of the worship thereof and yet any question of the logic or necessity behind the behavior would generally be ignored. When was the last time you and your child left cookies and milk for “Old Saint Nick?”

This may sound confusing to one today; but even our own esoteric spiritual understandings are interpreted through a Modernist light as being “real” and “quantifiable;” both thoroughly modernist presuppositional assertions. What the Ancients thought in terms of their identity and history could be considered a Metaphysical Pre-Dialectic. At the time of this writing, a teacher has barely escaped with her life from an Islamic-ruled country, after allowing her students to name a teddy bear “Mohammad” – generally speaking, Religion, today, is taken as seriously as one would gravity upon consideration of the idea of stepping off of the Empire State Building. Radial Muslims declared the teacher a Heretic and demanded she be executed. Heresy – because of the understanding of the mythological as the foundation/essential essence of Religion, at that time, in that culture – was not common, not nearly as much so as it is today. As M.I. Finely points out in his book, The Ancient Greeks –

Greek religion being one of ritual rather then doctrine, sacrilege too was normally a matter of acts: desecration of shrines, temple robbery, illicit participation in a rite or revealing secrets to the unititate, and the like. Where there is no orthodoxy there can be no heresy, and the laws or prosecutions directed against a man’s beliefs, not expressed in offensive actions, were rare throughout antiquity so far as we know. M.I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks, Popular Attitudes and Morals, pg. 136, italics mine)

W. K. C. Guthrie in his book The Greek Philosophers, From Thales to Aristotle – describes this foundation/essence as “Magic as a primitive form of applied science.[3]” And so the Greeks, as did any society at that time, had a society and a self-understanding thereof founded upon Magic, a potentially positable Metaphysical Pre-Dialectic: a Myth; which sought to explain their identity/history, but – important as it was – the explanation was more important then the ‘right belief.’ “Where there is no Orthodoxy,” therefore as Finely points out – “ there is no heresy.” Hesiod, an early Greek poet, writing in his Theogany[4] (“Generation of the Gods”) describes the origins of evil, which would have been a question, then; not necessarily as much today, often asked in the halls of pre-modern epistemology.  In his classic Poem, Hesiod recites how “Iapetus took Clymen, the fine-legged daughter of the Ocean” and she bore the Gods Atlas, Monoitios – “who’s pide soared,” the “quick” and “versatile minded” Prometheus, as well as the “wrong-headed” Epimetheus. For all their pageantry and prose – the Greeks, as stated previously, embraced how their Gods and how Evil came to be – as stories, and not what we consider today “Absolutes.” They would argue for with you that the story was the story: not as much the how but the what – but in the sense of them being “true” as a “Modern” would suppose, they would not be likely to put you on trial if you ignored or perhaps made fun of it in some way.

Philosophy began its life in the Mythological – but it would eventually break out of its confines, to some peoples joy – and other peoples consternation. Aristophanies said “When Zeus is toppled, chaos succeeds him, and whirlwind rules.”[5]

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Y Beyond Myth – The Rise of Rhetoric:

The Beginnings of the Sophistic Tradition Z

Edith Hamilton in her book, The Greek Way, writes that “something had awakened in the mind and spirits of the men there which was so to influence the world that the slow passage of time, of century upon century and the shattering changes that they brought, would be powerless to wear away that deep impress[6]” This impress that would make inroads into the essence and future of humanity began with the Greeks, as Thomas Cahill, author of The Gifts of the Jews and How the Irish Saved Civilization, continues on in the same vein of culture-changing-history thought in Sailing the Wine-Dark Sea, Why the Greeks Matter – when in the chapter aptly entitled How To Think, he talks of the Greeks introducing “something brand new” to the newly emerging stage of world epistemological thought. Philo-sophia – a Greek word meaning “Love of Wisdom”

In moving beyond an inherence in the Mythological, Philosophy – in the Greek Tradition – sought to inhere or ground itself into a different media: it found this foundation in Communication, but even this – as did a foundation in Myth – proved to be illusory; as those who practiced it were eventually seen in terms of what we would call modern-day “Spin Doctors.”  Prodicus echoes these frustrations when he says “They [the sophists] are on the borderline between philosophers and politicians.”[7]

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Y The Ascendance of An Authentic Cogency:

‘More then Words;’ The Search for Both Truth & Rhetoric: Dialectic is Born Z

Dialectic, according to Geddess MacGregor’s Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy comes from the Greek term dialektos (meaning discourse or debate) and is “the science of drawing rigorous distinctions.”[8] According to Aristotle, there is a founding figure to the concept of Dialectic, Zeno: who with his “logic chopping” or “rational thought” begins what might be termed an ascendance to authentic cogency.[9] Eudimus, speaking of Zeno, writes, “Zeno stated that if anyone could make clear to him what the one is, he would be able to speak of existing things.”[10]

But there is someone is the storybook of Philosophy that took Zeno’s logic chopping notion and created a veritable Asplundh[11] Epistemological tree clearing crew. Socrates believed in what could best be described as ‘disciplined communication.’ Samuel Enoch Stumpf describes Socrates’ theory of knowledge as being “Intellectual Midwifery,” in his book Socrates to Sartre. 

He writes –

Socrates was convinced that the surest way to attain knowledge was through the practice of disciplined conversation, acting as an intellectual midwife, a method he called dialectic (Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre, pg. 37).

Socrates turned the power of communication upon itself to create a form of epistemological self-abrogation that delineated the limitations of the power of mere communication. In doing this he stretched the power of Epistemology beyond the limitations of mere words and into the realm of the thoughts – both known and unknowable – that was defined by them; thus denying the self-authentication and absoluteness of Communication. In this act he freed the definition from that which sought to define it – in terms of the fact that he moved knowledge beyond the bricks and mortar that one uses to define or illustrate knowledge itself. In his rejection of “Absolute Communication”[12] Socrates states that there is something beyond just communicating with someone – there is a self-evident ironism: what in modern colloquialist terms might be referenced as the “Dilbertism[13]:” “talking is not communication;” which is reminiscent of sitting through hours and hours of lectures required by a company for various programs such as C.Q.I. or worse yet “Continuing Education in regards to Company Policies.” You can sit through hours of speeches and hear and comprehend/take in absolutely nothing; either by choice or by nature of incompetence on the part of the presenter – yet the solution most companies implement, is merely more lectures, more in-services, and yet another Power Point presentation.[14] Just speaking something does not constitute an automatic ‘reception of your explication’ – it is for this reason that good communication can be argued to be an art form; something that can and should be argued to be both dynamic and potentially beautiful in and of itself. But even this statement is itself limited; because the Sophists advocated a sense of Absolute Communication; which is to say that they believed the ‘end all – be all’ was in the Presentation. If the words were effective enough, it did not matter what the Truth was, just as Postmoderns say there is always something potentially beyond “Truth” and therefore there is no “Absolute Truth” – Socrates rejected the idea of the “Absolute Communication” of the Sophists, in that there was something beyond just talking – something beyond just communicating; there was truth and error – discovery and mystery, and these things could not be contained within the structure of mere “Communication;” as a process of engagement and delineation both could and therefore should necessarily be made  – even if it is outside of the sender or the receivers desires or interests.

Socrates takes this rejection of “Absolute Communication” – or Rhetoric  – as the measure of truth, and asserts that ‘Truth exists outside of any contingency with Communication:’ the essence of Rhetoric or words holds no unbreakable control over Epistemology. Socrates breaks beyond language to assert truth – and he does this by not just arguing that knowledge cannot be necessary controlled through words, but he does it through a process of Negative Dialectic or affirming and excavating apophatic[15] realties to destroy the cataphatic[16] assertions made by a potentially fallacious misuse of Rhetoric: it’s utilization as having a supposedly unshakeable foundation: Absolute Communication. This essentially adds depth to Socrates’ argument and ‘swings the door both ways’ for him; though that door is more often an epistemological wrecking ball to his opponents arguments, because it was generally easier for him to destabilize, through apophasis, his opponents potentially naturally unstable cataphatic assertions. It is interesting that Augustine makes mention of Socrates Negative Dialectic in his City of God where he states that he “was in the habit of starting every possible argument and maintaining or demolishing all possible positions.”[17] 

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Y Dialectic Today:
Arguments for it from The Past Z

The Term Dialectic is seemingly ever evolving; from the Hegelian Dialectic of a concept of a synthesis of unity between two apposing ideological principles, to the political revolutionary Marx’s Dialectical Materialism, and the immanent Neorthodox ‘uber’theologian Karl Barth, with his concept of Crisis or Dialectical Theology.

Many of these luminaries and the schools of thought they founded can be seen as being tied back into Greek philosophy, sometimes, on a variety of points.

British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, in book Wisdom of the West, described the philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus -and how Plato and the Atomists borrowed from Parmedides their concept of “immutable elementary particles” and from Heruclitus the idea of ceaseless movement. Russell writes; “This is one of the classical examples which first suggested the Hegelian dialectic. It is certainly true of intellectual progress that is arises from a synthesis of this kind, consequent upon an unrelenting exploration of extreme positions.”[18] There is a bit of Socratic irony, even – perhaps – in Russell saying this; as he himself was a radical atheist, and never explored the idea of himself possibly being a Christian – being noted, rather, for books with titles of such as Why I am not a Christian.

Barth’s theology is known for many thing; but the highlight of it comes from his rejection of Liberal Christianity’s “emotive” centricity,[19] reacting against his own theological upbringing in his book Epistle to the Romans, where he argues, as he would for the remainder of his career, for a “Crisis” or Dialectical understanding of Scripture[20] that means in essence – it is not about how you argue or feel about it – as the Greek Sophists might be seen to embody – but how you are challenge by it to either reject or be judged by it’s hard truth; which extends beyond the mere rhetoric of it[21].

A theological cohort of Barth’s – the fellow Neo-Orthodox theologian Rudolf Bultman – radicalized an approach to theology that pushed biblical literature back from the Dialectical ‘thought for thought’ essence that it carries today within modern Evangelicalism and sought to re-establish it within a purely Mythological essence; arguing that this was the way that Greeks not just understood their culture, but their Gods as well  – and it was therefore necessary to read any literary output they created from within this context, so that rather then finding the dogmatic truth, exegetically in a text, we should rather find the essence of the “Myth” that it was supposed to, in his thoughts, be extolling – as would have been the nature and default intention/method of the ancient author. Bultman’s contention was that we could not exert a Modernist Dialectical understanding on literature that was, in his view, purely Mythological in its presentation by virtue of when it was written. He argued that any proposed exegesis conducted using the ‘flawed method’ of dialectic – as understood within a modernist, non-Mythical examination – would inherently be isogetical because of it’s failure to apprehend the proper explicative process/intent of the original author and his context as he understood his own words.[22]

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Y A Continually Emergent Dialectic:
Arguments for what it May look like then,

Based on what it looks like now and Did Once Z

In his song Part of the Mind (feat. Zeebo), which could be potentially descried as an eclectic, hip-hop dance track with a meditative instinct, Rodney Hunter speaks through the artist Zeebo, who’s voice narratives the cadent dance track with intermittent contestations, sprinkled with a seemingly Rastafarian accent, phrases such as “Truth to the power, but they still don’t believe.” There are no lyrically-laid down stories, told amid the dance club-oriented cadences here; merely punctual metanarrative-like statements: “…Searching, but you never discover.”  The song ends with a single assertion whispered over and over again, in synch with the beat and, what could even be argued, the ideological harmonic of the entire song: “It’s part of your mind, your soul, and your spirit.”

In the very first page, even before the book’s index and formal introduction, Kevin J. Fanhoozer begins a brief paragraph, describing the proceeding book which he edited; The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, with a warning: “Postmodernity allows for no absolutes and no essence.” The rest of the book – a collection of essays by various theologians and philosophers – are merely contiguous-to-this-statement thoughts of how this reality is impacting the whole of today’s theology.

Philosophy, as an entity, has spoken “Truth to Power” through the power of Myth, as did Hesiod in his Theogany in Antiquity, and then purely through the power of Rhetoric in the works of the Sophists; eventually growing frustrated at the exhaustion of it’s own limited potential, then moving on to assertions of Cogency and Reason with the birth of Dialectic – as created by Zeno but perfected by Socrates. Dialectic has proven to be a foundational cornerstone for Modernism – and arguably even scientific advancement – in its ever ongoing quest for not just Words and Power – but Words, Power, and Truth. With Words have come Communication; with Power, Capability – and Truth – Authority. But in an age where voices from across traditions and schools of thought argue that a day is fast encroaching that we will not be heard if we assert Absolutes and Essences as part of our Communication and Authority; what is to become of that which was born out of a desire to move beyond just the power of mere Words to the power of Truth? Postmodernism says that it believes in Truth – but not Absolute Truth. Dialectic said that it believed in Communication but not Absolute Communication[23]. Is there a way that future generations can still “Speak truth to Power” in such a way that does not merely just rely on the power of words, but now, no longer merely solely relies on the power of Absolutes and Essence? Or – are we condemned by some virtue of an inherent Nihilism to a fate alluded to by Zebo; “Searching, but you never Discover…?” It is as though Socrates – as he has been accused of being; might actually be the greatest Sophist himself – his ghost having hence returned to us to say – “no, you can’t have it that way either, and here is why…”

Perhaps this sense of inner futility has been both the foundation and the primary driving force behind Philosophy and it’s urge to continue to discover – perhaps always finding a subsequently unveiled limitations, and then, a subsequent move to find what is still yet unknown; only to find, prove, assert, and disprove again. The Metaphysical Pre-Dialectical concept of Myth was created to achieve an understanding of Self and Community; Dialectic, a sense of Truth and definable Essence that was moved beyond merely a capability to communicate effectively, but, rather evoked an understanding of what it meant to effectively understand things as they truly are. Perhaps Post-modernity represents a yet another further maturation of Dialectic: a state possessive of a self-contained & self-authenticating fullness of an awareness that both mere Rhetoric is ultimately limited and, ultimately, the state of having merely Knowledge is a well. Having explored the full expanse of the Cataphatic potentials of Science, are we to be merely left with the Apophaticism of Mysticism? Did we come this far to start back were we began? We have returned in our journey to the place from which we came: the Mythical, the Unknown, and the Mystical. To define what Dialectic will mean to future Theologians, Philosophers and thinkers is a guess; but it a generally safe to assume the past can in fact be a good schoolmaster to present students.

My little brother asked me what the topic was for this paper – and when I told him Dialectic – he responded with the question, “is that like the grease that you put on your spark plugs?” I told him “yes – if the spark plugs in question are your imagination and your desire for knowledge.”

A Future Dialectic:

would probably see beyond both Words and Attainable Knowledge and know that both have Cataphatic power but are forever themselves limited by the potential if not inevitable encroachment of the Apophatic; they might echo the words that it is more then just what you can say, or think, or give essence to, but a mixture of all – plus the unknowable and the as of yet undisclosed; truly, “…part of you mind, your soul, and your spirit.”

A Future Dialectic:

may well affirm both Belief and the value of Skepticism, valuing the contributions of those who always will and those who don’t and the ongoing struggle to both know, and believe, along with those who will try to assert Authority both with and without Knowledge; even valuing the inner contestations, inconsistencies and divisions between; ascended to a place beyond the limitations to Myth, Rhetoric, and even Knowledge – “Truth to the Power, but they still don’t believe.

And it is in this place: between Knowledge and The Unknown – that both Science and Belief, Myth and Skepticism will no doubt continue to claim and counter-claim every square inch of the Ideological Universe.

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Y Bibliography Z

The New Thompson Chain Reference Bible, King James Version
Indianapolis, IN: B.B. Kirkbride Bible Co, 1964.

Campbell, Joseph. The Power of Myth
New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1991.

Chesterton, G. K. The Everlasting Man
San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1991.

Hamilton, Edith. The Greek Way
New York, New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1964.

Cahill, Thomas. Sailing the Wine-Dark Sea, Why the Greeks Matter. New York, NY: Nan A. Telese, 2003.

Gargarin, Michael & Woodruff, Paul. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists. Great Britain Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Woelfel, James W. Bonhoeffer’s Theology, Classical and Revolution. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1970.

Russell, Bertrand. Wisdom of the West.
London: Cresent Books, 1976.

Finely, M.I. Morris. The Ancient Greeks. Waco, TX: Penguin Books, 1977.

Editors, Gargarin, Micheal & Woodruff, Paul. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Guthrie, W. K. C. The Greek Philosophers, From Thales to Aristotle. New York, NY: Harper Brothers, 1960.

Edited by S. Mark Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C. Reeve Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy From Thales to Aristotle, Third Edition.
Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing, 2005.

Warner, Rex. The Greek Philosophers.
New York, NY: New American Library, 1962.

MacGregor, Geddes. Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy.
New York, NY: Paragon House, 1991.

Stone, I.F. The Trial of Socrates.
London: Anchor Books, 1988.

Stumpf, Samuel Enoch. Socrates to Sartre, A History of Philosophy. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982.

Russell, Bertrand. Why I am not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects.
New York NY: Simon and Schuster, 1957.

Palmer, David. Looking at Philosophy, The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1988.

Rodney Hunder. “Part of the Mind (feat. Zeebo).” Hunterville. CD. G-Stone, Hamburg, German, 2007.

Ashcraft, Morris. Makers of the Modern Theological Mind, Rudolf Bultman. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976.

Mueller, David. Makers of the Modern Theological Mind, Karl Barth. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976.

Trans. Hoskyns, Edwyn Sir. Karl Barth, Epistle to the Romans.
London: Oxford University Press, 1968.