REL 4920, Theology of Jonathan Edwards

George M. Madsen.  Jonathan Edwards – A Life.

London Yale University Press.  615 pp.  $25.00 (paper), ISBN 0-300-09693-3.

Reviewed by Matthew Lipscomb (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga)

Submitted per Required Coursework (December, 2010)

Commissioned by Gene Mills

A Review of Jonathan Edwards – A Life

Jonathan Edwards – A Life by George M. Marsden, is an excellent review of both the life and thought of the Puritan pastor, writer and theologian. Foremost known in the collective cultural conscious as being the author of the sermon Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God – Edwards is shown by Marsden to be a much more complex and nuanced individual then he is often assumed by the many to be. Marsden shows us that Edwards is much more then just a ‘hellfire and brimstone’ preacher, in that he paints a picture of an Edwards who is rather more of a nuanced theologian and a skilled writer then just a ranting hack – and more so importantly – that he is ever more so concerned with the task of grafting the wonder, the beauty, and the grace of God into the hearts of his parishioners – much more so then his account is often so afforded.

Marsden begins his story of Edwards with an apparently innocuous bible verse – strategically placed just before the table of contents.

But we have this treasure in earthen vessels,

that the excellency of the power may be of God, and not of us. 

– II Corinthians 4:7

The way the Marsden writes can be understood to essentially be an embodiment of the basic premise expressed by this verse. Marsden does not shy away from the aspects of Edwards that bring a degree of humility to the table in regards to his personality: his potential interpersonal stiffness towards others, his often single-minded determination which at times served to his own detriment, his struggle with an apparent depression while questioning his own salvation, and his positional, ideological, and cultural entrenchment in the aristocratic culture of New England – to name just a few.  In this sense, Marsden’s biography does not savage Edwards, but neither does it place him on a lofty pedestal. Whereas some biographies sharply veer into either hagiographic or polemic dimensions – Marsden avoids both extremes, and even offers a degree of self-critique in his own self-reflective stance. This strength offers a firm foundation upon which he builds his work and it may well serve as the strongest light by which Marsden illuminates Edwards along both his historical and theological continuums.

A second balance that Marsden maintains is in the exploration of the issues that Edwards struggled with in the context of his life. Marsden does not shy away from the theological techno-speak inherent to such discussion, but neither does he merely reduce it to the indecipherable-to-the-lay-person ‘private language’ so common to many specific disciplines at their higher, academic levels.  This is perhaps the strongest point of Marsden’s review in that he goes through the theological issues that Edwards wrestled with throughout his careers as an academic, pastor and writer – and presents them both with their complexities and their nuances intact, and, for the most part, Marsden does not alienate those who lack a seminarian’s vocabulary. In this sense – Marsden executes, with a beautifully crisp clarity, the delicate task of explaining both the theological, historical, and more importantly, personal contexts for Edwards and does not leave the average reader befuddled. Marsden accomplishes a further magisterial task, as one walks away from the reading of his work – in its fullness – with the sense that one has been imparted with not just an understanding of Edwards himself and his times – but also with a deeper degree of understanding in regards to the theology which Edwards both loved and courageously fought for. There is evident, perhaps, a kind of hidden anthem of reciprocity here: that in our exploration of Edwards, he is once again – through the pen of Marsden – preaching to yet another congregation; an act which is itself both an achievement and an honor, bestowable upon both biographer and his subject.

The task of writing a book that travels through the daunting continuums of both history and theology doubly predisposes the endeavor of its writing to be of a potentially tedious, boring, and generally confusing nature – for even the most educated and interested of readers. Marsden displays a deft hand against this seemingly Cerberus-like tendency by interweaving his subject matter with both humor and genuinely touching moments placed carefully throughout the discourse of his narrative. Marsden hilariously recalls the laugh-out-loud story of how a new building at Yale was almost inadvertently given the surely ignominious-to-future-generations name of “Belcher” Hall, and then goes on in later pages to tenderly describe the passion of Edwards, as he lay dying, for his wife; whom he felt a love so special that he hoped that it might persist for all eternity.  It is a love story, surely befitting any theologian. In this sense, Marsden achieves what could be though of as a third balance, in that it is both thorough in its examination of Edwards yet retains the viewers attentivity with a wise use of both humor and what another reviewer has termed its romantic ‘you’ve got mail’ moments:  those by which Marsden keeps the story seemingly aglow with the love affair between Jonathan and ‘the girl from New Haven’ as he affectionately once wrote of her – Sara Pierpont.

Marsden’s work is very thorough and completely adequate for a single-volume study. The only criticism that this writer can offer would be, admittedly, at best anecdotal in nature.  It might have been interesting to have the quirks and overall nature of Edward’s personality interpreted though the various lenses of modern psychiatric theory and diagnostic criteria. Could Edwards be seen as being a candidate for having had Aspergers Syndrome? Various other luminaries such as Einstein and Edison have been subject to such comparisons due to their respective personality quirks. Marsden’s example of Edwards as having  “no middle gears,” his evident ability to ‘hyper-focus,’ as well as the distinct and unique way that he understood inter-relational love to function almost only from within a logical & idealistic framework at the arguable expense of any role for pure, non-reason mediated emotion, are all hallmarks of Aspergian Autism in which love (for the Aspergian [or “Aspie” as is often used as a self-referencing moniker]) is generally experienced as a thought-derivation, rather then an emotionally derived dynamic/experience.  Could Edwards have been possessive of the non-neurotypical interrelational dynamic/tendency of Aspies to generally experience love from a logically-oriented locus, and if so – could it have influenced and/or even mediated Edwards work on The Divine Affections, whereby he sought a middle ground between mere emotions and pure reason? There is some meat here for further study – but it may also be arguably too tangential to the core goal of a biography.   Other forms of evidenced non-neurotypicality were perhaps at work in the Edward’s household, as even Edward’s wife, Sara Pierpont, bears hallmarks of some potential degree of manic depression, as does Edwards self-description of himself as being in a “low & sunk estate.” It must be added, that there is always a degree of potential unfairness in making such assumptions and relegating individuals to often vague and ever-changing categories of psychiatric orders, but – as Marsden shows Edwards to be – Edwards could easily have qualified as a polymath; especially in regards to his multidisciplinary proclivities as a man of both Science, Philosophy, and Religion.

Edwards fearlessly integrated both Science and Faith. As Marsden points out, Edwards owed the loss of his life, in part, to his taking of an early & primitive smallpox vaccine.  Edwards demonstrated a love of science both in his early years – as evidenced by his Spider Letter and in those late in his life as well. He was truly more then just a philosopher and theologian – the man the Marsden shows us – held very much the heart of a scientist within his breast.          Anyone interested in both modern and/or historical theology or the life of Edwards will decidedly benefit from opening the canvas that Marsden has painted.  From Marsden’s pallet we see Edwards not just as a Pastor, Theologian, Philosopher, Generational Zeitgeist and even Scientist – but also as a prophet convinced of a supreme and irresistible divine and intertrinitarian love; one he saw as saturating all of creation in its hues and vividities. We see much more then just an angry preacher, but a man dedicated to showing others the beauty and the power of a Divine Love which he felt both crucial, evident, and more so even the very fabric and sustenance of the very universe as he saw it.

Matthew Lipscomb

Jonathan Edwards, REL 4920.40397

Gene Mills

Calvinists in the hands of an angry scientist:

a soteriological ‘thought experiment’ regarding the Calvinist versus Arminian dilemma of volitional agency and the existential personality and theological method of Jonathan Edwards in terms of a modernly scientific, situational re-contextualization of his own Newtonian versus present-day Einsteinian understanding of space-time with the intent of demonstrating a non-conflational view of divine and creational chronologies

– or –

‘Honey, I shrunk the soteriology.’

In the classic Sherlock Holmes story, A Study In Scarlett, the central character, the master detective himself, makes the observation that “it is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories instead of theories to suit facts.” (Wilson 42). It may seem a bit odd to preface a paper on the theology of Jonathan Edwards with a quote from Sherlock Holmes, but it serves well to illustrate the thesis contained herein: namely, that Jonathan Edwards, though being a masterful and diversely educated theologian, inadvertently – by nature of being a man contextually engrained in the intellectual-scientific presuppositions of his given historical age within which he lived – did just that. Edwards is hallowed within the halls of academic theology because of his bold innovation in terms of seeking a remediation between the worlds of science and faith. He was unafraid to speak out of the conventional understandings of his day in regards to how he proposed the world to actually work in terms of God’s purpose and design. His assertion that the whole of reality echoed out of the very primacy of God’s own imagination[1] beckons us into the mind and heart of an immensely rigorous thinker who challenged the very foundations of theology in his day. Today, though he is widely known for his sermon, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God, to those who have taken the time to invest in him, Edwards reveals himself to be much more than just a “hellfire and brimstone” revivalist, but rather a fearless thinker who was controversially exacting and fearlessly rigorous in both in his theological studies and his love of science.[2] This paper will seek to propose a radical, theoretical possibility: that because of Edward’s deep love of both science and exegetical theology, that were he privy to the radical and revolutionary understandings of modern science, he may have himself embarked on a likewise radical and revolutionary alternative assertion to at least one doctrinal issue.  This paper will present an argument that Edwards might have done the unthinkable: gone from being an ardent Calvinist, to having an Arminian viewpoint.

The Two Schools of Soteriology[3]

In the interest of brevity, this author will attempt to simplify the traditionally oppositional theological traditions of Calvinism and Arminianism, by merely explaining that the emphasis of Calvinism is an uncompromising assertion of the sovereignty of God and an urging for Calvinist thinkers to defer all scripture references to God’s foreknowledge as being ontologically functionalized into a predestinationalist soteriological framework.[4]  Essentially, any ‘free agency’ on the part of humanity is subsumed/countermanded by the issue of Divine Sovereignty. This viewpoint essentially guides an interpretation of Romans 8:29[5] to mean that all (in the case of the argument for a so-called ‘double’ predestination) or only those “elected” (‘single’ predestination) are irreversibly committed to a specific spiritual destiny. It has been argued that the difference between single and double predestination is a rhetorical deception; because to commend only the elected to salvation is to logically damn everyone else to being lost.

Arminianism[6] refers to the school of soteriological thought founded by Jacobus Arminius who proposed an alternate viewpoint of understanding how Election[7]  works – that essentially – we are empowered with a choice. To accept God or reject Him is always an act of sovereign volitional agency on the part of the individual and not God.  Aminianism shares with Calvinism the quality of being a ‘broad heading’ in terms of there being a great deal of potential diversity among its constituents. Generally speaking, most classically Arminian groups, like their Calvinist counterparts, also hold the scriptures to a high degree of esteem, and argue their doctrinal assertions from a scriptural standpoint.

Edwards’ Position

The debate is much the same today, as it was in his own. After all, the scripture verses that each camp respectively uses have not changed. We may have newer translations, and the linguistic form of the verses may have changed according to the cultural language game going on invisibly behind the scenes, but their contextual content has remained largely the same.

Edwards makes his case for a Calvinist understanding of how the dynamics of Election actually work in his treatise entitled Freedom of the Will. In it he argues that the word ‘liberty’ means a different thing to a Calvinist then it does to an Arminian (Smith 192-222). Edwards argues, in part, that it is a fallacy to assume that there is any liberty, if the original dynamic force in the will is bound over to sin, and no successive series of subsequent itinerations thereof are capable of rendering a product which can be considered to have the quality of true liberty (Smith 209). In this sense, Edwards argues for a causational blindness – in terms of mankind’s inability to choose God from within his own volitional capacity.

A Tale of Two Extremes

Generally speaking most mainstream Calvinists openly accept that their doctrine of Limited Atonement[8] and Single/Double Predestination – in terms of man’s ability to make a choice for God – is a radical position. When Calvinist pastor and theologian John MacArthur was asked at the 2010 Shepherd’s Conference, “how do we tell people that Jesus Christ did not die for them?” MacArthur responded initially, “Well, you tell them whatever the Bible tells ‘ya to tell them,” adding, later – in a joking manner – “I feel your pain,” before continuing on with a standard Calvinist apologetical statement.[9]            Edwards himself pointed out the extremism that often resulted on the side of Arminianism in citing all of the various increasingly non-Christian variations that it seemingly potentially leads to (Marsden 440). The Assemblies of God, the world’s largest Pentecostal denomination, holds to an Arminian position, and likewise points to the extremisms that both views potentially offer,[10] citing their belief that it “It accepts the scriptural elements found in both teachings” (AG.org). Still others, such as Mars Hill Pastor Mark Driscoll, refer to themselves as ‘Modified Calvinists’[11] in that they claim to be Arminians with an ‘expanded theology‘[12] (MarsHillChurch.org).  Still, Driscoll argues for a Single Predestinational viewpoint, in keeping with his Calvinist background.[13]         Ultimately, the disagreement between Arminian and Calvinist viewpoints comes down to the Predestination/Election issue. Most denominations are unwilling to ‘walk between’ the traditional viewpoints, such as the Assemblies of God does, and would rather dig in their heels and offer the standard scriptural defenses when it comes to the issue of Election. Whatever degree any man-related political election process man can or has created in the past, the theological issue of how individual people come into a relationship with God through the Ordo Salutis – defined as the “theological doctrine that deals with the logical sequencing of the benefits of redemption as we are united to Christ which are applied to us by the Holy Spirit” (Monergism.com) – has more to its credit. Eventually, the difference comes down the Grace of God and the Will of man, as suggested by the likewise-titled book by the Arminian theologian Clark H. Pinnock, which traces his own process from being a Calvinist to becoming an Arminian.[14] Could Edwards have likewise made just such a monumental traversal?

A different view on volitional agency, Part I: De-conflating Calvin – The subjective understanding of time as it was accepted in the idealism of Newton’s world; setting the groundwork for a soteriological ‘thought experiment’ using the unique personality and convictions of Jonathan Edwards with reference to the essence of his existential personality and theological method.

         Jonathan Edwards lived in a world that was guided by certain scientific presuppositions; he lived in a universe that was guided by the precepts of physics, as they were understood by a Newtonian understanding. Edwards was exposed to and incorporated the thoughts and ideas of Sir Isaac Newton’s thoughts in terms of his understandings of science and philosophy (Albatrus.org). Today, when we speak of a Newtonian understanding of the world, we speak of it not as a necessarily archaic or outmoded understanding, but rather a previous or older way of understanding how the whole world was understood to work. This is because Newton was not necessarily wrong per se, but rather that great advances in the studies of physics have radically changed the way that the world, space, and even time are understood to exist together.

In this sense, we have a classist model that functions on the assumed ideals of how things worked. The classicist-idealist model of time is based on a Newton’s Clock:[15] that essentially there is one great big clock that governs all of everything, and that for a theologian of his day, Edwards and others would have understood this in a functional way; or that there is only one chronological continuum for both heaven (Spirit/God) and earth (our lives). The idea of time in this context was understood from a subjective standpoint. The idea that there is a separate time for God and that of man (II Peter 3:8[16]) was essentially lost in the murky mists of a subtlety imposed theological essence of subjectivity. It would be understood to be so – but assumed to be essentially a moot point, from a practical standpoint; especially when formulating soteriological doctrine and building respective worldview frameworks for subsequent understandings of Election for the 19^th century theologian and those who came before him.

This subjective classification of time in the Newtonian classicist-idealist understanding therefore created a chrono-conflation, or a bringing together of these two understandings of time. It would be natural to deny such a theological subjectively was extant and active. After all, a sincere theologian strives for the essence of a foundation and concrete objectivity in his work – but in the objective application of theology; especially within a Newtonian understanding of time – it was functionally asserted that this subjective dimension was to be enforced because these two separate realms of time (that of the Divine and the Creational) were understood to be of a nature by which they would not objectively render themselves separately. Their separateness was assumed to operate entirely on subjective grounds. Any paradox, subjective or objective, automatically deferred to the Divine. In terms of God’s foreknowledge of Man’s decision towards Him, and more so importantly, those spoken of as being ‘fore-knew’ by Romans 8:29,[17] the logically-induced, objectively-understood but subjectively-rendered, chrono-conflated, Newtonian-idealist mindset/world-view functionally resulted in Calvinian Predestination because – in a paradox – the default is always to God as the answer. This was expressed mildly in Augustine,[18] but much more pronounced in the theology of John Calvin.

A different view on volitional agency, Part II: Entering Einstein – quantum physics and objectively understood space-time continuums; understanding the difference it makes when time becomes creationally-objectively real within a soteriological framework and the resultant implications as they might have been understood by Edwards.

         When the United States dropped its World War II nuclear bombs on Japan, physics essentially forever changed the dynamics of modern warfare. No longer the plaything of geeks and academics, physics had made the scientist the foremost power broker in the economies of the world. Physics could be used to advance – or destroy civilizations.[19]

Another revolution – equally earth shattering, albeit infinitely quieter – was also occurring: General Relativity & the dawn of Quantum Physics. General Relativity, popularly adumbrated in the global lexicon as “E= MC²”, was a far more status quo-challenging understanding of the world than its simplified moniker suggested. More than just a formula to describe the relationship of energy to mass and light, it posited that time itself is not a subjective ideal but an objective reality: one as real as rain or as discernible as the ocean’s tides. Einstein postulated that time and space “act together to form the very fabric of space around us” (Answerbag.com), what is referred to as a Time-Space Continuum, and that time could be changed and/or altered by a given objects acceleration in relation to its speed and that of Light or Gravity (NASA).

In other words, Einstein showed us that time is a distinctive component of what is understood by the theologian to be God’s creation. The theological ramifications of this are an objective (versus subjective) split between God’s creation and what we understand to be that of the Divine.  The Creational World can be understood to have its own creationally imparted time. This means the theologian must wrestle with a bifurcated (two by intrinsic nature) dichotomy in terms of the inter-relational dynamics between God’s time and that of His creation. The split is no longer idealistically-subjective. It is now must inescapably be understood as concretely-objective in its actual nature. A functionally classicist-idealist, Newtonian understanding of creational time is shown to be guilty of a divine-creational conflation of respective chronologies.

In summary, we are left with the conclusion that, as definitions, Newtonian and Einsteinian time have very different understandings of each other and markedly different implications on one’s understanding of how Divine Time and Creational Time interrelate.

A) Newtonian time can be defined as one clock, which is of a ‘subjective-idealist’ archetype, the subsequent understanding being that Heaven and Earth are on the same clock, in a non-implied but functional way.

B) Einstein/Quantum Physics Time – Definition:  can be defined as time being of a creational dimension of an ‘Objective-substantive’ archetype, therefore its subsequent understanding is that rather than existing basically in a collective mind, time is an integral and reproducible part of the created world, as real as water or rock; which in essence means that it ‘actually exists’ as a ‘creationally-contingent essence’ and not an abstract thought/spiritual one.

A different view on volitional agency, Part III: observations of Einsteinian relativity and implied creational-contextual relations, ex situ versus in situ, in regard to volitional agencies suitably extant within creational time

The Modern Age lives at a harrowing pace of technological evolution. Technology evolves and improves at such a rate that the present generation of youth are seemingly oblivious to the possibility that previous generations lived without cellular telephones and personal computers. All of these, however, are small compared to the big questions that Quantum Theory asks: does time really exist? (Scientific American 58) In fact, a modern Einsteinian and Quantum Theory worldview, in regards to its assertion of the so-called “big bang” primeval event, is no longer looked upon with disdain but is even used by theologians to support the idea that the entire cosmos came from a genitive event (Dyke and Henry).

A worldview that takes into consideration Einsteinian relativity and quantum physics makes these assertions about time:

▪          It can literally be controlled. Atomic clocks have been observed to slow down (lose time) in relation to their speed in ratio with the speed of light, or that for as long as clocks were at a given percentage of the speed of light – they lost that degree of time (hyperphysics.phy-astr.gs u.edu).

▪          When you look out through the universe, you are looking at an actual, tangible fabric of time and space – a “time-space continuum.” It can be observed to be bent and warped, in relation to gravity of stars and black holes (Britannica.com). In this sense, time is bent and warped as well, as it is a literal, concrete, objective part of creation and not a Newtonian subjective-idealist archetype used to abstractly understand relationships between events and or positions of objects in changing relations to each other.

If we accept then that time is in fact a concrete, objective, tangible, aspect of creation and not merely an idealistic and subjective vapor – one that is resident only within the intangibility of the imagination as some kind of universal tracking system for orientations of intervals and events – then we are confronted with a second question: what is our relation to it? More specifically, within the context of a discussion of the Free Will of Man, or his associated Volitional Agency, can we be found to be contextually inside or outside of it? Contextual Relation is defined as either ex situ or in situ.

▪       Ex Situ: A primary dynamic/situation which is functioning or existing outside the whole content, posit and/or relational continuum of another given dynamic/situation.

▪       In Situ: “a primary dynamic/situation functioning/existing from within another given dynamic/situation’s content, posit or relational continuum.

The thought experiment posed herein is that Jonathan Edwards was more than just a theologian and a philosopher – but that he was deeply concerned with the issues of science. If Edwards understood time to function as we understand it today, would this have had serious implications on his theology? Is there ample evidence of a radicalism within him that could allow him to see the paradox between man’s Free Choice and Divine Foreknowledge to be radically restated when re-contextualized with an Einsteinian understanding of Time?

Edwards’ concern against Arminianism was always his perceived lack of a preservation of the Sovereignty of God (Marsden 439). This is, in essence, the very basis of Calvinism (Marsden 442). Yet the idea of Divine Restraint, especially for the biblical theologian is not a neologistic concept, but one that can be and is scripturally embraced. It would not have been a questionable precept for Edwards. As Spurgeon said later, “the power that binds omnipotence is omnipotence surpassed.”[20] All good theologians are familiar with the concepts of God forgiving our sins and throwing them into the proverbially-spoken of ‘sea of forgetfulness’ which is understood to be the meaning of Micah 7:19.[21] An argument for God’s self-constraint of his own knowledge of our sin is standard, conservative theological doctrine. Either in terms of God’s own knowledge or the exertion of his Sovereignty – a proposed doctrine of ‘Divine self-constraint’ is exegetically sustainable, even from a conservative Biblicist standpoint. Self-constraint (in knowledge or in power) in no way countermands God’s Sovereignty or his Omnipotence.

Edwards was possessive of the existential fortitude to assert radical assertions in his age, and he likely would have done the same in our own. Edwards could easily have argued for Volitional Agency on the part of man as being capable of being expressed exclusively within Creational Time. He could have easily argued for the time of man to have a nature such as it being creational and fully abstracted from that of Divine Time. He would have no logical problem of any divine self-constraint operating within God’s own Creational Intent and design – or God’s revealed soteriological process (Salvation) intrinsic to it. Furthermore, he could easily go on to further argue for a paradox-displacement: that the puzzle is no longer between Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty, but that it is instead suitably frameable as a paradox of how there can even be a Divine Time and Creational Time, instead.  This is also a mystery, but one that does not have the soteriological implications that a subjective, conflated, Newtonian understanding presents. Neither does it have expressly soteriological implications. Either by Creational Design, or Divine Constraint – both God’s Sovereignty and Man’s Free Will can arguably be preserved and seen to no longer be in direct conflict when understood through an Einsteinian understanding of time.

Edwards could argue that God’s foreknowledge is ex situ to the creational time-space continuum, and likewise, that our Volitional Agency is in situ to it, therefore, there is no paradox between the two dynamics. An apologist can argue that the only paradox observed is in the scriptural eisegesis[22] intrinsic to a Newtonian Mindset, whereas if the scripture is true, then it references the relation of Divine Foreknowledge as ex situ to Creational Time and Human Volition Agency as in sito to it – which correlates to a Einsteinian View, and by doing so, the paradox resolves itself once this reality (represented indirectly in the scripture) is seen to be demonstrateably (more or less) extant in the real scientific world.

Why Jonathan Edwards?
It is arguable that there is poverty in influence when it comes to many of the great issues in modern Christianity. Primarily, it can and will be argued that Jonathan Edwards represents the embodiment of the rare transformational zeitgeist: one who was truly capable of radically moving a given conversation forward and into the forefront of thought and even through the process of a generational or possibly even a millennial-equivalent paradigm shift.

This author makes no bones about the radicalness of the given proposal – as it has been outlined and explained, insofar as it might be unlikely – but inasmuch as it could have been fathomed to be possible by Edward’s immense & powerful, theological imagination. It is into this possibility, which we will have endeavored to thrust our own retroactive theological imaginations.

         Secondarily, as mentioned before, Edwards demonstrated an exacting, thorough desire to be both faithful not only to Scripture but also to a scientific understanding of the world. In this sense, he was a Compatabilist[23] in that he saw no necessary contradiction between Science and Faith when both are understood as they actually are and not as we may perceive them to be in a sense of immediacy.

Thirdly, Edwards possessed intense passion and energy. There was no “middle way” (Marsden 38) for him. He would have been a likely candidate to make radical assertions in light of radical new understandings.

A “Philosopher and Collector of Evidence” – but would he?

The purpose of a thought experiment is to examine a subject and entertain the various possible, allowable permutations in regards to the changing of situational dynamics and/or assumptions with the goal of gauging the probability of change and/or different outcomes. It is equally arguable that Edwards could have become an Arminian if his Newtonian understanding became Einsteinian.  Die-hard Calvinists would argue that he certainly would not, whereas dyed-in-the-wool Arminians would argue that he certainly would. Edwards was never afraid of science. His concern was that it would lead to materialism (Marsden 73), not a default disproof of Faith. Edwards was humble, (Marsden 45) but he had a passion towards a hope and belief that God could and might use him in potentially “grand historical moments” (Marsden 378) of change. What remains is that it certainly provides a great degree of fascination in regards to exactly how he would have processed the information which, in life, he was always gathering and thinking about (Marsden 240) and what the outcome would have been. This should be the focus of any student who aspires to be a theologian. If future theologians are to possess the same intellect and courage as Edwards, it would certainly benefit them to ponder both the strengths and the limitations of the Edwards’ courage. In studying him, they just might find the courage to be like him for this present generation.

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NASA. Tick-Tock Atomic Clock – NASA Science. n/a n/a 2002. 4 11 2010 <http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2002/08apr_atomicclock/ >.

Olausson, Peter. Hexmaster’s Factoids: I am become death. n/a n/a n/a. 3 12 2010 <http://www.faktoider.nu/oppenheimer_eng.html >.

Shepherd’s Conference. John MacArthur’s Predestination question from 2010 Shepherd’s Conference. 10 11 2010. 10 11 2010 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4mleum3jZ1E&gt;.

Singham, Mano. The accomodationists’ best case (Part 1 of 3) | Machines Like Us. 22 9 2010. Machines Like Us. 10 12 2010 <http://machineslikeus.com/news/accommodationists-best-case-part-1-3&gt;.

Smith, John S., S. Harry Stout and P. Kenneth Minkema. A Jonathan Edwards Reader. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2003.

Spurgeon, Charles. Charles Spurgeon – Morning and Evening. n/a n/a n/a. THE AGES DIGITAL LIBRARY COLLECTIONS. 10 13 12 <http://m-c-n.us/elm/ages/heritage/LIBRARY/Spu_moev.pdf&gt;.

The Assemblies of God. Assemblies of God Position Papers – The Security of the Believer. 21 August 1978. Assemblies of God. 10 11 2010 <http://ag.org/top/beliefs/position_papers/pp_downloads/pp_4178_security.pdf >.

The Light Shines in the Darkness… Augustine on the Predestination of the Saints. n/a n/a n/a. 13 12 2010 <http://www.lightshinesindarkness.com/augustine_predestination.htm&gt;.

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The Young Earth Creation Club. Defintion of Eisegesis. n/a n/a n/a. 10 12 2010 <http://www.creationists.org/definition-of-eisegesis.html >.

Wilson, Donald A. Forensic Procedures for Broundary and Title Investigation. n/a n/a n/a. Google Books. 10 12 2010 <http://books.google.com/books?id=6C7KhNvnHGUC&pg=PA42&dq=a+study+in+scarlet+it+is+a+capital+mistake+to+theorize+before+one+has+data.&hl=en&ei=heICTbu6CMO88gbk8fTsAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=a%20study%20in%20scarlet%20it%20is%20a%20capital%20mistake%20to%20theorize%20before%20one%20has%20data.&f=false&gt;.

Leni Riefenstahl’s

Triumph des Willens

(Triumph of the Will)

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A contextual analysis in relation to its form as either a true documentary work or an article of propaganda, with reference to represented and implied political ideology and subsequent forms of directorial presentation.

________________________________________________________________

By Matthew Lipscomb

Hist 3270

Under Hitler’s Shadow: Europe 1929-1945

Dr. Anthony J. Steinhoff

9/16/2010

Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will holds the distinction of being one of the most controversial films in the history of cinematography. No student of cinema and film can make it very far in their academic studies without being confronted both by its majesty and its controversy. Filmed in 1934, and subsequently released the following year, it deftly purports itself as a documentary of the Nazi rally in Nuremburg.  Its critics have historically ardently proclaimed an alternative agenda to be inescapably at work.

The film begins with the simple footage of Adolf Hitler’s plane, first as it flies through the soft and seemingly celestial embrace of the sky, and then its subsequent descent and its feverishly anticipated arrival in Nuremburg. Admittedly, the sense of excitement and welcome that is demonstrated by the citizens of Nuremburg is not unlike anything that would be found in the enthusiasm, emotion, and energy of any modern political rally. Riefenstahl integrates the visual display of military might; the ever marching columns of marching soldiers into the essence and earthiness of the German people; which was itself an integral aspect of the NSDAP’s  collective metanarrational ethos. An example of this, is the shot of the relatively well-known Gänsemännchen Fountain in Nuremberg. The ‘little duck man’ fountain features a presumed farmer holding two ducks, with water streaming out of their beaks. Still a part of Nuremberg’s collection of iconic fountain art,[1] it is representational of the earthiness that the Nazis sought to espouse, which was sometimes referred to “Blut und Boden” or “Blood and Soil.” Riefenstahl also incorporates the imposing architecture of the stone buildings of Nuremburg – which easily iconically resonate with the thematic ideals of the age & strength of the German people and their culture – along with the majestic waving of the ever-present Nazi banners and the ever smiling and beautiful throngs of people. In an age of poverty and humiliation functionally imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, it would seem natural that this would have been a welcomed sight and a wonderful event to have participated in for a very tired and beleaguered nation. Riefenstahl offers a vision of what must have been greatly welcomed and unquestioned; that of a vibrant restoration of national pride – the focus of which was power, capability and personal responsibility – all seeming fully embodied in a unified and unquestioned political party, logically and unquestionably led by Hitler.

Riefenstahl – as she quickly reveals herself to be – is not a ‘disinterested observer;’ as is the ideal relationally-ideological position of a good documentarian. A good director of a good documentary archetypically strives to show alternative conclusions of potentially controversial subjects, insofar as they could potentially be posited by a half-way educated viewer. Here, there is no such attempt made. Contrarily, there are gratuitous metanarrational aspects that are subtly employed, such as Riefenstahl’s before mentioned lengthy shot of the airy clouds during Hitler’s flight to Nuremburg – as if to hail a messianic-like arrival; one decidedly of a heavenly or divine-like nature. It seems clear, that even in the beginning, the vestiges of the film as being documentarian vs. propagandistic quickly fade into a brute force reality that is as subtle and gentle as the night sticks wielded by the Nazi soldiers it portrays.

It should be noted, that at the time of its release – many of the cannons of Nazi ideology were not strictly regarded as being anathemas. A steady stream of books and related articles – unabashedly trumpeting the so-called ‘science of Eugenics’ – could still be ubiquitously observed both in print and in the popular media and were regarded as high-brow intellectual reading materials and apt social topics; all of which were very much still-respected components of the conversational stream among respected politicians, studious scientists and sincerely caring health professionals, not just in Germany – but elsewhere across the world. To question the notion of a Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ was a logical if not completely acceptable notion, even when extended into the potential morass of a racial context.[2]  It was not until the abject horror of the Nazi’s ‘Final Solution’ and its infernal machinery was forever indelibly sublimated into the historical conscience of post-war Europe and the rest of the world, that Eugenics became a thoroughly anathemized idea that dare not be ever mentioned.  At no point does Riefenstahl make any attempt to juxtapose any apposing views. We are only continually entreated to the carefully ordered and imposing forms of orators and their aduelent throngs – all of whom make no attempt to hide their views on race, their intrinsic supremacy, and the seemingly limitless power that they proposed to be able to yield through the purposefully combined unity of them.

Throughout the film, we see an unwavering and adoring public. Hitler is posited as a supreme and unquestioned leader. The only point at which any of this is even indirectly questioned, is buried in the skillful rhetoric of Hitler himself -who notes that other nations and peoples who have essentially not gone through what the German people have, have no right to question or wonder how and why they have arrived at the conclusions and methods that they, the Germans, have. It is important to note the rhetorical prowess that Hitler exerts in his speechmaking – as other Nazi speakers sometimes come across sounding shrill, unmetered and almost monotone in their at times hysterical enthusiasm. Hitler makes skillful use of pauses – and is firmly in control of the delivery of each of his words; demonstrating the masterful oratory that he had employed to enthrall not just all of Germany  – but much of the still unsuspecting world.

Riefenstahl’s work is a calculated deposition of intent: that of the individual farmer and that of the ditch digger; the common soldier and his fellow comrades in their elite guard units. That – as the title aptly suggests – there is more at work here then just a spirited pep rally, reminiscent of a high school football game at its best.  Military historians sociologically correspondingly extrapolate the nature of the Japanese national spirit, as well – that it was likewise rooted in a belief in an intrinsic superiority – theirs, in the fact that their leader, the emperor, was believed and accepted as an actual god among themselves. The Germans, that there was a natural and ingrained superiority as true as the genetic makeup it was supposedly written upon.  It is purported that the Japanese national spirit was not militarily broken, until the emperor renounced his own divinity; and that of the Germans – until they had actually experienced their first decisive loss on the battlefield.  Each of these nationally ethoic dynamics arguably come into play and are wordlessly argued in Riefenstahl’s narrative. Though not strictly asserted – it is more then passively implied: that Hitler is a virtual God – if not fully embodied as such within the embrace of the German mythological cannon. Many of the Germans at the rally would have been familiar with the legend of the 12^th century Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who was said to “lie asleep in a cave, ready to spring to Germany’s aid whenever the black ravens circling overhead warn him that the sacred soil of his First Reich is in danger.”[3] Surely it would have been easy for them to reach back into just such a storyline – probably told to them all as beloved bedtime stories – and contextually see him as just such a mythologically-prophesied and hoped-for, once again-returned savior.

Was Riefenstahl’s guilty of creating a progandistic slideshow – or can it be argued that she was just doing what she intended to do: to show us Nazism and the nature of its spirit, the corresponding ideologies, and the subsequently contiguous ethoic assertions intrinsic to the parties beliefs – all of which were openly manifested over the course of those few days in September 1934? Was she a collaborator – or an expositor? Arguably – she is guilty of both.  There is no glossing over or shying away from the stated ideals of the Nazi ideological platform as she related them to us. However totalitarian or lampoon-worthy they might be viewed as being by today’s audiences – they were seen as arguably innocuous by many in the national and international communities. After all – Hitler never says or implies anything in any speech that he makes that he has not already explicitly spelled out for universal perusal and rumination in his book, Mein Kampf. Nothing should be shocking. Nothing should be unexpected. Nothing – it seems – was.

There are – and will always be – certain historical events, which, because of their contextual relations to both history and the experience and story of humanity, will never be fully exhausted – and which, arguably, are rediscovered and re-learned by each generation. The sinking of the Titanic. The stories of the Roman gladiators.  Or “how the West was won,” to name just a few. But even when we are all bored with icebergs, and both sword and gun fighting – one chapter will forever fascinate us – and we should pray that it never ceases to, less we forget the consequences that it bequeathed; that of a national transfixment and the meteoric rise of an Australian paperhanger to absolute dictator of one of the most advanced and intellectually, artistically, and theologically gifted nations in the world. If ever we forget it – then Leni will be there to remind us; with grey smoky torch lights and unfurled banners; the ideas, passions and fervor of a people – and of their will.

Agnes Humbert’s Resistance & Tadeusz Borowski’s This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen – An Integrated & Intercontextual Comparison of Survival, with Reference to Life in The Nazi Prison & Concentration Camp Systems

By Matthew Lipscomb

11/18/10, History 3270, Fall 2010

Dr. Anthony Steinhoff

The story of the Nazi’s rule of Europe and the concentration camps that they set up are continued objects of fascination within the global historical conscience. Few events that have transpired in recorded history have been studied and debated and talked about as much as their concentration camps have. The staggering depth of drama, pain, and the stories – those both told and those lost – boggles the imagination. Within each of the ghastly grey images – haggardly marching across the documentary screen, those of bodies both dead and near death – we are exposed to an individual human story. Each one – of an encounter with the Nazis and their infernal machinery of racial idolatry and the corresponding war it spawned. While there are overarching metanarratives in common for many of these personal stories – differences abound; some sublime, whereas others – they are very stark.  In this paper the author will attempt to explore the similarities and the differences between two people Tadeusz Borowski and Agnès Humbert, in terms of their survival and observations made by each, utilizing as resources the books which serve to account for their respective survival stories; Borowski’s This way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentleman, and Humbert’s Resistance, A Woman’s Journey of Struggle an Defiance in Occupied France.

Humbert’s memoir is different from Borowski’s not just in its presentation format (Humbert’s is an autobiographical narrative, while Borowski’s is a series of pseudo-historical stories bases on his actual events and experiences that he witnessed and participated in) but also that while all of Borowski’s stories occur only within the camp, Humbert’s ‘metanarrational story arch’ is one that could be thought of as being principally composed of the ideals of Resistance, Capture, Captivity and Freedom.  All that we learn from Borowski is based on only on that of Captivity. For instance – all of Borowski’s stories are centered on either life in the camp, or reflections of life in the camp from a post-liberation perspective; whereas at one point, Humbert’s recalls that as a member of the Resistance they felt that while prison may seem as an eventuality – it was not yet  (at that moment) an actuality, (H40). It could be argued that Borowski would see the other stages of a biographical story (pre- and post-captivity) as being distractions in his goal of imparting the full horror of his experience of his own captivity and survival. In this sense, Borowski’s account is decidedly more existential in its orientation and Humbert’s is more so of a historical orientation, while yet still retaining the crucial personal component.

There is a second difference in terms of the scope of their respective survival stories and that is that there is a difference in the scale within which each is presented. Borowski’s takes place in the claustrophobia-inducing confines of the camp, whereas Humbert’s is national in size. Her ‘fences’ extend across the whole of Europe, not just a couple of acres, because the realm within which her story is executed is essentially the whole of France, and of Europe as well. Her initial thoughts are for her country and its continuance within the context of survival (H29). Borowski’s story is, again, constrained and personal. We are not told what is happening outside the gates, other then that there is a steady stream of people coming in to be possessed, B33, B83, B89, B119)

Thirdly, there is the dynamic of the interrelations between characters detailed in both of their respective survival narratives. Borowski has a working understanding of constant mutual interrelation with his fellow prisoners because of the close confines of the camp (B130). This close confinement and the attendant proximity of each relation serves as one of the principal backdrops for all his stories.  This results in a different set of relationship factors between the two survival narratives. In Humbert we are introduced to characters, which because of the size and scope of the stage of the story, are mysterious and unknown. For instance, Humbert’s does not know whom the “mysterious gentlemen” are who contribute to the writing, supply the paper, and then organize the printing (H23).

Fourthly, there are both similarities and differences between the ways that each respective author is treated. Though both Humbert and Borowski’s are herded like animals (H130), Humbert exists in a larger framework of submission and subjugation, with subtle differences. Everywhere there is death and pain in Borowski’s camp (B1), but for Humbert, a close friend is still able to still have a life-saving medical operation (H44). Even in the “justice” that is meted out by the Nazis – there is a big difference. Humbert’s arrest (H46) and imprisonment takes place before things began to get very bad. Being arrested later on in the war – Humbert explains to us – would in fact have resulted in an automatic trip to the death camp (H111). The constant scenes of people marching into the gas chambers as portrayed by Borowski, are a part of this eventuality (H36, H37). Humbert recalls the trials and subsequent sentencings of friends and other encountered individuals. One of her friends is sentenced to two years in prison (H45) whereas she and another friend receive a sentence of five years (H102). Humbert portrays the judge as a man with sympathy for those whom he is judging (H102) insofar as he can be seen as a sharp contrast to the brutish leaders of Borowski’s world, who walk around with “clenched teeth” and constantly bark orders, (B38). Borowski writes of his fellow prisoners as being “comrades” (B100), whereas Humbert writes “I can’t say I relish rubbing shoulders with women like this…” (H142), referring to a syphilitic prostitute who was found guilty of infecting her “clients” (H118), and a mother who killed her son and two nephews. There is an irony here – as this is a character presented who actually does deserve not just prison but potentially an actual, justified death sentence. Instead, she is sentenced to only 10 years of hard labor, (H142).

Fifthly, Another motif that is different between the survival narratives of Humbert and Borowski is the aspect of the process and characterization of entry into the camps. For Humbert, the camp/prison is a place where, at times, silence reigns (H86). There is a stark qualitative difference between this and that, which is portrayed by Borowski. Borowski portrays the camps as a seemingly cacophony-filled sustained state of chaos, filled with dread and pain. Everyone knows that something terrible is happening – but often there is just too much confusion to know exactly what that is, as personified in the little girl who begs Borowski to tell her of her impeding fate. “Listen. Tell me, where are they talking us?” (B44).

Humbert’s experience is not to be taken lightly – however. The motif of alluded to violence is included – by observation of blood on the wall of one of the rooms, at the level of her forehead (H70) which – like an old-style horror movie -invites the reader of her words to fire up their own imaginations and to conjure up the dread of what must have happened and was not directly observed or reported by her narrative. There is the ongoing humiliation of bathing while under observation of her guards (H170) and the arrival of new prisoners and their subsequent delousing and having their hair shaved off and thrown in a furnace (H170).

Sexuality strongly factors into the survival narratives as related by each author. Because of the existential centrality of sexuality, it serves as a critical dimension of the humanity of those living and existing within the confines of the Nazi prison system. It does not cease to be a part of one’s existence just because one has been imprisoned in a cell or a death camp. Borowski relates that there was essentially a house of prostitution that existed within his concentration camp and that it was referred to as ‘The Puff’ (B106), and that in the same camp women are also held (albeit, in a very different way) inside a section of the camp that was used for medical experimentation, where gruesome and mad scientist-like fertilization experiments were conducted. He relates how sometimes other prisoners would break in and often inseminate the women – much to the frustration of the professor in charge (B108). Borowski relates that even in the center of such a painful and oppressive atmosphere, the prisoners are not “maniacs or perverts” and that “Every man in the camp dreams of women. Every man in the camp tries to get a hold of a woman” (B108). And so there is a constant effort at the achievement thereof – even in light of terrible punishment (B109). Nonetheless – sexuality remains a vibrant enterprise in both worlds. Borowski relates how there are almost always women hanging around who can be “had” for no greater price then “a piece of bright silk or a shiny trinket” (93).  Humbert recalls how two women – one who looked like a “Louis XV girl” and the other, a “natural platinum blond” – are caught “making love” to a couple of Belgian factory workers under the machines that they operated (H198). There is an unmistakably erotic nuance to Humbert’s words when she describes looking forward to the cloak room “with its ingenious round basins, filled with lovely, naked female bodies. How beautiful they are, these girls….” (H160). Elsewhere she also remarks how the toilet area had earned the nickname the ‘kissodrome,’ because of a hole and the many “hurried kisses” that were exchanged through it (H214).

In light of the long shadow of Eugenics that pervades much of the reason why the Germans set up the camps to begin with – there is a bit of subtle irony in a list of comments that Humbert makes regarding her observations of the Polish people after they have been liberated. There is arguably an extant racial overtone to them. She ruminates in regards to how they are “threatening to burn down the whole town” (H235) and that she urges putting up posters all over town stating that looters will be shot. She insinuates that it might be a good thing if the most troublesome poles were shot in the feet (H235). Elsewhere, she describes them as being “primitive people” (H226). Having seen so much violence and random shootings, it is doubtful that Borowski would have made such comments.

Lastly, we are left with very different feelings in the end of each narrative. In the case of Humbert, her last chapter is entitled “Hunting the Nazis,” and she finishes the chapter with a quote from the Old Testament from Isaiah 2:4; ‘They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore,’ and then she appends the quote with the ecstatic utterance of their Parisian taxi driver; ‘Allez, on your feet, you lot! Jump to it – we’re in France!’ (H270). For Humbert, this is an expression of her survival as expressed in the last component of the metanarrational arc of her story: Freedom. The essence of which, she seeks to impress upon us is one of hope and excitement. Borowski’s approach, as mentioned previously – is much more subdued, if not altogether melancholy. Borowski seems to almost still be trapped inside a concentration camp in his head. Borowski describes himself as essentially stained by his experience, in terms of his being possessed by a “concentration-camp mentality” (B176). For him, survival is less about a hope for the future, and more so a hope that he will be able to find a way to summon the “tremendous intellectual effort” that he knows it will take to “grasp the true significance of the events, things, and people I have seen,” (B180).

Each of the stories that Humbert and Borowski provide gives just a degree of insight into the tremendous amount of pain, destruction, bondage, and loss that the Nazis exerted upon their self-perceived enemies. Humbert provides us with a sweeping biography of her life experience, before, in, and after imprisonment. Borowski lacks such a sweeping story in his own account. It tells less about a story – and more about an intensity. It is less about resistance and more about survival itself. There is not really any freedom to be found in his narration, because in the end, he tells us that he is still locked away in a prison, not of his own making, in his mind.  However expansive, varied and telling each of their accounts are, and no matter how much about survival we can learn from them – this much is true: many more stories have been lost; stories of those who did not survive. It is those people, who comprise the heaps of bodies in documentary films who perhaps remind us that everything that Borowski and Humbert have to say about survival is really just scratching the surface. Even so as it may be, the stories that they have provided will hopefully allow future generations to dig that scratch – just a bit deeper.

Read Victor Klemperer

An Essay on Victor Klemperer’s I Shall Bear Witness

Matthew Lipscomb

10/5/10, History 3270, Dr. Steinhoff

History is fleeting. Each and every generation either rediscovers or pushes farther from its scope of attention the ideas and the events of the past. In the vast storehouse of history’s files – there is one subject that many would like to see forgotten while others struggle for its continued remembrance: the historical legacy and personal affects of the Nazi party’s anti-Semitism in Europe. If a student or professor presents in a casual and summary fashion the legacy of anti-Semitism, then the story runs the risk of either being boring, dissociative, or even much worse – wrong.  The people and events of World War II face this same dilemma. Like so many other events of history, they run the risk of becoming very commonplace and overly familiar to the reader. And insofar as they can be found to be taking on these qualities – they lose value. And in losing value – they lose relevance.  Once relevance is lost – any needful truth is lost to the generation in question. One strong tool, in the fight against this loss, is Victor Klemperer’s I Will Bear Witness 1933-1941, A Diary of the Nazi Years.

Klemperer’s diary serves the mission of preserving both the record and the understanding thereof in three distinct ways. The first is that serves to ‘humanize the revelator’. In Klemperer, we see a real person with whom we potentially find ways of connecting with – and in connecting with him; we are able to bring his story closer to not just into our memory, but also into our hearts and minds. The second is that it provides crucial information in regards to the formative and influential experiences and emotional content for the individual in question. This is crucial in the case of Klemperer, especially because he is the author of numerous scholarly works and a full and deep appreciation and understanding of his works cannot be made absent an analysis of the author’s own influences and life experiences. The third, and perhaps the most important, comes through the power of the first two: that a purchase is found in the attention of the audience in terms of finding traction with the people of the story and their personal lives and the content thereof.

The average American, living in typical circumstances, cannot begin to objectively imagine what it was like for the Jewish population of Germany to live under Hitler. A subjective self-identification can potentially be approximately rendered, but outside of a Gestapo agent banging on your door and searching your house for hours (276) – the fear and the constant dread of death (5), otherwise, is merely an academically-posited, mental exercise which is not all that unlike going to see a horror movie; once frightened by the cinematographers grip upon our attention – we can easily retreat from the dark confines of the theater and return to a harmless if not busybody life:  back to nothing less and nothing more.

Klemperer’s diary, however, provides us with a record of the daily thoughts of a man living in the midst of massive political upheaval; one that unlike scared theatergoers could – he could not walk out of. Once we allow Klemperer’s writing of his day-to-day life to have access to our attention, we find we can’t either – and this is a step along the path to being genuinely shaken out of our potential sense of academic malaise.  It shakes us in that we read his often pained words about the ever increasing systematic oppression of all those who are not German (133). If we have ever cared about doing our own job with excellence, then we are shaken when we are confronted with his conviction that life in the German university, as he knew it, was no longer about true scholarship (32) but more so seemingly only about how one fit under the German’s eugenic chart (133). If we have ever enjoyed a sense of comfort in how to do our jobs, then we are confronted by his own struggle to continue to study (50) and we can almost hear the screeching and bawling (41) of politicians who care nothing for us, nor for what we desire to do and the lives that we have hope to live. Klemperer offers us a street level view of the political goings on in the 3^rd Reich, even as Hitler’s street thugs get anybody and every body to vote their way – all the way down to the crazy forest witch – who with along with their heavy hand upon her – votes for the NSDAP (219). Amidst this madness, Klemperer see himself as yet still connected with his country (9) and painfully sees it in the throes of a “national idolatry” which, in his words “goes to pieces” for him (248).

If Klemperer is the narrator of a movie, then he serves to guide us from merely being paranoid – to being literally, genuinely terrified, as each and every day brings more atrocities (13). He shows us the escalating terror of what it is like to be a Jew under the hand of the Nazis. His fear grows.  If we listen and allow it to affect us – so does ours. Eventually – as he tells us – he is scared enough to be almost expectant of the eventual accusation of a previously unimaginable horror: the idea of expecting to find a dead child placed in his garden (252) for mere purposes of framing him is yet another step into an ever-deepening terror of the soul and mind.

Klemperer’s diary is suggestive of an experience that is never really “good” in any sense of the term. It does not start out, describing any type of favorable kind of life under the Nazis.  Very early in his diary, he describes himself has being “gripped by the fear of death” (5).  We are provided some degree of insight into the apparent political system – or at least as it appears to Klemperer – as he shares with his diary that he suspects that Hindenburg is merely a puppet (8) and that he that Hindenburg’s shuffling gate is reminiscent of his own father’s condition after his debilitating stroke (8). There is hope, expressed in the early pages. “Thank God I’m alive,” he writes – alluding to the preservation of his job (12) due to his service in the German army (12). This is, however, little comfort, as he testifies that everything that he considers to be un-German “flourishes here”, (11) as if to speak of his shame in what is rapidly enveloping and transforming of the country that he loves. He hears other speaking of moving far eastward, but a move to Palestine holds no interest for him and his wife (23). Their hearts remain in Germany.

            The steadily growing power of the Nazi anti-Semitic polices are like a shadow that gradually spreads over Germany and the regions ruled under it.  What begins as fear, such as Klemperer’s fear of dismissal from his teaching post (6) almost always finds footing in reality, as he finds that to be an eventual reality (119). There is an ever-increasing sense of fatality (108) and a sense that there is a kind of national-existential immolation taking place (93). What starts off as accusations – such as the idea that when a Jew writes in German, he is obviously by nature of the act lying (15) – escalates to methodically placed snaring and purposefully devious taunting and entrapment of Jews (128). Klemperer finds the behavior of other Jews to be repugnant (33) just as he does many of his fellow Germans. The oppression makes it difficult for the Jews to conduct business and to engage in the things that they like to do – for as Klemperer repeats often, it gets harder and harder for him to study (50). Even though Klemperer and many of his fellow Germans are distraught to the point that they feel that everything is lost, and that the nation is literally “Tapping in the dark” and scaring itself (77), Klemperer displays an indomitable spirit, as he is able to utter an occasional “Hurray, I’m still alive” (185) and finds solace in the simple things, such as drinking tea (92). Klemperer illustrates the divide between the way that Jewish and non-Jewish artistry is viewed (72) as though everything is now about “zoology and business” (13). He makes reference to the fact that Jews such as himself constantly have to prove themselves (82) merely because of their ancestral makeup (133). All through the process of discrimination, there are those who resist and those who are merely “blinkered fanatics” (41). Klemperer reserves his greatest vitriol for those in academia who have gone along with the Nazi agenda (185).  To the Germans, Hitler claims that he is not a dictator, but that he as only “simplified democracy” (156). Some Germans accept this – whereas others don’t.  Klemperer’s words are always saturated with an ever growing sense of both despondency and terrible uncertainty (74).

Because of the nature of Klemperer’s work in terms of it being a diary, it offers an insight into the very personal world of Klemperer, not just as a person – but also as a scholar functioning under extraordinary and profoundly oppressive circumstances.  When studying a scholar, it is important to learn not just about his thought – but also the shape and frame of the experiences under which both they and their thoughts were developed. Future scholars studying Klemperer’s works, especially his book on the Nazi’s use of language (208) – will find a wealth of information for their studies. For instance, Klemperer, very early on, expresses his fear in regards to how long he will be able to keep his post (6). How hard it is to study under the rule of the Nazis (50, 169), his disgust with the intellectuals who have supported them (185), as well as his street-level view of the ongoing political rhetoric both he and his fellow Germans were constantly bombarded with (128). His insistence that those who ought more so know better by way of their education be punished more, is telling of his belief in the presumed strength and the ‘filter-from-absurdity’ that he feels an education should beholden one to. In this way, he is speaking ‘beyond the text’ of what he has written to us, his readers. This brings up another important issue: that of a critical or discursive/postmodern interpretation/unpacking of Klemperer’s works.

In this sense, the work of Klemperer provides us with more then just his own words, even more then the content of what would be referred to as his ‘chosen content’.  A critical or postmodern analysis of his work takes us beyond the frame that he has built for us – that of his world  – and places our hand within his hand, even as he writes to us – and allows us to feel and experience that which he was immersed in and was driving him both as a writer, a person, a Jew – and even a German. This ‘third space’ is more readily accessible, the more intimate we become with Klemperer’s life and what it felt like for him to be in it. The intimacy and rawness afforded by the intrinsic nature of it being a diary, greatly enhances the capability of gaining further access into the content which lies beyond merely what he intends to tell us – but also the larger content of the text as it came to be in the final form of its actual content:  both the content of what he tells us willfully and directly and that which he tells us both inadvertently and unintentionally. By this nature, we have a larger scope to explore and unpack; as opposed to the intrinsic sterility of a document that gives no insight into the intents, emotions and life-forming experiences of the author; such as when Klemperer tell us how it is literally torturous to study Rousseau (169). This poverty is replaced by a richness present in his diary, which also serves to both anchor our attention and broaden the scope of its value to us both in terms of identifying with the author (for the sake of personally appropriating the importance of the history), but also its worth in more academic, histo-analytic dimensions.

In this sense, if we engage in a study of Nazi history and its anti-Semitism, then Klemperer’s diary provides a profound insight into not just the content of both it and related books, but the process and the pain that was experienced by Klemperer in the writing of them. When we read where Klemperer tells us that the rejection of his book on Voltaire (181) was even more painful to him then his dismissal from his teaching post (181), we are confronted with the author’s own love and – for lack of a better term – his ‘literary midwifery,’ that he endured in the ‘conception and birth’ of his books. But more then just affording us a deeper, potential understanding of his books – we are shown the more mundane aspects of his life as well – which, in terms of understanding and creating a treatment/understanding of Klemperer as a scholar and literary figure – are equally, if not more so greater in the sum of their importance. Reading about the “mystery tours” that he and his wife took (30) in their efforts to escape the war-like stresses exerted upon them, as well as the boldness required and the fear induced by the driving lessons (150) that he undertook to take in 1936.  He tells us of how his car “eats him up” (159), how it “rules” him (160), but gradually becomes more enjoyable (161), and even recalls the accident that they eventually have with it (177). In this way, his car, ironically, provides I road to a great potential depth of further understanding of Klemperer and both scholar, Holocaust survivor, and human being. He speaks to us more then he consciously intends. This is one of the valuable literary dynamics that the diary-format potentially possesses.

Just as the essence of a diary can potentially expand the ‘textual content’ of a given text – it can also potentially constrain it. By nature of it being a diary, it is almost completely subjective – and in losing or lacking a degree of objectivity, it must be considered as thus in the totality of its acceptance and/or judgment by the scholar and non-academic alike. Granted, Klemperer’s diary takes place in Nazi Germany, and so when he makes mention of pondering “dramatic measures with poison” (140) we see both a humor and a deadly, if not bitter, hopelessness echoing out of the text. But we have correlating historical evidence to support the objective presuppositions implied by the content of what Klemperer is telling us. But we could easily take the same diary-format and transpose it into a different set of historical circumstances. How would the diary of the infamous so-called “Unabomber” be considered? Would it likewise have scholarly value? Would we find a suitable and justifiable understanding or acceptance of his deeds from within it? Or what if a diary were found of one of the 9/11 terrorist attackers? We would be treated to each respective author’s interactions and subjective presuppositions about their worlds that they inhabit and how they felt about our own. Could one argue for a justifiable consilience? Or would such a work be automatically deemed hopelessly and irredeemably reprobate? Would that judgment be an ironically fascist-like decision in and of itself? Perhaps it would be possible to approach it academically, albeit accounting for its obviously culturally-mediated, dissonant aspects. Regardless, we do in fact have clear-cut, openly accepted and objective truths that correlate and support the subjectivity of Klemperer’s work – but outside of that, many will argue that the format can and often does lose strength and credibility after a certain points.

It will not suffice to merely tell forthcoming generations that the anti-Semitism of the Nazi party was wrong. We must find a way to open up the lives of those who lived through it, and find a way to make their experiences a place that finds a way to root themselves in our hearts, whereby their experiences are shared with us – and we feel that they become understandable and relevant to us.

In his diary, Klemperer pens the words piccolo mondo moderno; Italian for ‘small, modern world’.  Even today, as the magic of technology and science becomes ever more dazzling – the modern world bears much resemblance to Klemperer’s.  It is shrinking – and the pain and brutality and once seemed a world away, is again seemingly striving to confront us in our own back yard. Klemperer’s diary is an important tool to remind us that the struggles of anti-Semitism and eugenic ideology are relevant topics still for us today. They have to be. We have to maintain the relevance of them. Otherwise the lessons of Klemperer’s experience will have to be painfully relearned by forthcoming generations.

http://www.youtube.com/movie?v=WH9J48jlUE0&feature=mv_sr

Matthew Lipscomb

Reaction to Land & Freedom

UNDER HITLER’S SHADOW: EUROPE 1929-45

 Dr. Anthony J. Steinhoff,  HIST 3270, Fall 2010

What seem to be the major sources of conflict between the P.O.U.M. (the group that David, the film’s protaganist joins) and the other leftist/Republican forces?

In regards to the conflicts between the leftist/Republican forces – I think the sources of it are largely ideological. It is not enough, however, to just leave it at that – because it is much more multi-varied and complex. It is my personal opinion that both Socialism and Communism are both overly-idealistic and archetypically conflationary ideologies. They have a pie-in-the-sky egalitarian metanarrative, but always de-evolve into hegemonic totalitarianism because they throw out so many other dynamics in the formulation of their steadfast assumptions. Both Socialism and Communism necessarily must include the idea of ‘the other,’ (which in Marxist ideology is the “bourgeoisie”) and that it is oppressing a ‘victim,’ (rhetorically defined as the “Proletariat”). Marxism (and Socialism, to a lesser degree, but arguably still on the same ideological-political continuum) uses this ‘us’ vs. ‘them’/’victim’ vs. ‘oppressor’ dichotomy to gain a degree of purchase with its audience.

The issue is that it is a reactionary dynamic – in terms of its teleology – and therefore necessarily has an intrinsically reactive ontology. Therefore, it is not something that you just ‘put to bed,’ as it were. Hence, once a controlling totalitarian figure (Stalin, in this case) co-opts its energy, it suppresses the non-submissive groups forcefully, just as it had itself forcefully asserted its own growth. In the film, the P.O.U.M. is referenced as being a ‘trotskyian’ group. Trotsky trumpeted the idea of a “continued revolution” – which was against the interest of the Stalinist control, hence it was oppressed. As is typical of reactionary dynamics – the reaction is more often then not worse then that which caused it. This is a motif that is born out in the movie. They organize to defeat the fascists – but in the end  – are brutally oppressed and killed by those who would otherwise be their ideological partners and friends. In virtually every case countries with communist or strong socialist tendencies are ruled by the fist of a strong man – and not the collective will of the people.

If David had been a real person, do you think he would have regretted ever going to Spain to fight?

I think he would have.

Why?

I tried to make it a point to not do any research on Ken Loach, the producer of Land and Freedom. The reason for this – is that I am pretty sure that he is trying to make a political statement, and I wanted to try to maintain an even-handed review/reaction. I think the words that are spoken by the character in the end, “had we succeeded here – we could have changed the world,” are more then just the character speaking, but I suspect that he is a foil for the feelings of the director/writer, in that I suspicion that it may well represent a deeper statement of frustrated futility on his part. Looking back, even if you make an effort to objectively look back at this time in political history – it is a huge mess. It is a series of abusive governments, succeeded by thugs who evolve into even worse oppressors – all the while trumpeting such and such wonderful ideals while paving the way with the bones of both enemies and selves. It is a history literally written in blood. There are always lofty ideals – and brute force tyranny behind them. I think that the most telling aspect is that David does what most people would do; or more importantly, wish that they might be able to do (which he could – unlike most others): get back/immigrate to Britain.

I think that he would have recognized that there were no good guys in the whole affair – only people being controlled by others with dogmatic idealisms, which promised freedom and land – but in the end brought slavery and utter poverty.

3) Why do you think Loach decided to name his film “Land and Freedom”?

His argument is that that is essentially what the people are fighting for. The irony in the statement is that by definition, property ownership is taboo – so that if there is any ownership of anything, it is to be by everybody – hence the scene of the protracted argument over what do to with the property of the executed priest. Most (if not all) anti-capitalist groups – with their anti-meritocratic leanings – claim to represent fairness in “freedom” and “land” but historically these have been empty promises. Everything is eventually taken from everybody by force – and only a select few are self-appointed adjudicators (ironically, a functional hegemony) over the presumed proletariat. I think that Loach makes an effort to humanize the insurgents. The words of one of the characters that the insurgency was “Socialism in Action” is a telling phase. Several times I thought to myself – how many years down the road will we be watching Iraqi/Afghanistan insurgents falling in love, singing songs, and eating together on film, perhaps on A&E or a Showtime Television ministries. I am sure that it would win many awards and be warmly received by the critics.

Would a Nationalist (Franco-backer) agree with this decision?

No – I don’t think that they would. The nationalists were ideologues functionally (in terms of how the actual outcome of things would serve to be, not in terms of what they claimed to represent) bent on self-preservation as well. In the end – everything is rhetoric; there are no true Kantian absolutes. They would argue against these terms in terms of serving their larger ideological goals. To both groups, the terms of “land” and “freedom” are merely rhetorical postulates employed for the purposes of propaganda. There is no doubt that each would claim and argue to accurately represent and embody each – in terms of how each functioned, in the end; they merely served as an antithesis to each.

Concluding Thoughts

Today, there is a lot of talk of ‘postcolonial’ and ‘deconstruction’/ ’anti-foundationalist’ theory. A number of writers/theoricians who represent these schools of thought, are themselves avowed Marxists. The character of William Ayers, who was put on trial for a terrorist bombing and who was a founding member of the Weather Underground, a 60’s radical, Marxist group, later “grew up” and literally became a college English professor. He could easily be a modern real life “David.” Ayers was recently in the news, because he was denied Emeritus status by the Iowa Board of Regents. Christopher Kennedy, son of slain Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, put it pointedly when he said “I am guided by my conscience and one which has been formed by a series of experiences, many of which have been shared with the people of our country and mark each of us in a profound way.” He then went on to state that he could not give the honor of the title “to a man whose body of work includes a book dedicated in part to the man who murdered my father.”

The Marxist/anti-Capitalist thinking of the 1930’s has abandoned the battlefield, and all of its frustrations, for the fields of young minds offered in the University. Today, the rhetorical dialog of delineating “the other” goes on; as well as their demonization of what they perceive and endlessly expound as being the greed of the rich and the exploitation of the masses by greedy capitalists. Recent economic hardships brought on in part by the legitimate abuses of some capitalistic systems, has reignited the conversation – and the ghost of Marx is once again filling the heads of an idealistically-driven generation with dreams of complete equality and financial prosperity and whom, more importantly, are willing to put up a brutal fight for it.  But is this possible? Or – as did David discovered – will we merely once again fight among ourselves, only to once again bring ourselves under the thumb of a merciless tyrant? Unlike David, we won’t be able to just run back home to our family. We will be buried on our own battlefield – under our own soil.

Trailer is here http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DrgSHIJXAQ

A Reaction Paper to

Katyń

A Movie by Andrzej Wajda.

HIST 3270

UNDER HITLER’S SHADOW: EUROPE 1929-45

Dr. Anthony J. Steinhoff

Fall 2010

By Matthew Lipscomb

         In regards to why the Soviets were so hostile to the poles, I believe that this question resolves back to the relationship between the two governments. More importantly, it is integral to understand the Marxist mindset in relation to all other governments – and by fundamental concomitancy – individuals which functionally constitute them: not just officers and soldiers, but also lawyers, and academic professionals and other “intelligentsia.” In Marxist theory, violence is referred to as being a “handmaiden” to change and/or revolution. It is therefore perfectly acceptable that violence will potentially be (even more so, perhaps, expectedly so) a crucial part of any significant paradigm shift in relation to the economic and governmental ideology of a nation or people going from a prior system to that of Communism.  This ideology results in a sublimated expectation of violence within the conscience of the revolutionary agent; providing not just a fertile ground for its perpetration on their part – but also ample means for its subsequent exaggeration and continued propagation. I believe that a strong argument can be made that this ideology of an intrinsic, contextually-expectational violence serves as a lubricant for such ongoing, eventually archetypical behavior. If the presence of violence is the sign of progress – then it may well be instigated in the desire for a generation or even accentuation of hopes for it. Whether this be sending your own men into fields to clear mines – or shooting railroad cars worth of officers, citizens, and intelligentsia of a given country, as took place in the Katyn forest. The mentality potentially becomes that of ‘we now have violence – the progress that we seek is sure to follow.’ The end result is that such a government will almost assuredly perpetrate as much violence as need be conducted in their own minds to achieve whatever means they so desire. In the case of wartime Poland, the Soviets wanted to re-create it into a Communist buffer zone; one with a government and a people replete with their own Marxist ideology. As an acceptable part of this process – they wiped out the populations of any class of people who would theoretically pose a potential threat to the new system of government and it’s attendant social and economic theories.

         Based on the information that is presented in the film, it is relayed to the viewer that there was only a slight difference between that of the Germans and the Russians in regards to their treatment of Polish citizens. In the movie, the animosity of the Germans is seen as directed towards the academics (or intelligentsia), as demonstrated in the scene where the entire university is emptied out by an S.S. officer, and all of the professors and politicians sent off to a concentration camp. On the polish side, we see the violence of the soviets enacted against the polish officers by their eventual executions in the forest. Though we are not explicitly shown any Intelligentsia being executed in the forest, it is my understanding that a part of their number is known to have been included, according to historical records. I think that the Wajda may have been insinuating that the Russians were worse then the Germans, in that while the Germans did empty out the universities, they put them into concentration camps – and we are not shown any executions related to that action. The death that is highlighted (that of the older professor, whose ashes are received back by his wife) seems to be related as if it were because of poor healthcare for a bad heart – and not the violence of a gun.

         Each of the respective sides seems to make efforts to utilize the occurrence to their own favor. In each case of the Germans, we are shown an example of their propaganda machine at work, when they attempt to coerce a woman into reading a prepared statement. Her reticence illustrates her conviction that it is either a blatant lie, or that her words will merely be used propagate other lies. At the point of her steadfast refusal, she is whisked away and forced to watch a film detailing the atrocities the the eyes of German documentarians. Subsequently, the Soviets also used the story for their own means – which may have factored into their reasoning for its perpetration all along. In their case, we see a truck, with a built-in projector, showing the footage to civilians of soviet army technicians investigating the unearthed remains and arguing that it was the work of the Germans. In the movie, a woman starts banging on the side of the truck and yelling that it is a lie, interrupting its presentation. In the film, both Soviet and Russian film reels are at respective points shown, and it is almost as if both run off of the same exact script. It is, however, through Andrzej’s diary, his rosary, and other incidental items such his sweater, which he was wearing, that the truth comes back to those who were otherwise potentially unacquainted with the actual truth of the matter

         I think that you can argue that what Wajda is trying to show is the futility of Totalitarianism, as it is revealed to have when it is confronted by the power of the free spirit; but also the intense and immeasurable cost that has historically been injuriously required by it of not just those who love freedom, but more specifically, of the Polish people. We are provided a sense that while others have both hidden and tried to capitalize on what happened in the Katyn Forrest, in the end, the truth comes out – even if the voices of those who have endured the travesty of its horror have been silenced. His point is that true power is within the human spirit and not in the forced orchestrations of any governmental state. Any injustice, however horrible and however well hidden, will be immediately known to some – but eventually realized by all.

Thielickeian  Contestations   of   Cartesian  Theology:

Radically rearranging the macro-divisionary theological landscape and traditional Classifications of Christian Theology in Light of the Proposed Influence of René Descartes with Reference to a Foundation of Scripture, Pluralism, and the Origins of Faith.

I think, therefore I am.

Descartes

I am thought, therefore I am.

Franz Von Baader

He is – therefore I think.

Johann George Hamann[1]

Preliminary Considerations, Part 1: Understanding assumed theological-structural divisionary dichotomies, past and present – ‘Modern vs. Liberal,’ ‘Progressive vs. Conservative.’

If one were to consider the flow of Christian history – it is indeed a succession of ideological and epistemological assertions, counter-assertions and refutations and then subsequent alienations. And while the modern day theological practioner may hold dear the hope that this represents an ‘advancement’ – this may at times be true; yet, unfortunately, more so often it represents yet another doctrinal division or denominational fractionalization. This divisionary process has a decidedly bifurcated nature; in that it has taken place not just on a micro-level but also on a macro-scale as well. A micro-level example would be the diversity of conservative, Pentecostal denominations – such as that of my own background. The United Pentecostal Church[2] division,[3] which emerged out of the now much larger Assemblies of God[4] denomination, and the Church of God[5], then their own seceding Church of God of Prophecy[6], and – of course – then the even later splinter group of the Church of God of Jerusalem Acres. [7] A friend and I once joked that were going to start a new church denomination and call it The Assemblies of the Church of God of Prophecy at Jerusalem Acres Pure Holiness Anointing With Signs and Wonders Following; as it seems so much the nature of such subsequently re-splintered groups: the longer the name, the more legitimate the endeavor. And while this divisionary process is ever ongoing – sometimes with legitimate purpose – other times bordering on the absurd – the macro-level stratifications taking place upon the larger body of theological polity, are just as active and contested. It is this process that we will take a look at  – and make an attempt to clarify both generally held divisions/classifications, and the iconoclastic endeavors of the German theologian Helmut Thielicke; which if taken to heart – radically rearrange one’s macro-divisionary theological landscape in relation to them.

Traditionally, theological macro-historical divisions fall along certain lines. These are the Modern vs. Classic schools, as proposed by J. Gresham Machen[8] in the 1920’s and various Evangelical authors such as Karl F. Henry[9] in the 1970’s. In more modern times, this division is referred to in terms of a Liberal vs. Conservative dichotomy or even Progressive vs. Traditionalist; depending on the perspective or agenda at hand. Thielicke makes the argument that regardless of whether you use the title “Conservative” of “Fundamentalist” to describe them – one side will be primarily concerned with salvation and holiness, and the other – the “Progressive” or “Liberal” faction – will be more interested in Justice, Peace and ‘how one’s faith makes one feel’ vs. ‘where one’s faith will posit one’s soul a thousand years from now.’ Each side generally ignores and potentially even denigrates the concerns of the other side – as alluded to in Henry’s introspective caution when he wrote

The average Fundamentalist’s indifference to social implications of his religious message has been so marked, however, that non-evangelicals have sometimes classified him with the pessimist in his attitude toward world conditions.[10]

 

It is not fair to say that the ethical platform of all conservative churches has clustered about such platitudes as “abstain from intoxicating beverages, movies, dancing, card-playing, and smoking,” but there are multitudes of Fundamentalist congregations in which these are the main points of reference of ethical speculation. In one of the large Christian colleges, a chapel speaker recently expressed amazement that the campus newspaper could devote so much space to the all-important problem of whether it is right to play “rook,” while the nations of the world are playing with fire.[11]

This stands in sharp contrast to the ‘Social Gospel’ of Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918); who taught that man rarely sinned against God – but more so often against society and his fellow brother[12] or the theology of Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who’s theology – as described by the great German theologian Karl Barth – concerned itself with how one’s faith made one feel; in his words – a “theology of feeling, of awareness.”[13]

Preliminary Considerations, Part 2: Thielicke’s Restructurement in light his Cartesian vs. Scriptural Foundations.

Against this classical dichotomy of classification, Thielicke proposes a bold move. He proposes that both theological movements, especially the “Modern,” are essentially rooted back into Descartes’ idea of the Ego. They are, in the words of Paul C. McClasson, rooted back into the “cannons of Rationality” to which the church “owes nothing whatsoever.”[14] But what then forms the basis for any theological thought? Both McClasson and Thielicke propose that the nature of the work of theology must center – not upon man’s own thought of it – but rather an uncompromising view of Scripture. The argument does hence arise – is this purported view a merely a regurgitated fundamentalism? The argument that both McClasson and Thielicke make is that the soteriological urgency of Fundamentalism and Societal concern of Liberalism are merely “two sides of the same Cartesian coin[15]” – in that they are both true and need not be so needlessly separated from one another. Reason – or our ability to think and digest and understand both scripture and doctrine – are to be firmly grounded in the foundation of the Scripture – not or own potentially fanciful logical outworking of it; no matter how thought-out and thorough they might be, to both the actual and the perceived shortcomings of scriptural admonitions.

Thielicke proposes two theological dynamics – each of which represent alternate potentialities of doctrinal formulation in relation to Christian scripture: Actualization & Accommodation. Actualization is “ a new interpretation of truth, in it’s readdressing, as it were. The truth remains intact. It means that the hearer is summoned and called ‘under the truth’ in his own name and his own situation.” Accommodation, on the other hand, represents truth “under me” and is essentially pragmatic in its nature.  Beginning with Descartes, truth is subjected and potentially countermanded by the “I” or the cogito of self. Rather then “Self” being under the “Truth” – Truth is interpreted and authorized by man’s own affirmation of it.  “Descartes paves the way for making the relevance of the knowing self the center of thought.”[16] Essentially – the dynamic in play becomes “ ‘Reason’ or ‘Self’ seeking understanding” contra the classic Augustinian/Anselm dictum of fides quaerens intellectum – faith seeking understanding. Descartes based every potentiality for understanding on his own self-awareness; whereas Augustine based a capability to reason on the motto credo ut intellegam – I believe (have faith) in order to understand.[17]

Neither Thielicke nor McClasson reject the value or the potential of Reason or ‘self-awareness’ – rather they assert that there will always be an teleological foundation in any theological epistemology – and that for all it’s limitations – Scripture is the only suitable foundation, and Reason should remain what it is essentially in relation to it – a tool.

As a nontheological foundational epistemological basis for dogmatics, any form of human philosophy, from Aristotle to Wittgenstein, is absolutely to be rejected. To any that would set the agenda or determine the parameters of Christian truth, our answer is simply no![18] However, as a set of tools that may bring some clarity to the process of faith seeking understanding, any form or human philosophy and culture may be legitimately brought to bear upon the questions at hand, provided the usage is in accordance with the inner logic of the subject matter as learned from the scriptures. The church theologian should be fully educated in the history of human culture and fully conversant with the issues of the day, but the theologian is absolutely free from the imperialistic claim of any human system.  [19]

The style and understanding of Christianity as advocated by Thielicke and McClasson is not the ‘check your brain at the door’ varietal – a precursory reading of any works penned by their own hands reveal both men to be astute and their own writings and their respective work far from the palladium offered by many self-proclaimed modern philosopher-kings. Rather, perhaps, their efforts mark a correction to the Enlightenment’s efforts to make one’s own self-awareness and Reason the ‘end-all’ & ‘be-all’ for theological formulation. Their contestations of an unchecked Cartesian self-centric and ego-authenticated epistemology perhaps echo the words of the Judeo-Christian cannon of Scripture itself, which warns that the Deity which it purports to reveal to the reader is in no way beholden to the logic or the common sense of anybody, anywhere – and if anything, He would rather use “foolishness” and “brokenness” to achieve the revelation of Himself to those who will find Him in it’s pages, confounding the wise and using weakness to outwit the strong.[20]

And so – one could conclude – that it is not contrary to the “inner logic” of the Scripture, that even if Descartes was in fact under the full influence of his proposed “evil genie” – that even such a condition could not necessarily preclude the capacity for a divine God to use the situation for his own glory, self-proclamation and revelation. Thielicke and McClasson might well ague with Descartes that his Method of Systematic Doubt fails at the onset with the assumption that his ‘evil genie’ precludes any potential revelatory capacity itself. Whereas Descartes attempts to use constriction and weakness as a limiting factor of awareness – the scripture makes clear that we, as humans, need not be ultimately foundationally dependent upon our own capabilities for either life, or our own theological ruminations. Through strength – or weakness, comprehension – or deception – God’s grace is omni-sufficient for any conceivably proposeable task.

Secondary Considerations, Part 1: Where then from whence a Foundation?  The Interpretation Thereof.

The point of this essay, thus far – has been to illustrate both the contentions and the divide between those who would either directly or indirectly embrace logic or rational thought as a foundational structure for faith, vs. those who would seek to rather ground belief and the attendant religious structure thereof upon a scriptural foundation. The ensuing dilemma is not all that unlike that of Antony Van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723); who solved a number of mysteries and problems in his discovery of bacteria and single-celled organisms; such as what causes infections and eventually how to prevent them during surgical procedures – but in opening this door, he truly opened the gate to a veritable universe of more unknowns and further, successive challenges – which proved to be exponentially greater in their number and illusiveness, then to the problems and their solutions that he had successfully closed the door to and put behind him. Today, every hospital lab has a department dedicated to the science of Microbiology, which comes with a trained and dedicated staff who work 24/7 inside it, laboring to find and then isolate which antibiotic a given patient’s infection will respond to. The technology and knowledge of just the medical wedge of this field alone continues to grow exponentially – and no one can dare guess how advanced or mature it may or may not be in the years to come, let along the light years it as advanced from when Leeuwenhoek first gazed through his primitive microscope. What often happens to the biologist, who finds yet another lay of biochemical complexity – or the astrophysicist, who finds yet another division in the intergalactic orderings of planets, constellations, and universes in his view of the night sky – the same is also true for the theologian. Once we challenge Reason and assert a foundation of the Scripture – then we are asked – whose scripture and method? The problems that challenge us are greater then those that we have put to rest. But we cannot go back. Advancement – in any field of study – demands that we potentially allow more mystery for every puzzle that we unlock.

In the 5O’s, the German Neorthodox Theologian Rudolf Bultman popularized the notion of “Demythologization” – through which he assumed that the stories of the bible were told as stories, and our job for today is to merely find their ‘meta-narratives’ and then correctly reinterpret them for today within the scope of modern epistemological frameworks and current cultural ideological references. Another Neorthodox Theologian, from the same time period – Paul Tillich – used an Existentialist tool-set to interpret scripture, through which he described God as ‘The Ultimate Concern” and how that related to one’s own “Ground of Being.” Another giant in the arena of theologians, Karl Barth – who wrote the incredibly long-winded, 14 volume series entitled Church Dogmatics; and was still writing/working on it the day he died – was once asked impromptu by an eager news reporter, in so many words, ‘Professor Barth, tell us something very deep and theologically profound about your work,’ to which he responded, with the nursery rhyme – which arguably succinctly distilled all the endless pages that he had himself written; “Jesus Loves me – this I know, for the Bible tells me so.” Can something be so complex that it cannot fit into 14 volumes; so much, that the entire productive life of a theologian is yet not enough to write it – and still yet can it really be so simple as to be capable of being conveyed in the silliness of a nursery rhyme? More Doors unlocked – and still more mystery.

In context of the current discussion of how to interpret and apply the Scripture-as-Foundation precept – McClasson favors the work of Brevard S. Childs, a Yale theologian known for his Old Testament work and commentary. Childs advanced the term “Canonical” in regards to an understanding of ‘the whole of scripture’ and not just a select part of it; as both Liberals and Fundamentalists are prone to do. He advances a concept or understanding of seeing the scripture itself as speaking to us regarding a revelation or knowledge that is itself beyond just the Bible itself: the actuality of God and the knowledge of Him, as revealed through the scripture. Through this process – Childs advanced the notion, that the scripture – though it be a foundation to us – to God, it is a merely a tool; as the Scripture, while it may be a theologically true statement to say that “the Word (The scripture) became flesh and walked among men (Christ), the Bible itself, as it is posited upon paper and endlessly rewritten in a variety of languages – is not God himself. Essentially, Childs argues that we must remind ourselves that the Bible/Scripture may be our only way to ‘see’ God’s revelation – but it is still – nonetheless – a window, and not God himself. God is not to be confused with the revelation of Himself. As ‘alive’ and ‘dynamic’ as we may assert it to be – we will eventually come back to the issue of faith in regards to the perceived limits of that revelation in regards to the things that we wish it did speak to and of, but does not. It is far beyond the already stretched scope of this paper to offer an extended analysis of Bultman, Tillich, and Barth, and even Henry and Machen, and all of their diverse theological methods both in regards to theology and the scripture, or even their own self-perceived positions inside the theological Conservative vs. Liberal assumed normative & divisionary dichotomies of their respective times. But it may be safe to say at least this much, each – and many others for that matter – saw and wrote from a unique perspective and both closed and opened doors to both mysteries and solutions. And all would probably agree in as much as this, as has already been asserted: for all the answers that we given, again, many more remain.

Secondary Considerations, Part 2: Where then from whence a Foundation?  The Diversity & Plurality Thereof.

Several nights ago, I sat in a Mexican restaurant and glanced up to see the big screen television hanging from the ceiling, in the corner. It was tuned to CNN, and the focus was on a group of hair-bunned, plain-faced women in long pastel-colored dresses. Some of whom were visibly distressed. Larry King was interviewing them on national television. The caption on the bottom of the screen read “FLDS Mothers Speak Out: We want our Children Back!” I stood up from my table and walked over to where I could read the teletyped conversations, as they drifted across the screen. At least one of the women seemed near tears. The conversation seemed to revolve around the question – ‘are you aware that you have broken the law?’ 416 children had been more or less forcibly removed by Child Protective Services from the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saint compound named, “Yearning for Zion” a few days earlier. They were being placed in foster homes by the state, with DNA paternity tests to soon follow. A bed found in their “temple” was reasoned to be where “spiritual” marriages were consummated between very young girls and appreciably older men; with the goal of preserving and perpetuating the sect’s practice of Polygamy. The droning, succession of talking heads that followed the muted cries for help by the mothers, made statements like, ‘it might take ten years of intensive therapy, before they or any of their children can function within normal society.’ I thought to myself  – was the State just in what they did? And if they were just in their actions there – could the same reasoning send them to my church with goals of someone doing something likewise, even as seemingly unthinkable as splitting up scores of families? After all, we may not believe in Polygamy; but what if laws were passed against the practice of Glossolalia[21]? That is as odd to some people as Polygamy would be perverse to anybody. There is seemingly no limit to the eccentricity, or at times perversity, that some will engage themselves in, under the guise of the alleged scriptural admonition, in the practice thereof of ‘this or that’. But how far is too far? How open can we be both within the realms of Religious and the Secular? There have never been any easy answers. It is doubtful there ever will be. The vast majority of orthodox theologians who work in the Judeo-Christian tradition concur that the essence of the scripture is an allowance of interpretive and religious freedom. You are free to do what you want – but the future and penalties for the wrong choice are potentially clear -depending in the question at hand. A scholarly pastor friend once said; ‘all paths may or may not lead to God, but God is not on all the paths’.

And so in speaking of the question of a Scriptural Foundation contra one of Cartesian Reason, and it’s respective position in relation to the interpretation of the Scripture within such a proposed theological dichotomy – in regards to it’s application as commonly accepted today, even among those who would consider ourselves to be “Fundamentalists” – we see our own faith as essentially an underlying cultural meta-ethic which informs but does not force it’s control over our society at large. Family members, who have grown up in my own family, were not seen as “lost or damned” if they began to attend a different church, one which potentially interprets the scripture differently. Even in its more austere forms – such as my own – a degree of religious pluralism is an essential underlying and openly accepted dynamic[22]. The results of this is a decidedly non-hedgemonic theological atmosphere; wherein an understanding of a universal catholic church embodies the existential identity of each individual believer: I may attend Grace Assembly of God, in Cleveland; a church in the Assemblies of God denomination – and yet I am just as much a Christian as someone else who attends Our Lady of Perpetual Help Catholic church, in Chattanooga. Our respective churches may differ on various doctrinal aspects, but in light of eternity, we feel we know where we will be 10 thousand years from now.

It should be further pointed out – that even in my own denominational background, which at times is seemingly guilty of borderline culturally successionary practices; we don’t drink, don’t smoke, don’t dance – and certainly – don’t go to movies – growing up, we heard a constant stream of stories from missionaries overseas[23], who told tales of people killed or brutally repressed for nothing more then changing their religion from Muslim to Christian[24]. I myself, in my own overseas missionary work, have worked with those who have put their lives in danger and even fled from those trying to kill them – such as the Marxist ‘Shining Path,’ in Peru[25]. And whether it was purposeful or inadvertent, this understanding of a capacity for an allowance of a sense of Religious Pluralism embodies the theological identity of our given denomination and many others. We are free to choose our own interpretation – because we are Christians – and even further then that – because of the Scripture and the liberty that comes from it and not from men alone, nor anyone’s understanding of it[26]. And so – whereas there is a seemingly an ever-expanding diversity of churches – as joked about in the beginning of this paper – it is a part of the underlying theological ethic: Pluralism is not just allowed – it is a part of the DNA of an authentically scriptural-based church. If you look at it under the microscope; this truth will be seen. The closer that you are to the scripture theologically, the closer you are to genuinely understanding that diversity is allowed and not just healthy, but welcomed. Churches who deviate on critical orthodox doctrines[27], such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses and others – will by the nature of this deviation, become themselves Hegemonic in their theology, either directly or eschatologically and isolatory in their relation to the rest of the world and the church. Much controversy remains and will no doubt continue on in much of the current geo-political conversations in regards to the role of both America in World affairs and Faith and it’s role not just in Politics but in the foundational essence of Political Thought itself – Philosophy. Certainly many seek to isolate Religious influence from both Political and Philosophical thought, with both constructive and sometimes malfeasant directives; but – regardless of anybodies assertion or attempts – the two remain inextricably intertwined with one another in a variety of contexts and dynamics; regardless of how far they are removed from each other in a given epistemological apprehension or attempted framework. The assertion that Pluralism is an inherent tenant of the Judeo-Christian Tradition has been contested by many so-called Post-Modern, self-described Post-Colonialist/Post-Imperialist, Post-Patriarchal thinkers; but regardless of which historical/epistemological reconfiguration we attempt; the conversation will, no doubt, be both controversial, introspective, and ultimately – hopefully – illuminating for both ideological sides, and on both sides of the issue of the role of Faith/Scripture in Politics/Philosophy.

Secondary Considerations, Part 3: Where then from whence a Foundation?  The Faith Therein.

If we accept the premise that faith must precede understanding – as has been argued in this paper – then how are we to understand faith itself? And if belief is a part of the rational process, then how – outside of Reason – can we even believe in faith or have faith to believe? Where does faith come from? In some form or another, this question has been wrestled with, practically, since the dawn of Christianity. Augustine and Pelagius argued about it – and then later, so did John Calvin and Jacob Arminius. John Calvin – the theological father of so-called modern, 5-point Calvinism – argued for Double Predestination; that essentially, God, on His own accord, pre-selects or “elects” certain individuals to experience Divine illumination and purpose, and ultimately heaven –  and then pre-selects all others to be “vessels fitted for wrath;” or in other words, condemned to Hell. Contra this – there is Arminianism; which holds that, ultimately, we make that choice. The number of books written on this debate, no doubt outnumber the number of letters in this present essay. But it is held by a few individuals, my self included, that this division is yet another dichotomy that is not an either/or choice; but that, rather – the truth is probably somewhere in between, or paradoxically – possibly even both.

All theology is divided into ‘cataphatic’ or ‘apophatic’ categories; that which you can know and assert – Positive Theology – or, conversely, that which is essentially unknowable and mysterious: Negative Theology. In Eastern Orthodoxy, mystery is embraced and celebrated within a theological context, but in it’s divergence from the East, The Western, Roman Catholic church – and later it’s Protestant step-children, generally favor the Positive or Cataphatic emphasis of things. It is arguable that this is a Cartesian influence – whereas we may accept mystery as a token theological reality; we are much more interested in the potentiality of rational assertions. And while any theologian can attest that this is a worthwhile endeavor – the potentially unchecked practice of it ultimately diminishes and potentially altogether removes the role of the Apophatic in the theological-epistemological theater of thought. Can something make sense to God and not man? Any Judeo-Christian theologian worth his salt will readily agree. However – many of these same theologians will express a reticence at actually allowing such a dynamic to express itself doctrinally or in the hermeneutical machinery that they are responsible to oversee.  In the context of ‘where does faith come from,’ and the question of even ‘if you have a choice to believe’ or if you were just chosen by God by Grace and no initiation or proclivity on your own part – it is certainly possible that the whole theological discussion is essentially too far gone into the Cataphatic to be of any use to anyone. The argument can be made that in denying the allowance of the Apophatic, either unintentionally or purposefully – we may just create bigger mysteries then we solve – but yet solve nothing, outside of our own minds, in our actual epistemological progression: we don’t  really solve any problems – we just add to the list the things are either outright preposterous or unknowable. There is no unified school of thought in the realm of the philosophical – no one idea unifies everybody all the time; just as there exists no such animal in the realm of the religious. Reason divides both Philosophers and Theologians into whatever respective schools thinks ‘this about that’ and ‘that about the other.’ The question for both Theologians and Philosopher alike is ‘does an advancement into ‘mystery’ advance the State of Prior Knowledge?’ In the words of the before mentioned Karl Barth in regards to Soterilogical Election/Foreknowledge and those who espouse Supralapsarian Double Predistination, who himself may have come as close as anybody to accepting the contractions of the scriptures he so much loved – “we are not autonomous, but we are responsible.”

Are we either – through a supralapsarian,[28] double-predestination – pre-selected to either be a Christian or a ‘Heathen;’ or are we just out here on our own, trying to figure it all out on our own? Is the capacity to apprehend Faith, provided for us – or is it discoverable? Wherein can one find a foundation to believe in faith? What is the place of Apophatic & Cataphatic Theology or even Philosophy? Is Philosophy epistemologically immune to such categorization? The general notion that faith can be found through either philosophical or scientific means is generally referred to as “Natural Theology.” When Descartes embarks on a process of argumentation – with the means of an attainment of faith as the goal – he is essentially going down this same path. Many sing the praises of Natural Theology – either directly or indirectly. Perhaps they dress it up as a form of philosophy; and never realize that it is a theological construct. This much I know to be true. No amount of education can ever necessarily induce faith in an individual. I have a professor who is fluent in Biblical languages and who commands a fantastic knowledge of Church history; which he teaches with all the passion and energy and excitement insomuch as one, that one would almost assuredly assume that he is a believer. And yet he is not. Faith is perhaps an enigma: the greatest vernacular inconsistency in the human language. Faith – in the context of Christianity – is a puzzle wrapped in a puzzle. Perhaps the clue to solving the first, necessarily lies in the latter. A dimension of Faith will always reflect back into the Apophatic, regardless of how much we try to emphasis the Cartesian Rationalist, Philosophically-Cataphatic impulses inherent to the human nature; to explore and figure out any mystery set before us.

The question has been asked; “what makes Faith believable?” Descartes would argue that his ego/rationality ultimately can serve as an adequate basis for faith, and he can Cataphatically assert a truth-to-faith dichotomy. The scripture speaks of the necessary inclusion of an Apophatic mystery-to-faith dichotomy as well, as Romans 10:17 states “so then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.” And so does Faith make Scripture believable or does Scripture make Faith believable – which came first the chicken or the egg? Faith, from a Cartesian perspective might be understood to mean the act of belief in something via an astute excogitative process that teleological culminates in an advanced ideological directive through established and proven epistemological norms. Faith from a scriptural standpoint – is child-like and inherently simple. Though it may be as complex as 14 volumes, it can never be fully redacted from the simplicity of Barth’s own quotation of the beloved nursery rhyme; simplistic – but still laden with deep theological portent. What Barth told the reporters – who had asked for something deep, was ironically the deepest thing he could tell them – which was the simplest thing he could tell them as well. Faith: it just is – and is just so; because I was told by Christ that much – from His Word, and nothing more or nothing less. For all it’s modern limitations, and seemingly endless interpretations, it is all we really need, and it can only be the only real foundation in our spiritual lives. Reason may be a tool, but it cannot be wisely used as an ultimate and excluded foundation.

This present writer has himself actively engaged in the sometimes seemingly ‘competitive sport’ of Apologetics, and I have set my own feet down in the dust of a number of foreign lands, and in all of these endeavors, my goal was the impartation of Faith to those who did not know Christ. And have I made a rational case for Christianity ala Renée Descartes? I most certainly have. And was this wrong? It was most certainly not. But more importantly, ultimately – not my Reason, nor any argument, nor my thoughts, nor their positions towards anything else were the prime directives in any of my efforts: they were not the foundations for my work. I went – because that is what it is written I am to do. I spoke, because it is written that I am to speak. And I proclaimed – what it is written I am to say: I preached Christ and Christ crucified as it is written, I am implored to speak of. This I will do – as others have done before. If there is a circular notion to my logic, it is that the only reasonable argument to be made is to follow the instructions, as they were written – not because I thought about them or was able to think of them, neither deeply nor succinctly. My Reason is encapsulated within the concept of a self-authentication dynamic present and accepted inside the content and posit of scripture itself. Ultimately – this is where my faith is posited and grounded. Not in my own self-awareness, but in the self-awareness of scripture. Thielicke and McClasson argue that everything is either a theologic or philosophic logical (or illogical, for that matter) outworking of this premise. It and it is upon this notion that either Dogmatic/Canonical theology or Cartesian Theology either both rise and fall; are judge and dismissed or affirmed. But perhaps – we have chased yet another aspect of Rationality. Perhaps, Descartes has – as Kierkegaard tried to do – deceived us into the truth. Or perhaps he is as Socrates himself; his line of questioning, eventually questioned his own self. My own conviction is that there is a danger in the unquestioning application of any pure ideology. Would Descartes argue that even an understanding of Scripture as the ground of all Theology and Belief/Faith is still necessarily grounded back into the capacity to apprehend such truth? Possibly. For many never have the rational capacity to be any measure of a theologian; but you don’t have to be a theologian to believe – just able to so even as a child. And so – in thus, even the scripture affirms a Cartesian capacity to Reason and understand – as long as it is understood that it can appear and be existent in and of itself, but perhaps be of another origin – none-the-less – there for all to see. Understood and believed – in child like faith, as a Child. But perhaps we are just guilty of winding up yet another toy on the theologian/philosopher’s playground; more epistemological Lincoln logs; cataphatically arranged or apophatically strewn in yet another way. It is impossible to tell. What I do know, is that I can have a Child-like Cartesian faith; but that is all it is. Everything else – it comes from the Word.

Concluding Considerations

The Philosopher George Santayana once said ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’[29] Modern theologians – Thielicke and McClasson would argue – spend too little time going back into the history of thought to consider the philosophical influences and attendant epistemological de facto assumptions that shape and form their own thought processes and resultant conclusions; especially the Cartesian underpinnings that essentially serve as the foundations of much of the epistemological gerrymandering that both theologians and philosophers alike so enjoy doing. From their theological toy box, modern seminary students can seemingly put together endless combinations of potentially usable ideological itinerations and convolutions. But are they wise? What is the foundation upon which they place their efficacy? And more so in urgent in need of questioning is the idea – are they really ‘moving the conversation forward’?

Descartes, in his attempt to build a ‘philosophy behind his theology’ jumped from the theological to the philosophical and then back again. Is this allowable? Certainly. Both theology and philosophy share a multiplicity of connecting points and goals. Their waters are as rivers that mix and then diverge, only to mix again. But does this mean that they are indivisible? Certainly not. Not everything that is philosophical and endure purely theological treatment, nor can all philosophy endure the rigors of theological prejudice. This paper is surely guilty of a high degree of theology – and, I would argue, this is allowable – as Descartes allows a high degree of philosophy to become a part of his theology. The waters mixed – and to re-find/re-evaluate Descartes’ original directive, we must mix them yet again. So how and where did the two mix? When and where, if they did, did they lose their respective identities and responsibilities – and if such losses were incurred, were they both necessary – and above all – genuinely constructive? Are the strong theological assertion of Thielicke and McClasson warranted – to countermand a possible abuse by Descartes of this own theology, at the hands of Philosophy – and if this is so, are the eyes of Philosophy itself best able to see it – or do we need to look with theological eyes to see what was lost in the goal to see more theologically to begin with? Was that not the initial aim of Descartes to begin with – to use philosophy to help his theological counterparts in their own ambitions? Was he successful? Did he fail? And if he did either – did he lose or maintain his aim – and is that same aim the directive force of our own ruminations/applications of his ideas? Perhaps it is in the return to original intent, that we can remain most true. Because if we lose Descartes original intent of finding the Scriptures themselves and the Faith they speak of to be provable – then we risk merely following some obtuse and winding path that leads who knows where.

Perhaps this is what happened. If so – can we find our way back?

Another quote, which is also attributed to Santayana, is his description of Fanaticism; “redoubling your effort after you’ve forgotten your aim.” Both Thielicke and McClasson would remind us that no matter how much you preach the dogmas of soteriological salvation or the imperatives of social justice, if you forget the essential and mutual Judeo-Christian foundation which both are based upon, and rather choose to base your faith on your own ability to understand, interpret and apply select aspects of either –then you do indeed risk merely de-evolving into a fractious fanaticism that soon itself forgets where it even came from.

Bibliography.

Helmut Theilicke. The Evangelical Faith. Volume One: Prolegomena, The Relation of Theology to Modern Thought Forms.
Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmands Publishing Company, 1974.

Karl Barth. Protestant Theology in the 19^th Century.
Valley Forge, Great Britain: Judson Publishing, 1976.

Carl F. H. Henry. The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism.
Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmands Publishing Company, 2003.

Paul C. McClasson. Invitation to Dogmatic Theology, A Canonical Approach. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press, 2006.

Stanley Hauerwas. A Better Hope, Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press, 2000.

Carl F. H. Henry. God, Revelation, and Authority, Volume 1, God who Speaks and Shows, Preliminary Considerations. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1999.

Walter Martin. Kingdom of the Cults. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Bethany House Publishers, 2003.

George Santayana. Life of Reason. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998.

Karl Barth. Church Dogmatics. New York, New York: Westminster Press, 1955.

J Gresham Machen. Christianity and Liberalism. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Bethany House Publishers, 1996.

–   At War With Warfield  –

by Matthew Lipscomb

Considerations of an Overstepping Rationality in B.B. Warfield’s Doctrine of Cessationism, in Relation to the Assertion of the Necessary & Balancing Aspects of the Irrational-Numinous, as Found in Rudolf Otto’s Idea of the Holy; with Contextual References to Various Other Religious Thinkers & Theorists.

Few issues present themselves to be as divisive, as the interpretation and manifestations of the ‘gifts of the spirit’ in the modern church reveal themselves to be. Even fewer people serve as such great dividing points, in this controversy-filled crux, as much as does the theology of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield (1851-1921). His book, Counterfeit Miracles, has for many years been considered the de facto standard defense of cessationist pneumatology – or – the theological stance that the manifestations of the Holy Spirit (as documented in the book of Acts) no longer occur in similar nature today.[1] But did he go too far? Did the theologian often regarded as the ‘last great lion of Princeton’[2] roar too greatly – and maybe even in the wrong direction? Lutheran theologian, Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), in his book, The Idea of the Holy, agued that a balance exists between rationality and the irrational – and – that in a very important sense, they serve to both critically and necessarily balance each other. Otto held to the position that unreasonable or potentially irrational spiritual events are normal to authentic understandings of spiritual realities, and that they can and still do occur[3]– whereas Warfield argued (on the premise of them being irrational)[4] that they no longer did. Did Warfield break this proposed balance and possible even conflate the two? In this paper the author will attempt to determine if Warfield’s cessationism is potentially a conflation and/or improper imposition upon Otto’s understanding of the Numinous: the tremendous, fascinating and fearful mystery of the otherworldly divine operations.

For many years, the ideas of the belief in and practice of the ‘gifts of the spirit’ were linked with the motifs of backward thought and impoverished living. Peter Adair’s 1967 documentary Holy Ghost People,[5] serves as an illustration of just such a proposed illumination of what some would consider the fringe of the continuationist[6] movement: the black and white images of the back-woods, semi-literate West Virginians of Scrabble Creek; handling snakes, ecstatically dancing, and evoking images of someone, somewhere having ‘gone off the rails,’ theologically speaking, ‘a fur piece back.’ Such potentially denigrating stereotypes existed everywhere – even in the big cities, where Pentecostal worship was present; albeit absent the snakes and strychnine. In years past, anyone, anywhere who practiced ‘speaking in tongues,’ or such related practices, were often directly told that they were either channeling demons or were just plain, out-right heretics.[7] However – contra the efforts of many main-line cessationist, warfieldian-influenced denominations – Pentecostalism and it’s modern itineration, the Charismatic movement, both did and have continued to grow and achieve greater middle to upper-class penetration,[8] and have as well made the contribution of many notable Pentecostal scholars.[9] But regardless of their increased popularity and growing academic gravitas – the Pentecostal/Charismatic movements maintain an emphasis on something bigger and beyond themselves – the Holy Spirit: what Otto would potentially consider a very real embodiment of his concept of the Numinous.[10]

In the opening chapter of his book The Idea of the Holy, Rudolf Otto makes the assertion that contrary to a common understanding that “orthodoxy is the mother of rationalism,” it cannot in fact fully do justice to the non-rational component of ‘God-as-He-is,’[11] or – to use the language which Warfield would have been comfortable with – the theologia archtypa.[12] Even though he acknowledges that the rationalist imperative is not an assertion that is without merit, Otto argues for the inclusion of what he refers to as the Numinous: the inexpressible or ineffable aspects of the Divine.[13] His assertion is essentially representational of a tidewater in the theological historicity of the conversation; one that flows back and forth – sometimes from one extreme to the other, and sometimes even suffers from the attempts of others to do away with it altogether. Examples of this attempted removal are varied – and usually related to the area of study for the religious polemicist in question. Examples include the economic reductionism of Karl Marx (1818-1883);[14] who tried to resolve the numinous-spiritual into mere economic forces allegedly only used to oppress the lower classes,[15] and the psychological reductionism of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939);[16] who stated that anybody who was religious was essentially psychologically sick.[17] Other attempts to explain away the existential authenticity of the supernaturality of Otto’s idea of the Numinous include the sociological reductionism of Émile Durkheim[18] (1858-1917) and the related anthropological of E.B. Tylor[19] (1832-1917) & James G. Fraiser[20] (1854-1941). All these interpretive religious/social theorists owe some part of their thinking to Ludwig Feurbach (1804-1872) – who is the father of the statement that “all theology is anthropology;”[21] which is a ways of arguing that anything spiritual always comes back to man in some way.

But it was another warfieldian cessationist, J. Gresham Machen, who argued that it was impossible to conflate the natural and the supernatural – and that the two had to be understood to properly be in relation to one another, but also separate in a true Ottoian sense. Machen argued that liberal Christianity was a failure for this express reason – because it had attempted to supplant the ‘irrational history’ – that was supposedly presented in the ontological posit of an implied-to-be supernatural Christ. Machen insisted that without the scriptural supernatural – however irrational it might appear to be to whomever in its presentation – there is no true scriptural history without it; and without a true history – there is no true Gospel.[22] But whether it is traditional liberal thinking or just brute force rationalism, these forces work in a very real sense to “routinize’ the “charisma” of theology and especially it’s component of charismatic-inclined pneumatological doctrine. 

Max Weber (1864-1920) discusses the concept of the routinization of the charisma of theology/spirituality – or how innovation, energy, danger, and unpredictability (ottoian numinosity) serve as a form of life, which, as time progresses, are rendered static, dead, safe and predictable by institutional structure and a formal ecclesiastical establishment responsible for doctrinal formulation and preservation, via what he called “formalistic juristic rationalism.”[23] Weber discusses how the “prophetic” speaks back against these sterilizing, normalizing tendencies.[24] Warfield himself attempted to speak prophetically against the forces of modernity/liberalism in relation to the established understanding of the the bible, spending a large portion of his time defending it’s “inerrancy” against the forces of historical criticism – which he strongly perceived as a great threat to the faith and integrity of the life of the church. Warfield argued for the necessity of an affirmation of plenary inspiration in regards the scriptures, and that it was, in the words of theologian Clark Pinnock, “an essential concomitant of the doctrine of inspiration.”[25]

Sometimes a prophetic voice speaks in terms of a simplicity for the purpose of establishing a means of restoring charisma  – as did Luther with his Theologia Crucis (a theology centered on the cross).[26] Such prophets can speak in a myriad of corrective ways – and not just from an academic standpoint.  Weber argued that prophetic correction/charismatic re-endowment can take place within both ethical (telling) and exemplary (showing) dimensions. Personal experience often carries an important capacity for charisma; such as experiential prayer, or the testimonies of individuals who have spoken fluently in languages that they have never learned.[27] These dynamics fall on the prophetic-exemplary side of charismatic renewal/emphasis.

Warfield may well have served as a prophetic-charismatic agent in terms of his focus on the issue of the inerrancy of scripture; which served well in a prophetic-ethical dimension – but he may well have functioned as an institutional-routinizing agent, in terms of his pneumatology[28] – by express virtue of his marginalization of the prophetic-exemplary dimensions intrinsic to the continuationist pneumatologic interpretation, which stood contra in relation to his own adopted cessationist position. He showed more prophetic function in his telling-ethical, rather then the exemplary-showing/feeling as was actively espoused by the charisma of the Pentecostal advocates of his day. In this sense – it might be argued that he was half-wrong, but also half-right.

If the last lion of Princeton was wrong when it came to a fully integrated prophetic pneumatology- then his penultimate mistake was placing too much emphasis on his own reason. Warfield may have committed the reductionist turn by aligning his theological method too closely with his own anthropology – or his own thinking. Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) argued that religion must be explained on it’s own terms, that life can be changed by the sacramental, and that symbols are essentially the keys. Often these symbols become what he referred to as “heirophanies”[29] – a term used to describe a “sacred appearing.” Eliade argued that historically society has by default always attempted to re-root its self back into the “Eternal” – or what it perceived, as it’s intrinsic spiritual foundations – a religious/societal dynamic he referred to as “the Myth of the Eternal Return.”[30] Eliade believed that this ‘movement’ and the frustrations thereof could be readily witnessed in the dynamics of a culture.  It is in alignment with this assertion, that Ottoian thought represents a rehabilitation of the mystical: a prophetic correction to the formalized, rationalization-centric and intended-to-be-decent, safe, and respectable – if not in anything else then the word secularized – notion of theology. If Warfield’s rationalism is a form of secularist-routinization, then it could be argued that the pentecostal experienced may actually be an archetypically-Hegelian synthesized Eliadian “Eternal Return,” functioning as an extant heirophany, and also arguably, a prophetic-charismatic break with the overly-secularized routinization tendency that modern theology/liberalism represented (and that Warfield, ironically, battled so much against); back to something eternal, wild, otherworldly-foundational and dangerous. As it was then –it is still today; more and more people seek to embrace a foundation that is beyond their own self-acknowledged finitude; echoing in this movement, the steps of the generations of seekers that came long before them.

A full discursive analysis of these questions – given the space allowed here – is genuinely impossible. Only a precursory contestation can be made – and even that, in a somewhat tangential manner, considering the scope of the issue and all it’s ramifications and implications. When all is said and done – it may prove impossible to adequately adjudicate the lines of reason, non-reason and the amorphous regions in between. As Paul Tillich notes in his book The Protestant Era, it is a central thesis to Protestantism itself that “no individual and no human group can claim a divine dignity…for its doctrine.”[31] Because of this, Tillich argues that good theology (orthodoxy) and it’s attendant good practice thereof (orthopraxy) is always intrinsically rooted in the ultimate responsibility of the individual, and not in any established ecclesiastical structure – appropriately echoing Weber in his “thesis” of an inwardly-manifest pietism, functioning from an expressly-individualistic emphasis, as being the driving force behind the early machineries of European commerce and capitalism.[32] One must “decide for himself whether a doctrine is true or not, whether a prophet is a true or a false prophet, whether a power is demonic or divine.” 

It is easily arguable that Warfield was as reductionistic in his pneumatological formulation as his ideological adversaries both before and after him were. It can also be shown that by nature of a potential marginalization of any Ottoian numinosity, he haphazardly routinized charisma in a weberian-sense with a “formalistic juristic rationalization”[33] run amok, and that he may have resultantly only theologically inhabited only one sphere of the prophetic task. The supreme irony may lie with the fact that such a theologian – with a sincere and uncompromising view of Christ, Scripture and the necessity for a critical, life-endowing vibrancy thereof and thereby as he possessed – may have in fact been flippantly dismissive of the proper soteriological dynamics behind a real-world Eliadian prophetic-hierophany and a pnematological movement mirroring the concept and dynamics of “The Eternal Return.”

It is possible the B.B. Warfield would agree to at least this much: that doctrines must constantly be thought of in terms of what we think they are and what is actually present in the actual mind and heart of God – because as a good Princetonian theologian – he would have recognized the difference between the theologia archtypa and theologica ectype; “the knowledge of God which he has of himself” and the knowledge of God “which he has made available via revelation to humanity.”[34] And so both he and we should ask the same question: ‘how good is our copy?” Have we managed to bridge the “vast epistemic gulf”[35] between God and man in some way that is at least in part sufficient for the task we have committed ourselves to? And this is, of all things, a question that necessarily must – in true ottoian fasion – be left open and unanswered in our minds – truly numinous – for generations of theologians and believers to come.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adair, Peter. “Holy Ghost People, 1967”. Internet Movie Database. 11/20/2009 <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0270992/&gt;.

Chrisope, Terry A. Towards a Sure Faith, J. Gresham Machen and the Dilemma of Biblical Criticism. Ross-shire, Great Britian: Christian Focus Publications, 2000.

Chung, Sung Wook. Alister E. McGrath & Evangelical Theology – A Dynamic Engagement. Glascow, Great Britain: Paternoster Press & Baker Acedemic, 2003.

Cross, Terry L., and Emerson B. Powery. The Spirit and the Mind – Essays in Informed Pentecostalism, To Honor Dr. N. Bowdle, Presented on his 65th Birthday. Lanham, ML: University Press of America, Inc., 2000.

Feurerbach, Ludwig. “Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, Preface to the Second Edition”. Marxists Internet Archive. 11/20/2009 <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec00.htm&gt;.

Grenz, Stanley J. Renewing the Center – Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000.

Johnson, Gary L. W., and Ronald N. Gleason. Reforming or Conforming – Post-Conservative Evangelicals and the Emerging Church. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008.

Lipscomb, Byron & Linda. Personal interview. 20 November 2009.

Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. New York,  NY: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Pals, Daniel L. Eight Theories of Religion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Pals, Daniel L. Introducing Religion, Readings from the Classic Theorists. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Poloma, Margaret. “Charisma and Institution: The Assemblies of God”. Christian Century Foundation. 11/20/2009 <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=815&gt;.

Riddlebarger, Kim. “Riddleblog – B. B. Warfield — The Lion of Princeton”. The Riddleblog, Devoted to Reformed Theology & Eschatology. 11/20/2009 <http://kimriddlebarger.squarespace.com/b-b-warfield-the-lion-of-pr/&gt;.

Tillich, Paul. The Protestant Era. Chicago, IL: Pheonix Books, The University of Chicago Press, 1973.

Warfield, Benjamin B. Counterfeit Miracles. New York,  NY: Charles Scibner’s Sons, 1918.

Hegelian Dialectical Synthesis in Feuerbachian Thought, With Reference to Christ

By Matthew Lipscomb, Interpretation of Religion, UTC, Prof. Mills, 8/26/2009

Ideas have consequences. This age-old adage is aptly demonstrated in the thought of Feuerbach, as it relates to a Hegelian synthesis with reference to the character and principles of Christ. As we will see, Feuerbach also believed many ideas have sources.

Feuerbach was a post-Christian Hegelian philosopher who rejected the external authenticity of the Christian faith and embraced a view that it was, instead, an external projection of Man’s own ideals and potentials. But rather then embracing a complete aversion to the ideas and dynamics of faith, he purports to see a synthesis to take place, whereby instead of either just an “acceptance/thesis” vs. “rejection/antithesis” dualism being setup – he proposed a “synthesis” (or unity) that looks different from what both the believer and the atheist would say about something, or as is discussed here: Christ.

If asked what this unity or synthesis looks like – in relation to Christ and his principles, for example – Feuerbach would say that the reason that Christianity contains the figure of Christ and his respective attributes is that both he and they are projections of man’s own needs – externalized (from an innate awareness of man’s potential/ideal state) into the religious sphere’s dichotomy (with it’s various attendant theological assertions). The reason that Christ is presented as a savior, is that man is at times genuinely in need of a redeeming leader and his coming upon the given historical scene – one who is capable of bringing significant paradigm shifts towards the betterment of all those involved – or – at least, those who will follow him.  In addition to the need for the arrival of “messiah” or “rescuer,” Feuerbach would also argue that we need leaders who portray to us the embodiment of the ideals that our culture either does or should hold to be ideal. If our culture does not reflect them – then Feuerbach might suggest that it may be in even greater need of a “messaiah” or “redeemer” to bring the prevailing, metanarrational social ethical standard and it’s respective points back up to the place that they should be held to ideally be. Hence – we need an external image that reflects these accepted-as-valuable and to-be-desired archetypical values (peace, sacrifice, constraint of power, unconditional love, justice and equality – to name just a few) back into the collective societal/cultural conscience – which, Feuerbach argued, was it’s original collective source.

Have there been historical ramifications to this proposed Hegelian synthesis of Christ with reference to Faith/Atheism? Both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (who were influential in the inception and initial propagation of Communism) cited Feuerbach as an influence. Indeed, the history of Communism, politically speaking, has generally revolved around charismatic, messiah figures that proclaimed the need for a restoration of justice and equality to often profoundly repressed & poor political and social demographics. Whether these same figures can be judged to have been more demonic then they were divine is the gist of many other philosophical and historical discussions. But as Feuerbach would point out – these same characteristics and historical presentations –may well just be further itinerations of the same Hegelian dialectical process – just reasserting itself into different dualisms to find new syntheses – as history continues to go marching on its own way – through both heaven and hell, destruction and salvation.